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Abstract
Large scale systems are forecasted to greatly impact our future lives thanks to their
wide ranging applications including cooperative robotics, mobility on demand, resource
and task allocation, supply chain management, and many more. While technological
developments have paved the way for the realization of such futuristic systems, we have
a limited grasp on how to coordinate the behavior of their individual components to
achieve the desired global objective.
With the objective of advancing our understanding, this thesis focus on the analysis
and coordination of large scale systems without the need of a centralized authority. At
a high level, we distinguish these systems depending on wether they are composed of
cooperative or non-cooperative subsystems. In regard to the first class, a key challenge
is the design of local decision rules for the individual components to guarantee that
the collective behavior is desirable with respect to a global objective. Non-cooperative
systems, on the other hand, require a more careful thinking in that the designer needs
to take into account the self-interested nature of the agents. In both cases, the need
for distributed protocols stems from the observation that centralized decision making is
prohibited due to the scale and privacy requirement associated with typical systems.
In the first part of this thesis, we focus on the coordination of a large number of non-
cooperative agents. More specifically, we consider strategic decision making problems
where each agent’s objective is a function of the aggregate behavior of the population.
Examples are ubiquitous and include social and traffic networks, demand-response mar-
kets, vaccination campaigns, to name just a few. We present two cohesive contributions.
First, we compare the performance of an equilibrium allocation with that of an opti-
mal allocation, that is an allocation where a common welfare function is maximized. We
propose conditions under which all Nash equilibrium allocations are efficient, i.e., are de-
sirable from a macroscopic standpoint. In the journey towards this goal, we prove a novel
result bounding the distance between the strategies at a Nash and at a Wardrop equi-
librium that might be of independent interest. Second, we show how to derive scalable
algorithms that guide agents towards an equilibrium allocation, i.e., a stable configura-
tion where no agent has any incentive to deviate. When the corresponding equilibria
are efficient, these algorithms attain the global objective and respect the agents’ selfish
nature.
In the second part of this thesis, we focus on the coordination of cooperative agents.
We consider large-scale resource allocation problems, where a number of agents need to be
ix
allocated to a set of resources, with the goal of jointly maximizing a given submodular or
supermodular set function. Applications include sensor allocation problems, distributed
caching, data summarization, and many more. Since this class of problems is computa-
tionally intractable, we aim at deriving tractable algorithms for attaining approximate
solutions, ideally with the best possible approximation ratio. We approach the problem
from a game-theoretic perspective and ask the following question: how should we design
agents’ utilities so that any equilibrium configuration recovers a large fraction of the opti-
mum welfare? In order to answer this question, we introduce a novel framework providing
a tight expression for the worst-case performance (price of anarchy) as a function of the
chosen utilities. Leveraging this result, we show how to design utility functions so as to
optimize the price of anarchy by means of a tractable linear program. The upshot of our
contribution is the design of algorithms that are distributed, efficient, and whose perfor-
mance is certified to be on par or better than that of existing (and centralized) schemes.
x
Sommario
I sistemi tecnologici su larga scala promettono di migliorare sensibilmente la qualita` della
nostra vita futura grazie alle loro numerose applicazioni, tra cui la robotica cooperativa,
la mobilita` su richiesta, l’allocazione di risorse, la gestione della supply chain. Nonos-
tante gli sviluppi tecnologici abbiano aperto la strada alla realizzazione di questi sistemi
futuristici, abbiamo una conoscenza limitata su come coordinare i singoli componenti
per ottenere l’obiettivo macroscopico desiderato.
Questa tesi si concentra sull’analisi e il coordinamento di sistemi su larga scala privi
di un’autorita` centralizzata, con l’obiettivo di migliorarne la comprensione ed il funzion-
amento. Ad alto livello, distinguiamo questi sistemi a seconda che essi siano cooperativi
o meno. Una sfida chiave in relazione ai sistemi cooperativi e` la progettazione di al-
goritmi di controllo per le singole componenti che garantiscano il raggiungimento di un
predeterminato obiettivo globale. I sistemi non cooperativi, d’altra parte, richiedono una
maggiore attenzione in quanto e` necessario tenere in considerazione la natura egoistica
degli agenti. In entrambi i casi, l’utilizzo di protocolli distribuiti e` reso necessario dalle
dimensioni di tali sistemi e dai requisiti di privacy che vi sono associati.
Nella prima parte di questa tesi, ci concentriamo sul coordinamento di sistemi non
cooperativi. Piu` specificamente, consideriamo problemi strategici in cui l’obiettivo di
ciascun agente e` influenzato del comportamento aggregato della popolazione. Esempi
di tali sistemi comprendono i social networks, le reti stradali, i mercati azionari. Nel
seguito presentiamo due risultati coesivi. In primo luogo, confrontiamo la performance
di un’allocazione di equilibrio con la performance di un’allocazione ottimale, cioe` di
un’allocazione in cui viene massimizzata una funzione obiettivo comune. Proponiamo poi
condizioni che garantiscono l’efficienza di tutte le allocazioni di equilibrio. Nel percorso
verso questo obiettivo, otteniamo un risultato che delimita la distanza tra gli equilibri
di Nash e Wardrop e che potrebbe essere di interesse indipendente. In secondo luogo,
progettiamo algoritmi scalabili che guidano gli agenti verso un’allocazione di equilibrio,
cioe` una configurazione stabile in cui nessun agente ha alcun incentivo a deviare. Quando
tali equilibri sono efficienti, questi algoritmi raggiungono l’obiettivo globale e rispettano
la natura individualistica degli agenti.
Nella seconda parte di questa tesi, ci concentriamo sul controllo di sistemi cooper-
ativi. In particolare, consideriamo problemi di allocazione delle risorse su larga scala,
dove un insieme di risorse deve essere assegnato ad un fissato numero di agenti, con
l’obiettivo di massimizzare una funzione obiettivo globale, submodulare o supermodu-
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lare. Le applicazioni includono problemi di allocazione dei sensori, caching distribuito,
data summarization e molto altro ancora. Poiche´ questa classe di problemi e` intratta-
bile dal punto di vista computazionale, ci prefiggiamo di ricavare soluzioni approssimate
con algoritmi efficienti, idealmente con il miglior rapporto di approssimazione possibile.
Formuliamo questo problema con il linguaggio della teoria dei giochi e ci poniamo la
seguente domanda: come progettare le funzioni obiettivo da assegnare agli agenti in
modo che ogni configurazione di equilibrio produca la massima frazione del valore ot-
timo? Per rispondere a questa domanda, introduciamo un nuovo metodo per calcolare in
maniera esatta la qualita` di un equilibrio in relazione alle funzioni obiettivo scelte (price
of anarchy). Sfruttando questo risultato, mostriamo come costruire tali funzioni obiet-
tivo in modo da massimizzare la performance dei corrispondenti equilibri grazie ad un
programma lineare ausiliario. Il risultato finale e` la progettazione di algoritmi distribuiti
ed efficienti, il cui rapporto di approssimazione e` alla pari o superiore a quello di molti
schemi (centralizzati) comunemente usati.
xii
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CHAPTER 1
Overview
Large scale systems have enormous potential for solving many of the current societal
challenges. Robotic networks can operate in post-disaster environments and reduce
the impact of nuclear, industrial or natural calamities [Kun+12; Kit+99]. Fleets of
autonomous cars are forecasted to revolutionize the future mobility and to reduce traffic
congestion as well as pollutant emissions [Spi+14]. Demand-response schemes have the
potential to allow for the integration of a large share of renewable resources [Mot+16].
On a smaller scale, swarms of “microbots” promise groundbreaking results in medicine
by means of local drug delivery [Ser+15] or microsurgery [ISA02].
While all the above-mentioned systems (and many more) can be thought of as a col-
lection of multiple subsystems or agents, we distinguish them in two categories depending
on wether the corresponding subsystems are or are not cooperative. An example of coop-
erative system is that of a drones swarm performing a rescue mission. On the other hand,
privately-owned self driving cars are non-cooperative, since each car’s objective is that of
reaching its destination as swiftly as possible, while respecting the traffic rules. Another
example of non-cooperative large scale system is the electricity reserve market, where gen-
erators sell their ability to increase or decrease their electricity production to the system
operator, whose ultimate objective is that of balancing production and consumption.
Figure 1.1
One of the main challenges in the operation of both
types of systems is the design of local decision rules for
the individual subsystems to guarantee that the col-
lective behavior is desirable with respect to a global
objective [LM13]. With this respect, non-cooperative
systems pose an additional layer of difficulty, in that
preexisting local objectives might not be aligned with
the system-level goal. As a concrete example consider
on-demand ridesharing platforms such as Uber, Lyft or
Didi, where agents are represented by human drivers
hovering around different city neighbors (Figure 1.1).
While drivers’ might position themselves in neighbors
1
that maximize their own profit, the system-operator might have a different goal, e.g.,
to guarantee a minimum coverage of the city. For this class of systems, it is not suffi-
cient to design local decision rules to be executed from each subsystem, but it is equally
important to incentivize their adoption.
The spatial distribution, privacy requirements, scale, and quantity of information
associated with typical systems do not allow for centralized communication and decision
making, but require instead the use of distributed protocols. In addition to the above
requirements, designing such protocols is non-trivial due to the presence of heterogenous
decision makers and informational constraints. To complete the overview, we note that
the quality of a control architecture is usually gauged by several metrics including the
satisfaction of the global objective, the robustness to external disturbances, as well as
the amount of information propagated through the communication network.
The goal of this thesis is to address the challenges previously discussed, with particular
attention to the design of local decision rules in relation to their corresponding system-
level performance. While in the first part of the thesis we focus on large scale non-
cooperative system, we exploit some of the insight obtained therein to address, in the
second part of the thesis, large scale cooperative system and propose novel efficient
distributed algorithms.
1.1 Outline and contributions
1.1.1 Part I: strategic agents
In the first part of the thesis we focus on large scale systems composed of strategic agents.
Specifically, we consider the framework of average aggregative games, where each agent
aims at minimizing a cost function that depends both on his decision and on the average
population strategy. Our objective is twofold. First, we wish to understand to what
extent selfish decision making reduces the system performance. We do this using the
notion of price of anarchy. Second, we aim at the design of scalable and decentralized
algorithms that provably converge to a Nash or a Wardrop equilibrium. We achieve this
leveraging the theory of variational inequalities.
Outline. Chapter 2 provides an informal introduction to the framework of aggregative
games and describes how such games can be used to model applications pertaining to
various fields. At the end of the chapter we review the existing literature and connect our
work with it. In Chapter 3 we review the mathematical tools needed throughout Part I
of this thesis. In Chapter 4 we formalize the notions of Nash and Wardrop equilibria
in the presence of coupling constraints, and use the language of variational inequali-
ties to reformulate these problems. We conclude the chapter studying the monotonicity
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properties of the variational inequality operator associated with the corresponding equi-
librium problems. In the first part of Chapter 5 we study the relation between Nash and
Wardrop equilibria with particular attention to the distance between the corresponding
strategies. In the second part of this chapter, we leverage these results to bound the
performance degradation incurred when moving from a centralized solution to strategic
decision making. In Chapter 6 we present a best-response algorithm and a gradient-
based algorithm that provably converge to a Nash or Wardrop equilibrium. We conclude
Part I with Chapter 7, where we demonstrate the results previously obtained to two
large scale applications.
Contributions. The main contributions of Part I of this thesis are contained in Chap-
ters 4, 5, 6 and 7, and are detailed in the following.
(a) In Chapter 4 we introduce the notion of Wardrop equilibrium as a condition on
the agents’ strategies, rather than a condition on the aggregate behaviour. This
allows to address a larger class of equilibrium problems, compared to the existing
literature. We then study the relation between Nash and Wardrop equilibrium
strategies and show that, in a game with M players, their euclidean distance is
upper bounded by O(1/√M) when one of the corresponding variational inequality
is strongly monotone (Theorem 1). This allows us to provide guarantees on the ef-
ficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the efficiency of the corresponding Wardrop
equilibria (Theorems 2, 3 and 4).
(b) In Chapter 6 we present a best-response and a gradient-based algorithm that allow
to compute a Nash or a Wardrop equilibrium in the presence of coupling constraints
(Theorems 5 and 6).
(c) In Chapter 7 we apply the theoretical results previously derived to i) coordinate
the charging profile of a population of electric vehicles, and ii) to predict the travel
time distribution for a road traffic network. The results we obtain both in terms
of equilibrium efficiency and algorithmic convergence are novel.
1.1.2 Part II: programmable machines
In the second part of the thesis we focus on the control of large scale systems composed
of multiple cooperative subsystems. We assume that each subsystem (agent) is endowed
with computation and communication capabilities, and we aim at achieving a global
objective through local coordination of the agents. More specifically, we consider a class
of combinatorial allocation problems, where each agent selects a subset of resources with
the goal of jointly maximizing a given welfare function, additive over the resources.
Since this class of problems is intractable, we seek distributed algorithms that run in
polynomial time and give provable approximation guarantees. Rather than directly
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specifying a decision making process, we adopt the game design approach, and assign to
each agent a local utility function. The fundamental question we seek to answer in this
part of the thesis is how to design local utility functions so that their selfish maximization
recovers a large fraction of the optimal welfare.
Outline. In Chapter 8 we introduce the problem considered, discuss potential applica-
tions as well as related works. In Chapter 9 we review the mathematical tools needed
for the development of our work. In Chapter 10 we formulate the utility design question
and tackle it in two steps. First, we provide performance certificates for a given set
of utility functions; second, we show how to design utilities that maximize the corre-
sponding worst-case performance. In Chapter 11 we specialize the results to a class of
submodular, supermodular and maximum coverage problems. Finally, in Chapter 12 we
present two applications: the vehicle-target assignment problem and a coverage problem
arising in distributed caching for mobile networks.
Contributions. The main contributions of Part II of this thesis are contained in Chap-
ters 10, 11 and 12 and are detailed in the following.
(a) In Chapter 10 we pose the utility design problem and adopt the notion of price
of anarchy as the worst-case performance metric. We show that traditional ap-
proaches used to quantify such performance metric are rather conservative and are
not suited for the design problem considered here (Theorem 7). Motivated by this
shortcoming, we propose a novel framework to compute (Theorems 8 and 9) and
optimize (Theorem 10) the price of anarchy as a function of the given utilities.
In particular, we show that the utility design problem can be reformulated as a
tractable linear program. The upshot of this contributions is the possibility to
apply the game design procedure to a broad class of problems. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first approach that allows to systematically compute and
optimize the price of anarchy.
(b) In Chapter 11 we specialize the previous results to the case of submodular, maxi-
mum coverage, and supermodular problems. Relative to the submodular case, we
obtain a novel and fully explicit expression for the price of anarchy (Theorem 11).
We further apply this result to determine the exact price of anarchy for the Shapley
value and marginal contribution design methodologies (Corollary 4). These results
are compared with previous (non tight and fragmented) results from the litera-
ture, and are placed in the larger context of submodular maximization subject to
matroid constraints. Relative to the class of problems considered, we show how
optimally-designed utilities provide an approximation ratio superior to the best
known ratio 1 − c/e of [SVW17].1 Relative to the case of multiagent maximum
1The result of [SVW17] improves on the (1 − e−c)/c of [CC84], where c is the (total) curvature of
the welfare function [CC84] and e the Euler’s number.
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coverage problems, we obtain a novel analytical expression for the price of anar-
chy (Theorem 12), and subsume previous results in [Gai09; RPM17]. Optimally
designed utilities achieve a 1 − 1/e approximation, the best possible [Fei98]. We
conclude the chapter providing a tight expression for the price of anarchy in the case
of supermodular welfare function (Theorem 13), and show that our result comple-
ments [JM18; PM17b]. Limitedly to this case, we observe that optimally-designed
utility functions provide a rather poor approximation ratio.
(c) In Chapter 12 we test the performance of the proposed algorithms on a task-
allocation problem, and on a coverage problem arising in distributed mobile net-
works. We provide thorough simulation results and show the theoretical and nu-
merical advantages of our approach.
1.2 Publications
This thesis contains a subset of the results derived during the author’s studies as PhD
student at ETH Zurich, all of which have already been published or submitted for pub-
lication. The corresponding articles on which this thesis is based are listed below.
1.2.1 Part I: strategic agents
The relations between Nash and Wardrop equilibria presented in Chapter 5, the algo-
rithms developed in Chapter 6 as well as the numerical simulations included in Chap-
ter 7 were developed in collaboration with B. Gentile, F. Parise, M. Kamgarpour and
J. Lygeros. The results on the equilibrium efficiency featured in Chapter 5 were derived
with the help of F. Parise and J. Lygeros.
[Pac+18] D. Paccagnan, B. Gentile, F. Parise, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros.
“Nash and Wardrop Equilibria in Aggregative Games with Coupling Con-
straints”. In: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (2018). Early access.
[PPL18] D. Paccagnan, F. Parise, and J. Lygeros. “On the Efficiency of Nash Equi-
libria in Aggregative Charging Games”. In: IEEE Control Systems Letters
2.4 (Oct. 2018), pp. 629–634.
[Pac+16] D. Paccagnan, B. Gentile, F. Parise, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros. “Dis-
tributed computation of generalized Nash equilibria in quadratic aggregative
games with affine coupling constraints”. In: 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on
Decision and Control. Dec. 2016, pp. 6123–6128.
[PKL16] D. Paccagnan, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros. “On aggregative and mean
field games with applications to electricity markets”. In: 2016 European Con-
trol Conference (ECC). 2016, pp. 196–201.
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1.2.2 Part II: programmable machines
The utility design approach presented in Chapter 8, the characterization and optimiza-
tion of the price of anarchy presented in Chapters 10 and 11 were developed in collabora-
tion with J.R. Marden, with the additional help of R. Chandan limitedly to Theorem 7.
The approach, the theoretical findings as well as the numerical studies (Chapter 12) are
published in the following papers.
[PCM18] D. Paccagnan, R. Chandan, and J. R. Marden. “Distributed resource allo-
cation through utility design – Part I: optimizing the performance certificates
via the price of anarchy”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv: 1807.01333 (2018). Sub-
mitted for journal publication.
[PM18b] D. Paccagnan and J. R. Marden. “Distributed resource allocation through
utility design – Part II: applications to submodular, supermodular and set
covering problems”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv: 1807.01343 (2018). Submitted
for journal publication.
1.2.3 Other publications
The following papers were published by the author during his doctoral studies, but are
not included in this dissertation:
Aggregative games and applications
[Gen+18] B. Gentile, F. Parise, D. Paccagnan, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros.
“A game theoretic approach to decentralized charging of plug-in electric
vehicles”. In: Challenges in Engineering and Management of Cyber-Physical
Systems of Systems. River Publishers, 2018.
[Bur+17] G. Burger, D. Paccagnan, B. Gentile, and J. Lygeros. “Guarantees of con-
vergence to a dynamic user equilibrium for a single arc network”. In: Elsevier,
2017, pp. 9674–9679.
[Gen+17] B. Gentile, D. Paccagnan, B. Ogunsola, and J. Lygeros. “A novel concept
of equilibrium over a network”. In: 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on
Decision and Control. Dec. 2017, pp. 3829–3834.
Utility Design
[PM18a] D. Paccagnan and J. Marden. “The Importance of System-Level Informa-
tion in Multiagent Systems Design: Cardinality and Covering Problems”. In:
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (2018). Early access.
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[PM17a] D. Paccagnan and J. R. Marden. “The risks and rewards of conditioning
noncooperative designs to additional information”. In: 2017 55th Annual
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. Oct. 2017,
pp. 958–965.
[RPM17] V. Ramaswamy, D. Paccagnan, and J. R. Marden. “The Impact of Local
Information on the Performance of Multiagent Systems”. In: arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.01409 (2017). Submitted for journal publication.
Others
[PKL15] D. Paccagnan, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros. “On the range of feasible
power trajectories for a population of thermostatically controlled loads”. In:
2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. Dec. 2015, pp. 5883–
5888.
[Jr+14] M. J. Jrgensen, D. Paccagnan, N. K. Poulsen, and M. B. Larsen. “IMU
calibration and validation in a factory, remote on land and at sea”. In: 2014
IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium. 2014, pp. 1384–
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Part I
Strategic agents: aggregative games
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CHAPTER 2
Introduction
In the first part of the thesis we consider large scale systems composed of mutual influ-
encing and strategic agents. We use the term “mutual influencing” to describe the fact
that agents’ actions have influence on one another, while the term “strategic” captures
the self-interested nature of the agents. As an example, consider that of traders in the
stock exchange market. In a simplistic setup, each trader’s goal is to maximize his profit
by carefully buying and selling various financial products. At the same time, the value
of one such product depends on what action the other traders take, making the final
outcome difficult to predict. While this is only one example, similar scenarios arise in a
number of real-life applications ranging from road traffic network to opinion dynamics
and even missile defense or racing cars. A setup in which multiple agents behave strate-
gically and influence each others’ objectives is typically referred to as a game, and the
corresponding field of study termed game theory.1
Game theory originated as a set of tools to model the interaction of selfish decision
makers and has been given formal recognition as an independent research area thanks
to the pioneering work of Von Neumann [Neu28] and to the celebrated existence result
of Nash [Nas50]. With the modern terminology of game theory, a game is fully specified
by four elements:
- players or agents: these are the decision makers, e.g., the traders in the stock
exchange market. In the following we identify each agent with an index i ∈
{1, . . . ,M}.
- strategy or action sets: these are the actions available to each agent, e.g.,
which financial products a trader can buy/sell, in what amount, and when. In the
following we denote with X i the set containing all the possible actions available to
agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
- utilities or cost functions: a measure that quantifies whether the goal of each
agent has been satisfied and to what extent. This is typically captured through
1The terminology derives from the fact that chess, poker, go, and many other board games are
prototypical examples of strategic decision making.
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a function mapping an element of the joint action space X := X 1 × · · · × XM
to a real number. In the following we concentrate on cost minimization games
and thus introduce the function J i : X → R representing the cost incurred by
player i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, e.g., the negative profit incurred by each trader in the stock
market.2
- equilibrium concept: while player i aims at minimizing his cost function J i, this
function depends on both xi ∈ X i and the choices of all the other agents, typically
referred to as x−i. Thus, we need to define what is a descriptive outcome of the
game. This concept is captured by the notion of equilibrium, the most celebrated
of which is known as Nash equilibrium. Informally, a joint strategy xN ∈ X is a
(pure) Nash equilibrium, if no agent can lower his cost by unilaterally changing his
action.
Building on these foundation, we wish to introduce an additional dimension to the prob-
lem and to address games with a large number of players. This is motivated by the
observation that a relevant number of applications are indeed large scale, e.g., stock
exchange markets, road traffic networks, online advertising, and many more. The first
difficulty that one is faced with, when thinking about these large system, is that of com-
plexity or more formally tractability. In order to alleviate this issue, in the remainder of
Part I of this thesis, we will consider aggregative games. Aggregative games are games
where the cost function of each agent does not directly depend on the choice of all the
other players, but instead is a function of the aggregate players’ behaviour. As a purely
conceptual example consider the following.
Example 1 (Guess 2/3 of the average). During the first lecture of the course in al-
gorithmic game theory each student is asked to pick an integer number in the interval
{0, . . . , 100}. The student(s) that selects the number closest to 2/3 of the average wins.
What number should you pick?
This puzzle can be modeled as a game where the players are the students, and the
action set of each player is {0, . . . , 100}. Further, each player’s cost function is captured
by the distance from his selection to the 2/3 of the average. According to the previous
definition, this game is aggregative in that the cost function of every player does not
depend on which number each player selected, but only on an aggregate measure, i.e.,
the average in this case.3
2Observe that any cost minimization game can be transformed in a utility maximization game upon
reversing the sign of the cost functions.
3The answer to this puzzle is more subtle than what it might appear at first, and is more of an
exercise in behavioral psychology than a question related to game theory. Indeed, it immediate to
observe that the only pure Nash equilibrium of the game consists in all players selecting the number 0.
Nevertheless, the fundamental question we need to answer is different: is the notion of Nash equilibrium
an appropriate equilibrium concept for the given setup? Real world experiments show that this is not
the case, as the average of the players’ actions is usually much higher than 0.
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Besides Example 1, the aggregative structure arises in various real world applications:
in a stock exchange market, the price of a product depends on the total demand and
supply, but not on the specific choice of each trader. Similarly, in a road traffic network,
the travel time on each link depends (ideally) only on the total number of vehicles on
that link.
2.1 Equilibrium efficiency and algorithms
The notion of Nash equilibrium describes a strong stability condition, requiring no agent
to be capable of improving by means of unilateral deviations.4 On the other hand,
the quality of an allocation is often measured at the system level with a single scalar
cost function JS : X → R.5 As an example, consider that of a road traffic network,
where agents move from origin to destination with the goal of minimizing their own
travel time. In this scenario, each agent’s cost function captures the time spent on the
the road. Nevertheless, a system-level measure describing how well the infrastructure
is used is the sum of all users’ travel time. Thus, of great interest from a system’s
perspective is to further understand to what extent equilibrium strategies are efficient.
Formally, given a game and a social cost function JS, the efficiency of a Nash equilibrium
xN is measured by the ratio between JS(xN) and the minimum possible social cost, i.e.,
minx∈X JS(s). The worst-case (best-case) efficiency over all possible equilibria is known
as price of anarchy (price of stability). While non uniqueness of the equilibrium set
means that these quantities can be quite different, the notion of price of anarchy has
received greater attention. Indeed, knowledge of the price of anarchy can be used to
bound the efficiency of any possible Nash equilibrium. Additionally, the system regulator
can exploit knowledge of the price of anarchy to influence or design better-performing
systems. For example, in relation to the road traffic network mentioned previously,
the system operator could impose tolls on specific streets or dynamically modify the
speed limit so as to improve the efficiency of the overall system. Following this research
direction, the first objective of Part I of this thesis is to study the price of anarchy
relative to a class of aggregative games.
Once the equilibrium efficiency problem has been settled (and measures have been
taken in case of non-satisfactory performance), of fundamental importance is the prob-
lem of coordinating the agents towards an equilibrium of the underlying game. With
this respect, we are particularly interested in the use of decentralized algorithms. The
advantage in using this class of algorithms includes privacy-preserving features and com-
putational tractability. In this spirit, the second objective we pursue in Part I of this
4In order to make sense of the following discussion, we assume existence of a Nash equilibrium. We
will formally tackle the existence question in Chapter 4.
5In some cases the function JS is simply the sum of each agents’ cost function. This need not be the
general case.
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thesis is the development of decentralized algorithms for a class of aggregative games.
To summarize, the goal of Part I of this thesis is twofold.
- First, we wish to provide guarantees on the efficiency of Nash and Wardrop equi-
libria as formally defined in Chapter 4.
- Second, we want to devise decentralized algorithms to coordinate the agents to-
ward one such equilibrium.
2.2 Related works
In this section, we limit ourselves to connect our work and the aggregative game frame-
work with other research threads and models. In particular, we do not provide a compari-
son between the contributions presented in Part I of this thesis and the existing literature.
On the contrary, we postpone this task after the presentation of the results in each of
the Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This allows us to provide a sharper literature comparison.
Aggregative games
While well-known models studied in game theory belong to the class of aggregative games
(e.g., the classical Cournot model of competition [Cou38], or the traffic user equilibrium
of Wardrop [War52]), a systematic study of this class was initiated only at the turn of the
last century, with significant effort coming from the economic literature [Cor94; DHZ06].
Early studies have been devoted to proving existence of the equilibria, and to the analysis
of parametric equilibrium problems. A particular class of which is that of comparative
statics, where the goal is to predict how the modification of a parameter in the game
would alter the set of equilibria [AJ13]. Additional results include convergence analysis
for best-response like algorithms, but their scope is generally limited to scalar valued
aggregate functions [Jen10; CH12]. Within the engineering and control community there
has been a recent surge of interest in the class of aggregative games, in particular because
of their potential applications to road traffic dispatch, wireless network routing, and
demand-response schemes [Pac+18; Scu+12; MCH13]. Under technical assumptions,
gradient-based algorithms have been proposed to coordinate the agents towards a Nash
equilibrium, for example in [KNS16; Che+14].
Mean field games
Mean field games are a class of continuous-time dynamic games, where the evolution of
each agent’s trajectory is governed by a stochastic controlled differential equation. In the
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simplest setup, agents are coupled purely through the cost function, which is assumed to
depend only on the average state of the agents [HCM07]. The analysis is carried out in the
limiting regime of large populations, since the problem “simplifies” to a system compris-
ing a Hamilton-Jacobi equation (backward in time, capturing the optimality condition)
and a Fokker-Planck equation (forward in time, capturing the distribution of the agents
in the state space) [LL07]. While there are some elements of contact between mean field
and aggregative games (e.g., the dependence of each agent’s cost on the average), some
fundamental differences prevent from deeming one class of problems a subset of the other.
In particular, the presence of input constraints in aggregative games does not allow for
a reformulation in terms of mean field games. The converse is also true, for example due
to the fundamental role played by stochasticity in the realm of mean field games.
Population games
A population game consists of a game played by a splittable unit mass of players. To
facilitate the comprehension, one can think of this model as a game with infinitely many
identical agents. By choosing an action from a finite and common set, each agent receives
a payoff that depends on the chosen action and on the total mass of agents selecting the
same strategy [SA10]. We note that this class of games differs from that of aggregative
games for at least two reasons. First, aggregative games are a modeling language ca-
pable of describing games with any number of agents, in contrast to population games.
Additionally, the result available for aggregative games are not confined to the limiting
case of infinite number of players, but the analysis is possible without restoration to the
limit. Second, in aggregative games the strategy sets are typically thought of as contin-
uous sets, while this is not the case for population games. Classical results in population
games include, amongst others, convergence analysis of evolutionary dynamics including
the replicator dynamics and extension thereof [Bom83; CT14].
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CHAPTER 3
Mathematical preliminaries
In this chapter we introduce the mathematical tools required for the development of the
first part of this thesis. We begin discussing and connecting useful properties of finite
dimensional operators. We then turn our attention to variational inequalities, discuss
existence and uniqueness of the solution and present two classical algorithms. While all
the material is already available in the literature, we redirect the reader to [FP07] for a
comprehensive treatment.
3.1 Operator properties
In this section we introduce some useful properties of finite dimensional operators. Our
interest stems from the key role they play in the study of variational inequalities.
Definition 1 (Lipschitz, nonexpansive, contractive). The operator F : X ⊆ Rn → Rn
is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant L > 0 if
||F (x)− F (y)|| ≤ L||x− y|| ∀x, y ∈ X . (3.1)
The operator F is non-expansive if (3.1) holds with L = 1. The operator F is contractive
if (3.1) holds with L < 1.
Definition 2 (Monotone and strongly monotone [FP07]). The operator F : X ⊆ Rn →
Rn is strongly monotone with monotonicity constant α > 0 if
(F (x)− F (y))>(x− y) ≥ α‖x− y‖2 ∀x, y ∈ X . (3.2)
The operator F is monotone if (3.2) holds for α = 0. 
An example of monotone operator is that of the gradient of a convex function, as
detailed in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 (Convex functions have monotone gradients [BC+11, Prop. 17.10]). Let
X ⊆ Rn be convex, and consider f : X → R a continuously differentiable and (strongly)
convex function. The operator F : X → Rn defined by F (x) = ∇xf(x) is (strongly)
monotone.
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Definition 3 (Co-coercive). The operator F : X ⊆ Rn → Rn is co-coercive with constant
η > 0 if
(F (x)− F (y))>(x− y) ≥ η||F (x)− F (y)||2 ∀x, y ∈ X .
The notion of co-coercivity sits in between that of strong monotonicity and mono-
tonicity. In particular, for a given Lipschitz continuous operator it is possible to show that
strong monotonicity =⇒ co-coercivity =⇒ monotonicity. (3.3)
These results follow directly from the corresponding definitions and can be found in
[FP07, p. 164]. The following figure is typically employed to give a visual interpretation
of the properties just defined.
(1, 0)(0, 0)(−1, 0) (α, 0) (1/η, 0)
NE
η−COC
α−SMON
Figure 3.1: Two dimensional representation of nonexpansive operator (NE), co-coercive
operator with constant η (η−COC), and strongly monotone operator with constant α
(α−SMON). For each of these properties, the corresponding colored region represents
the locus of points where F (1, 0) must lie, under the assumption that 02 is a fixed point
of F , i.e., that F (02) = 02. The regions can be easily derived from the corresponding
definitions.
3.2 Variational inequalities
Variational inequalities are fundamental mathematical tools that lend their power from
their chameleonic nature. Indeed, surprisingly different problems can be formulated and
studied using the language of variational inequality. Examples include systems of equa-
tions, optimization problems, Nash equilibrium problems, contact problem in mechanics,
options pricing. While the term “variational inequality” was coined by Stampacchia in
relation to partial differential equation [HS66], in the following we focus on the treatment
of finite dimensional variational inequalities, as defined next.
18
Definition 4 (Variational inequality). Consider a set X ⊆ Rn and an operator F : X →
Rn. A point x¯ ∈ X is a solution of the variational inequality VI(X , F ) if
F (x¯)>(x− x¯) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X . (3.4)
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness [FP07, Cor. 2.2.5, Thm. 2.3.3]). Consider
the variational inequality VI(X , F ), where X is compact convex and F continuous.
(a) The solution set of VI(X , F ) is nonempty and compact.
(b) If the operator F is strongly monotone, the solution of VI(X , F ) is unique.
Connection to convex optimization
The variational inequality problem is tightly connected with that of mathematical pro-
gramming. In a mathematical program we are given a set X ⊆ Rn and a real valued
function f : Rn → R. Our goal is to select an element of X that minimizes f over such
set. The next proposition makes this connection clear.
Proposition 3 (Minimum principle [BT89, Prop 3.1]). Given X ⊆ Rn closed convex and
f : X → R continuously differentiable, consider the problem of minimizing f over X .1
(a) If x¯ ∈ X is a local minimizer of f , then x¯ solves VI(X ,∇xf)
(b) If f is convex on X , then any solution to VI(X ,∇xf) is a global minimizer of f .
In a nutshell, a convex optimization problem is equivalent to a variational inequality
where the operator F represents the gradient of the original function and the set captures
the constraint set X . It is important to observe that the converse does not hold. Indeed,
there are variational inequalities that do not represent the first order condition for any
optimization problem. To convince ourselves of this, it suffices to observe that not all
operators F : Rn → Rn can be written as the gradient of some underlying function.
We also note that the gradient of a strongly convex function is strongly monotone (see
Proposition 1), so that existence and uniqueness of the solution is already guaranteed
by the corresponding result on variational inequalities presented in Proposition 2. A
geometric interpretation of condition (3.4) and the corresponding interpretation in terms
of mathematical program is illustrated in the following figure.
1In the following, we say that f is continuously differentiable in a closed set X if there exists an open
set Y ⊃ X where f is continuously differentiable.
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XF (x¯)
F (y¯)
x¯
y¯
X
∇xf(x¯)
∇xf(y¯)
x¯
y¯
Figure 3.2: On the left: illustration of the condition (3.4) for a general variational
inequality. The point x¯ is a solution of VI(X , F ) since the scalar product of F (x¯) with any
other vector attached to x¯ and pointing inside the set X is non-negative. With a similar
reasoning, it is immediate to note that the point y¯ is not a solution of VI(X , F ). On the
right: the special case of variational inequality VI(X ,∇xf) corresponding to the convex
optimization program minx∈X f(x). Similarly to the case on the left, x¯ is a solution of
VI(X ,∇xf) and thus a global minimizer of f (see Proposition 3), while y¯ is not.
Projection based algorithms
In the following we introduce two classical algorithms for the solution of variational in-
equalities with a strongly monotone (Algorithm 1) or monotone (Algorithm 2) operator.
Before doing so, we recall the definition of metric projection of a point onto a convex set.
Definition 5 (Metric projection). Given X ⊆ Rn, we define the metric projection of x
onto X as the map ΠX : Rn → Rn with
ΠX (x) = arg min
y∈X
||y − x||. (3.5)
Informally, the projection of x onto the convex set X is the closest point in X to
x. From the computational point of view, computing the projection of a point onto a
convex set amounts to solving the program in (3.5). We observe that the program (3.5)
reduces to a quadratic program if X is a polytope. Since quadratic programs can be
solved efficiently, (3.5) can be used as subroutine in the following algorithms.
Algorithm 1 (Projection algorithm)
1: Initialise k = 0, τ > 0, x(0) ∈ Rn
2: while not converged do
3: x(k+1) = ΠX (x(k) − τF (x(k)))
4: k ← k + 1
5: end while
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Proposition 4 ([FP07, Thm. 12.1.8]). Let X ⊆ Rn be compact convex and F : Rn → Rn
be co-coercive with constant η. Then Algorithm 1 converges to a solution of VI(X , F )
for any choice of τ < 2η and x(0).
Since any strongly monotone and Lipschitz operator is also co-coercive as seen in
(3.3), the previous proposition applies in particular to the special case of strongly mono-
tone operators. Observe that strongly convex optimization problems are equivalent to
strongly monotone variational inequalities with the corresponding gradient as operator
as discussed in Proposition 3. Thus, the previous proposition gives an alternative proof
for the convergence of the well-known gradient projection algorithm for strongly convex
programs.
If the operator F is not strongly monotone, Algorithm 1 might not converge in
general (it does if we restrict ourselves to variational inequalities representing convex
optimization problems). A counterexample is provided in [FP07, Ex. 12.1.3]. It is
possible to recover convergence of the algorithm at the price of one extra projection per
each iteration, as detailed next.
Proposition 5 ([FP07, Thm. 12.1.11]). Let X ⊆ Rn be compact convex and F : Rn →
Rn be monotone and Lipschitz with constant L. Then Algorithm 2 converges to a solution
of VI(X , F ) for any choice of τ < 1/L and x(0).
Algorithm 2 (Extragradient algorithm)
1: Initialize k = 0, τ > 0, x(0) ∈ Rn
2: while not converged do
3: y(k+1) = ΠX (x(k) − τF (x(k)))
4: x(k+1) = ΠX (x(k) − τF (y(k+1)))
5: k ← k + 1
6: end while
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CHAPTER 4
Nash and Wardrop equilibria
in aggregative games
In the first section of this chapter we introduce the class of average aggregative games as
well as the notions of Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. In Section 4.2 we show how these
can be reformulated as variational inequalities. We conclude the chapter discussing the
monotonicity properties of the operators associated to the Nash and Wardrop problems in
Section 4.3. All the proofs are reported in the Appendix (Section 4.4). The formulation
presented in this chapter has been published in [Pac+18].
4.1 Equilibria with coupling constraints
We consider a population of M agents, where each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} can choose
a strategy xi in his individual constraint set X i ⊂ Rn. In addition to the constraint
xi ∈ X i, each agent’s strategy has to satisfy a coupling constraint, which involves the
decision variables of other agents. Upon stacking together the strategies of all players as
in x := [x1; . . . ;xM ] ∈ RMn, the coupling constraint takes the form
x ∈ C := {x ∈ RMn | g(x) ≤ 0m} ⊂ RMn, g : RMn → Rm. (4.1)
We assume that the cost function of agent i depends on his own strategy xi and on
the strategies of the other agents via the average population strategy σ(x) := 1
M
∑M
j=1 x
j,
as typical of aggregative games [Jen10]. The cost function of agent i is identified with
J i : Rn × Rn → R and takes the form
J i(xi, σ(x)). (4.2)
The cost and constraints introduced above give rise to the game G identified with
G :=

agents {1, . . . ,M}
cost of agent i J i(xi, σ(x))
individual constraint X i
coupling constraint C
, (4.3)
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which is the focus of Part I of this thesis. We denote for convenience X := X 1× . . .×XM
and define
Qi(x−i) := {xi ∈ X i | g(x) ≤ 0m}, Q := X ∩ C. (4.4)
Note that Qi(x−i) represents the feasible set of player i, given that the other players have
selected the strategy x−i, while Q represents the feasible set for the stacked strategy
profile x. We consider two notions of equilibrium for the game G in (4.3). The first
is a generalization of the celebrated Nash equilibrium concept [Nas50] to games with
coupling constraints [AD54; Ros65].
Definition 6 (Nash Equilibrium). A set of strategies xN = [x
1
N; . . . ;x
M
N ] ∈ RMn is
an ε-Nash equilibrium of the game G, if xN ∈ Q and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and all
xi ∈ Qi(x−iN )
J i(xiN, σ(xN)) ≤ J i
(
xi, 1
M
xi + 1
M
∑
j 6=i x
j
N
)
+ ε . (4.5)
If (4.5) holds with ε = 0 then xN is a Nash equilibrium. 
Intuitively, a feasible set of strategies {xiN}Mi=1 is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can lower
his cost by unilaterally deviating from his strategy, assuming that the strategies of the
other agents are fixed. If no coupling constraint is present, i.e., if C = RMn, the previous
definition reduces to the well known notion of Nash equilibrium introduced in [Nas50].
In order to differentiate the two definitions, a Nash equilibrium for a game with coupling
constraints is usually referred to in the literature as generalized Nash equilibrium [FK07].
Nevertheless, in Part I of this thesis we refer to one such equilibrium simply as a Nash
equilibrium.
Note that on the right-hand side of (4.5) the decision variable xi appears in both
arguments of J i(·, ·). However, as the number of agents grows the contribution of agent
i to σ(x) decreases. This motivates the definition of Wardrop equilibrium.
Definition 7 (Wardrop Equilibrium). A set of strategies xW = [x
1
W; . . . ;x
M
W] ∈ RMn
is a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G if xW ∈ Q and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and all
xi ∈ Qi(x−iW)
J i(xiW, σ(xW)) ≤ J i(xi, σ(xW)).
Intuitively, a feasible set of strategies {xiW}Mi=1 is a Wardrop equilibrium if no agent can
lower his cost by unilaterally deviating from his strategy, assuming that the average
strategy is fixed (i.e., he does not influence the average σ(xW)). Similarly to the ter-
minology introduced to indicate a Nash equilibrium, in the following we will refer to a
generalized Wardrop Equilibrium simply as a Wardrop equilibrium. The term “Wardrop
equilibrium” originates from the fact that Definition 7 can be used to model, amongst
others, the equilibrium concept introduced in [War52] in relation to the study of road
traffic networks and often referred to as traffic user equilibrium or Wardrop equilibrium.
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Remark 1 (On the definition of Wardrop equilibrium). Even though the notion of
Wardrop equilibrium is thought of as a classical concept, the existing literature defines
a Wardrop equilibrium only in terms of the aggregate behaviour σ(x) [War52; ABS02;
AW04; MW95; DN87], while Definition 7 is presented in terms of the agents’ strategies
{xi}Mi=1. It is important to observe that Definition 7 can be reformulated as a condition
on the aggregate σ(x) only in specific cases (e.g., for applications in transportation net-
works [War52] or competitive markets [DN87]), while there are games for which one such
aggregate reformulation is just not possible. Thus, Definition 7 is not a mere revisita-
tion of the classical notion of Wardrop equilibrium, but instead can be used to address a
larger class of equilibrium problems. Additionally, all the aforementioned works define a
Wardrop equilibrium in relation to a specific application, and thus restrict themselves to
specific constraint sets or cost functions. On the other hand Definition 7 does not pose
any such limitation.
To the best of our knowledge, the first formulation of a Wardrop equilibrium in terms
of agents’ strategies appears in [MCH13; Gra+16], where however it is not recognized as
an equilibrium concept on its own, but rather characterized as an ε-Nash equilibrium for
an appropriate value of ε.
4.2 Variational reformulations
In this section we show how Nash and Wardrop equilibria introduced in Definitions 6
and 7 can be obtained by solving a corresponding variational inequality. The connection
we will draw between these equilibrium notions and the theory of variational inequalities
is fundamental for the development of Part I of this thesis. As a matter of fact, most of
the results we will derive in relation to the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria are
based on the analysis of their corresponding variational inequalities.
Recall from Definition 4 that a variational inequality is fully specified by its constraint
set X and operator F (see Chapter 3 for a brief introduction to the theory of variational
inequalities). Towards this goal, we introduce the operators FN, FW : X → RMn, where
FN(x) := [∇xiJ i(xi, σ(x))]Mi=1 , (4.6a)
FW(x) := [∇xiJ i(xi, z)|z=σ(x)]Mi=1 . (4.6b)
The operator FN is obtained by stacking together the gradients of each agent’s cost with
respect to his decision variable. FW is obtained similarly, but considering σ(x) as fixed
when differentiating. The following proposition provides a sufficient characterization of
the Nash and Wardrop equilibria introduced in Definitions 6 and 7 as solutions of two
variational inequalities. Both variational inequalities feature the same constraint set Q,
defined in (4.4), but different operators FN and FW, defined in (4.6a) and (4.6b).
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Assumption 1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the constraint set X i is closed and convex. The
set Q in (4.4) is non-empty. The cost functions J i(xi, σ(x)) are convex in xi for any fixed
xj ∈ X j, j 6= i. The cost functions J i(xi, z) are convex in xi for any z ∈ 1
M
∑M
j=1X j.
The cost functions J i(z1, z2) are continuously differentiable in [z1; z2] for any z1 ∈ X i
and z2 ∈ 1M
∑M
j=1X j. The function g in (4.1) is convex.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, the following hold.
(a) Any solution x¯N of VI(Q, FN) is a Nash equilibrium of the game G in (4.3).
(b) Any solution x¯W of VI(Q, FW) is a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G in (4.3).
Proposition 6 states that any solution of the variational inequality VI(Q, FN) is a
Nash equilibrium and, similarly, any solution of VI(Q, FW) is a Wardrop equilibrium.
The converse does not hold in general, in that there might be strategy profiles that are
Nash equilibria but do not satisfy the corresponding variational inequality. This is due
to the presence of the coupling constraint C. Indeed, if C = RMn, then Q = X and
one can show that xN solves the VI(X , FN) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of
G [FK07, Cor. 1]. A similar result holds in the case of Wardrop equilibrium. The
equilibria that can be obtained as solution of the corresponding variational inequality
are called variational equilibria [FK07, Def. 3] and are here denoted with x¯N, x¯W instead
of xN, xW (indicating any equilibrium satisfying Definition 6 or Definition 7). We next
provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of variational equilibria by
exploiting two well-known results in the theory of variational inequalities.
Lemma 1. [FP07, Cor. 2.2.5, Thm. 2.3.3] Let Assumption 1 hold.
(a) If Q is bounded, then there exist a variational Nash equilibrium and a variational
Wardrop equilibrium.1
(b) If FN is strongly monotone on Q, then the variational Nash equilibrium is unique. If
FW is strongly monotone on Q then the variational Wardrop equilibrium is unique.
In light of Proposition 6, the proof of the first statement in Lemma 1 amounts to show-
ing that Assumption 1 ensures the existence of a solution to VI(Q, FN) and VI(Q, FW).
This is guaranteed if the constraint set Q is compact and convex, and the operator is
continuous [FP07, Cor. 2.2.5]. Such conditions follow immediately form Assumption 1.
Similarly, the proof of the second statement relies on the fact that the solution of a
variational inequality is unique if the constraint set Q is compact and convex, and the
operator is continuous and strongly monotone [FP07, Thm. 2.3.3]. The proofs are not
reported here, but can be found in the above-mentioned references.
1The convexity of the cost functions required by Assumption 1 is not needed for the first statement
of Lemma 1, continuity is enough.
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Since any variational Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, the first claim in
Lemma 1 guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium. A similar conclusion hold
for the existence of a Wardrop equilibrium.
A hierarchy of equilibria: variational and normalized equilibria
The notion of games with coupling constraints has been introduced in the seminal works
[AD54; Ros65]. In [Ros65] the author defines the concept of normalized equilibria to
describe the fact that one should expect a manifold of equilibria when the agents are
subject to a coupling constraint, even under strong monotonicity conditions. Formally,
the strategy profile xN is a normalized Nash equilibrium if there exists a vector of weights
r ∈ RM>0, such that xN solves the VI(Q, F rN) where F rN(x) := [ri∇xiJ i(xi, σ(x))]Mi=1. It
is proven that any normalized Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of
Definition 6. Additionally, [Ros65] shows that different choices of r correspond to a
different division of the burden of satisfying the coupling constraints C among the agents.
In the context of aggregative games, however, each agent contributes equally to the
average. Therefore it is typically assumed that the burden of satisfying the coupling
constraint should also be split equally among the agents by selecting r = 1M , see [FK07;
PP09; FFP07]. It is immediate to see that the subclass of normalized equilibria for
which this property holds is the class of variational equilibria introduced in the previous
section. Nonetheless we note that our results could be easily extended to normalized
equilibria by using the operator F rN instead of FN. We conclude observing that the set of
Nash equilibria, normalized Nash equilibria and variational Nash equilibria are all nested
as in Figure 4.1. A similar result holds for Wardrop equilibria.
NE
Variational NE
Normalized NE
Figure 4.1: The set of Nash equilibria (NE), normalized NE and variational NE are all
nested.
In the following we exemplify how the presence of the coupling constraint C is typically
associated with a manifold of equilibria, regardless of the monotonicity properties of the
operators FN or FW.
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Example 2 (Coupling constraints and manifold of equilibria). Consider the aggregative
game G defined as in (4.3) where there are only two players, and
X 1 = {x1 ∈ R | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1},
X 2 = {x2 ∈ R | 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1},
J1(x1, σ(x)) =
3
2
(x1)2 − 2σ(x)x1,
J2(x2, σ(x)) = 2σ(x)x2.
(4.7)
We first study the case where there is no coupling constraint, i.e., C = R2, and observe
that for such game Assumption 1 is satisfied. Thus, any Nash equilibrium is a solution
of VI(X , FN) and vice versa as discussed immediately after Proposition 6. The operator
FN and the corresponding ∇xFN(x) are obtained from (4.6a) as
FN(x
1, x2) =
[
x1 − x2
x1 + 2x2
]
∇xFN(x1, x2) =
[
1 1
−1 2
]
.
Lemma 2 in Section 4.3 ensures that FN is strongly monotone since ∇xFN(x1, x2) +
∇xFN(x1, x2)>  0. Thus, the solution of the variational inequality VI(X , FN) is unique
(thanks to Lemma 1), and so is the Nash equilibrium. It is immediate to verify that the
unique Nash equilibrium is given by (x1, x2) = (0, 0).
Let us now consider the same game defined in (4.7) and introduce the additional
coupling constraint
C = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 |x1 + x2 ≥ 1}.
Assumption 1 is still satisfied so that any solution of the variational inequality VI(Q, FN)
is a Nash equilibrium, but the reverse does not hold in this case, due to the presence of
C. As a matter of fact, the solution of VI(Q, FN) (i.e., the variational equilibrium) is
unique thanks to the strong monotonicity of FN. On the contrary, it can be verified that
any point in the set {x ∈ R2 |x1 + x2 = 1, x1 ≥ 1/2} is a Nash equilibrium as no player
can improve by means of unilateral deviations.
4.3 Sufficient conditions for monotonicity
In this section we derive sufficient conditions that guarantee the monotonicity or strong
monotonicity of the operators FN, FW associated with the Nash and Wardrop equilibrium
problems. The importance in assessing whether these operators posses any monotonicity
property stems from the following three observations.
i) Uniqueness of the variational equilibrium is guaranteed by the strong monotonicity
of the corresponding operator, as already discussed in Lemma 1.
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ii) Strong monotonicity is crucial to control the behaviour of the variational equilibria
and their corresponding efficiency in large populations regimes (Chapter 5).
iii) Monotonicity of FN, FW allows to compute the corresponding equilibria using
tractable algorithms and to bound their distance (Chapter 6).
To verify whether FN, FW are monotone or strongly monotone one can exploit the
following equivalent characterizations.
Lemma 2. [FP07, Prop. 2.3.2] A continuously differentiable operator F : K ⊆ Rd → Rd
is strongly monotone with monotonicity constant α (resp. monotone) if and only if
∇xF (x)  αI (resp. ∇xF (x)  0) for all x ∈ K. Moreover, if K is compact, there exists
α > 0 such that ∇xF (x)  αI for all x ∈ K if and only if ∇xF (x)  0 for all x ∈ K.
In the following we specialize this result to the case when the cost functions (4.2)
reduce to
J i(xi, σ(x)) := vi(xi) + p(σ(x))>xi. (4.8)
The cost functions in (4.8) can describe, for example, applications where xi denotes
the usage level of a certain commodity, whose negative utility is modeled by vi : X i → R
and whose per-unit cost p : 1
M
∑M
i=1X i → Rn depends on the average usage level of the
entire population. Cost functions of the form (4.8) are widely used in the applications,
see [Che+14; MCH13]. We refer to p in the following as to the price function. The
operators in (4.6) become
FW(x) = [∇xivi(xi)]Mi=1 + [p(σ(x))]Mi=1, (4.9a)
FN(x) = FW(x) +
1
M
[∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1. (4.9b)
Lemma 3 (Sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity of (4.9)).
(a) Suppose that for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} the function vi in (4.8) is convex and
that p is monotone; then FW is monotone. Under the further assumption that p is
affine and strongly monotone, FN is strongly monotone.
(b) Suppose that for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} the function vi in (4.8) is strongly
convex and that p is monotone. Then FW is strongly monotone.
4.3.1 Linear price function
In the following we refine the sufficient conditions of Lemma 3 to the important class of
aggregative games with cost functions of the following form
J i(xi, σ(x)) :=
1
2
(xi)>Qxi + (Cσ(x) + ci)>xi , (4.10)
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where Q ∈ Rn×n is symmetric, C ∈ Rn×n (not necessarily symmetric), ci ∈ Rn. We
observe that (4.10) is a special case of (4.8), obtained setting vi(xi) = (xi)>Qxi+(ci)>xi
and p(σ(x)) = Cσ(x). We refer to this case as to the case of linear price function. The
cost functions in (4.10) have been used for example in [HCM07; Gra+16; BP13]. Since
the operators FN, FW defined in (4.6) are obtained by differentiating quadratic functions,
their expression is affine, and given by
FW(x) =
(
IM ⊗Q+ 1M 1M1>M ⊗ C
)
x+ c, (4.11a)
FN(x) = FW(x) +
1
M
(IM ⊗ C>)x, (4.11b)
where c = [c1; . . . ; cM ]. The following lemma exploits the structure in (4.11) to derive
sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity of FW, FN.
Lemma 4 (Sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity of (4.11)).
(a) If Q  0, C  0 then FW in (4.11a) is strongly monotone.
(b) If Q  0, Q− C>Q−1C  0 then FW in (4.11a) is strongly monotone.
(c) If Q  0, C  0 or if Q  0, C  0 then FN in (4.11b) is strongly monotone.
4.3.2 Diagonal price function
In the following we consider the case when the price function p(σ) has diagonal structure,
i.e., the t-th component of p depends only on the corresponding component of the average.
Formally, we assume that p(σ(x)) can be decomposed as p(σ(x)) = [pt(σt(xt))]
n
t=1, with
pt : R→ R for all t, σt(xt) = 1N
∑M
i=1 x
i
t and xt := [x
1
t , . . . , x
n
t ]. This corresponds to cost
functions of the following form
J i(xi, σ(x)) = vi(xi) +
n∑
t=1
pt(σt(xt))x
i
t . (4.12)
Cost functions as in (4.12) are typically used in the literature to describe congestion costs
of road traffic networks ([War52; CSS04] and Section 7.2) or the charging of electric
vehicles ([MCH13; Gra+16] and Section 7.1). We refer to this case as to the case
of diagonal price function. A sufficient condition ensuring the monotonicity or strong
monotonicity of FW can be obtained directly exploiting the structure of (4.12) and the
result in Lemma 2. The situation is more complicated when we turn our attention to FN
due to the presence of the additional term [∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1 in (4.9). The following
lemma provides a sufficient condition.
Lemma 5. Let X be closed and convex. Assume that vi(xi) in (4.12) is convex for each
agent i ∈ [M ] and that pt is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing for all
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t ∈ [n]. Further, suppose that X i ⊆ [0, x0]n for each i ∈ [M ]. If
min
t∈{1,...,n}
z∈[0,x0]
(
p′t(z)−
x˜0p′′t (z)
8
)
> 0, (4.13)
then the operator FN is strongly monotone.
We note that the positivity requirement on the agent strategies is satisfied in many
applications such as those studied in Chapter 7. Nevertheless, the previous lemma can be
extended adjusting the condition (4.13) to the case where X i ⊆ [−x0, x0]n, see [Gen18].
An immediate consequence of the previous lemma is that, when pt is continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave for all t, the operator FN is strongly mono-
tone. It is worth noting that [YSM11] considers a similar setup to what studied in this
section. In [YSM11, Lem. 3] the authors exploit the structure in (4.12) and give condi-
tions for ∇xFN(x) to be a P -matrix, which in turn guarantees uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in the absence of coupling constraints. This is, to the best of our knowledge,
the only work providing sufficient conditions for equilibrium uniqueness and convergence
of the algorithms. It is interesting to note that uniqueness in [YSM11] holds assuming
p′t > 0, p
′′
t > 0, whereas our result holds if the opposite condition is satisfied, namely if
p′t > 0, p
′′
t < 0.
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4.4 Appendix
4.4.1 Proofs of the results presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.
(a) The proof of the first statement can be also found in [FFP07, Thm. 2.1].
By definition x¯N is a solution of VI(Q, FN), that is
FN(x¯N)
>(x− x¯N) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q . (4.14)
In the following we fix the strategies of all the players but i to x−i = x¯−iN , so that
all the summands in (4.14) vanish, except for the i-th term
∇xiJ i(x¯iN, σ(x¯N))>(xi − x¯iN) ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Q(x¯−iN ) .
Consider the function xi 7→ J i(xi, 1
M
xi+ 1
M
∑
j 6=i x¯
j
N) and observe that J
i : Q(x¯−iN )→
R is convex by assumption. Since Q(x¯−iN ) is also convex by assumption, it follows
from [BT89, Prop. 3.1] that x¯iN must be a minimizer of J
i : Q(x¯−iN )→ R, i.e., that
J i(x¯iN, x¯
−i
N ) ≤ J i
(
xi,
1
M
xi +
1
M
∑
j 6=i
x¯jN
)
, ∀xi ∈ Q(x¯−iN ) .
Since this holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and since x¯N ∈ Q by definition of variational
inequality, it follows that x¯N is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(b) We rewrite the operator FW(x) as F˜W(x, σ(x)), where F˜W(x, z) := [∇xiJ i(xi, z)]Mi=1.
Fix z¯ = σ(x¯W). By definition, if x¯W solves VI(Q, FW) then FW(x¯W)>(x− x¯W) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ Q, i.e.,
F˜W(x¯W, z¯)
>(x− x¯W) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q. (4.15)
Consider i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, set x−i = x¯−iW in (4.15) and consider an arbitrary xi ∈
Qi(x¯−iW); then all the summands in (4.15) vanish except the ith one and (4.15) reads
∇xiJ i(x¯iW, z¯)>(xi − x¯iW) ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Qi(x¯−iW). (4.16)
Consider the convex function J i(·, z¯) : Qi(x¯−iW) → R. Since Qi(x¯−iW) is a convex
set, by (4.16) and [BT89, Prop. 3.1] we have that x¯iW ∈ arg minxi∈Qi(x¯−iW ) J
i (xi, z¯).
Substituting z¯ = σ(x¯W), one has J
i (x¯iW, σ(x¯W)) ≤ J i (xi, σ(x¯W)) for all xi ∈
Qi(x¯−iW). Since this holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and since x¯W ∈ Q, it follows that
x¯W is a Wardrop equilibrium of G.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof.
(a) Let us first show that FW is monotone. Since v
i is convex, then ∇xivi(xi) is mono-
tone in xi by [Scu+12, Sec. 4.2.2]. Hence [∇xivi(xi)]Mi=1 is monotone. Moreover,
for any x1, x2
([p(σ(x1))]
M
i=1 − [p(σ(x2))]Mi=1)>(x1 − x2)
= M(p(σ(x1))− p(σ(x2)))>(σ(x1)− σ(x2)) ≥ 0,
(4.17)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that p is monotone. By (4.9a) and
the fact that the sum of two monotone operators is monotone, one can conclude
that FW is monotone.
To show that FN is strongly monotone, we write the affine expression of p as
p(x) = Cx + c, where there exists α > 0 such that C  αIn by Lemma 2. Then
the term 1
M
[∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1 in (4.9b) equals 1M (IM ⊗ C>)x. Since ∇x( 1M (IM ⊗
C>)x)  α
M
IMn, then
1
M
[∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1 is strongly monotone by Lemma 2.
Having already shown that FW is monotone, the proof is concluded upon noting
that the sum of a monotone operator and a strongly monotone operator is strongly
monotone.
(b) Strong convexity of vi is equivalent to strong monotonicity of∇xivi(xi) in xi [Scu+12,
Sec. 4.2.2]. Then [∇xivi(xi)]Mi=1 is strongly monotone. Monotonicity of [p(σ(x))]Mi=1
in (4.9a) can be shown as in (4.17).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof.
(a) By Lemma 2, strong monotonicity of FW in (4.11a) is equivalent to ∇xFW(x) =(
IM ⊗Q+ 1M 1M1>M ⊗ C
)>  0, which is independent from x. If Q  0 and C  0,
it holds
(
IM ⊗Q+ 1M 1M1>M ⊗ C
)>  0, proving the statement.
(b) Since Q is symmetric, Q  0, and Q − C>Q−1C  0, by Schur’s Complement we
have [
Q C>
C Q
]
 0 .
It follows that [
x
x
]> [
Q C>
C Q
] [
x
x
]
= x>
(
2Q+ C + C>
)
x ≥ 0 ,
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from which it must be Q+ C  0. We conclude the proof by showing that Q  0
symmetric and Q + C  0 imply ∇xFW(x) =
(
IM ⊗Q+ 1M 1M1>M ⊗ C
)>  0.
Recall that ∇xFW(x)  0 is equivalent to showing positive definiteness of
IM ⊗ 2Q+ 1
M
1M1
>
M ⊗ (C + C>). (4.18)
To prove the latter inequality, let us consider λj an eigenvalue of the matrix ap-
pearing in (4.18) with corresponding eigenvector vj 6= 0Mn. It must be(
IM ⊗ 2Q+ 1
M
1M1
>
M ⊗ (C + C>)
)
vj = λjvj ⇐⇒ 2Qvij+
C + C>
M
M∑
i=1
vij = λjv
i
j,
(4.19)
for all i ∈ [M ]. Summing the previous expressions over i gives
(
2Q+ C + C>
) M∑
i=1
vij = λj
M∑
i=1
vij .
Thus, if
∑M
i=1 v
i
j 6= 0n, λj is also an eigenvalue of 2Q + C + C> and it must be
λj > 0 since Q + C  0. If, on the contrary,
∑M
i=1 v
i
j = 0n, it follows from (4.19)
that 2Qvj = λjvj, i.e., λj is also an eigenvalue of 2Q and it must be λj > 0 since
Q  0 and symmetric. We conclude, as required, that the matrix appearing in
(4.18) is positive definite, since all its eigenvalues are strictly positive.
(c) Similarly to the first point, strong monotonicity of FN in (4.11b) is equivalent by
Lemma 2 to
(
IM ⊗Q+ 1M 1M1>M ⊗ C
)>
+ 1
M
(IM⊗C>)>  0. If Q  0 and C  0 or
if Q  0 and C  0, it follows that (IM ⊗Q+ 1M 1M1>M ⊗ C)>+ 1M (IM⊗C>)>  0,
completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. First, observe that the operator p : Rn → Rn is monotone. Indeed, since pt is
strictly increasing it holds for all y, z that
(p(y)− p(z))>(y − z) =
n∑
t=1
(pt(yt)− pt(zt))(yt − zt) > 0 .
Thanks to Lemma 3, we conclude that FW is also monotone. According to (4.9b), to
show strong monotonicity of FN it is sufficient to show that the term [∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1 is
strongly monotone for all x ∈ X . The latter is equivalent to proving∇x[∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1 
0 for all x ∈ X by Lemma 2. We have
∇x[∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1 = IM⊗∇zp(z)|z=σ(x) +
1
M
1M⊗
(
[diag{p′′t (σt)xit}nt=1]Mi=1
)>
, (4.20)
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where diag{p′′t (σt)xit}nt=1 is the diagonal matrix whose entry in position (t, t) is p′′t (σt)xit.
The permutation matrix P = [[e>t+(i−1)n]
M
i=1]
n
t=1 (ei denotes the i-th vector of the canonical
basis) permutes (4.20) into block-diagonal form
P∇x[∇zp(z)|z=σ(x)xi]Mi=1P> = (4.21)p
′
1(σ1)IM
. . .
p′n(σn)IM
+ 1
M
p
′′
1(σ1)x11
>
M
. . .
p′′n(σn)xn1
>
M

where xt = [x
i
t]
M
i=1. To conclude, it suffices to show that p
′
t(σt)IM +
1
M
p′′t (σt)xt1
>
M  0 for
all t. Lemma 6 (reported at the end of this proof) guarantees that λmin
(
xt1>M + 1Mx
>
t
)
/2 ≥
− x˜0M
8
, which terminates the proof.
Lemma 6. For all M ∈ N, it holds
min
y∈[0,1]M
λmin
(
y1>M + 1My
>) ≥ −M
4
. (4.22)
Proof. The statement is trivially true for M = 1. For M > 1, the left hand side of (4.22)
is equivalent to
min
y∈[0,1]M
‖v‖=1
v>
(
y1>M + 1My
>) v = min
y∈[0,1]M
‖v‖=1
2
(
v>y
) (
1>Mv
)
. (4.23)
Let us consider a pair y?, v? minimizing (4.23). If 1>Mv
? = 0, the bound (4.23) is trivially
satisfied. We are left with two cases, 1>Mv
? > 0 and 1>Mv
? < 0. Let us start from the
case of 1>Mv
? > 0. To minimize 2
(
v>y
) (
1>Mv
)
, it must be
y?i =
{
0 if v?i > 0
1 if v?i < 0,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (4.24)
Without loss of generality, we can assume y?i ∈ {0, 1} if v?i = 0. Hence we conclude that
y? ∈ {0, 1}M and (4.22) reduces to
min
p∈{0,...,M}
λmin
 2(1p1>p ) 1p1>(M−p)
1(M−p)1>p 0(M−p)0
>
(M−p)
, (4.25)
where without loss of generality we assumed the first p components of y? to be 1 and
the remaining to be 0. Note that the matrix in (4.25) features p identical rows followed
by M − p other identical rows. Hence any of its eigenvectors must have p identical
components followed by M − p other identical components. With this observation and
the definition of eigenvalue, algebraic calculations show that the matrix in (4.25) has only
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two distinct eigenvalues, the minimum of the two being p−√Mp. The function p−√Mp
is minimized over the reals for p = M/4 with corresponding minimum λmin = −M/4,
as it can be seen by using the change of variables p = q2 and minimizing the quadratic
function q2 − √Mq. Since p ∈ {0, . . . ,M} in (4.25), the value −M/4 is a lower bound
for the minimum eigenvalue, and it is attained only if M is a multiple of 4. We conclude
by noting that the derivation for the case 1>Mv
? < 0 is identical to the derivation for the
case 1>Mv
? > 0 just shown, upon switching 0 and 1 in (4.24).
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CHAPTER 5
Equilibria and efficiency in large populations
Many real world applications where agents behave strategically feature the interaction
of a large population of individuals. As an example, consider that of drivers moving on
the road network of a city, with the objective of reaching their destination as swiftly as
possible. As an alternative example consider that of traders in a stock market. Moti-
vated by this observation, the current chapter is dedicated to the study of aggregative
games with a large number of players. The chapter is divided in two parts. In Sec-
tion 5.1 we provide bounds on the distance between Wardrop and Nash equilibria, while
in Section 5.2 we study the efficiency of these equilibria, i.e., we study how much selfish
behaviour degrades the performance of a centrally controlled system. All the proofs are
reported in the Appendix (Section 5.3). The results presented in this chapter have been
published in [Pac+18; PPL18].
Specifically, we consider a sequence of games (GM)∞M=1. For fixed M , the game GM is
played among M agents and is defined as in (4.3) with an arbitrary coupling constraint
C, arbitrary costs {J i(xi, σ(x))}Mi=1 and arbitrary local constraints {X i}Mi=1. For the sake
of readability, we avoid the explicit dependence on M in denoting these quantities and
in denoting xN, xW, FN, FW.
5.1 Distance between Nash and Wardrop equilibria
As we have learnt from the previous chapter, the monotonicity properties of the operators
FN and FW might not coincide. For example, FN might be strongly monotone for a
given game, while for the same game FW might not be. Unfortunately, if the operator
associated to a variational inequality is not monotone, determining the corresponding
solution is in general an intractable problem. Motivated by this shortcoming, in this
section we provide bounds on the distance between x¯N and x¯W, so that, should one of
the two equilibria be difficult to compute (e.g., due to the lack of monotonicity), we might
be able to compute the other and still be able to learn something about the former.
Assumption 2. There exists a convex, compact set X 0 ⊂ Rn such that ∪Mi=1X i ⊆ X 0
for each GM in the sequence (GM)∞M=1. Let R := maxy∈X 0{‖y‖}. For each M and
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i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the function J i(z1, z2) is Lipschitz with respect to z2 in X 0 with Lipschitz
constant L2 independent from M , i and z1 ∈ X i.
We note that Assumption 2 implies that σ(x) ∈ X 0 for any M and any x ∈ X 1 ×
· · · × XM . Furthermore, if the cost function (4.2) takes the specific form (4.8), then p
being Lipschitz in X 0 with constant Lp implies J i(z1, z2) being Lipschitz with respect to
z2 in X 0 with constant L2 = RLp, as by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
‖J i(z1, z2)− J i(z1, z′2)‖ = ‖(p(z2)− p(z′2))>z1‖
≤ ‖p(z2)− p(z′2)‖‖z1‖ ≤ RLp‖z2 − z′2‖.
(5.1)
The next proposition shows that every Wardrop equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium,
with ε vanishing as M grows.
Proposition 7. Let the sequence of games (GM)∞M=1 satisfy Assumption 2. For each
GM , every Wardrop equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium, with ε = 2RL2M .
Proposition 7 is a strong result as it guarantees that for relatively large M a Wardrop
equilibrium is almost stable in the sense of the Nash equilibrium definition. In particular,
at any given Wardrop equilibrium no player can improve upon its cost by more than an
additive factor ε, considering the strategies of the others fixed. Unfortunately, Proposi-
tion 7 provides no information on the distance between the set of strategies constituting
a Nash and a Wardrop equilibrium. This question is addressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let the sequence of games (GM)∞M=1 satisfy Assumption 2, and each GM
satisfy Assumption 1. Then:
(a) If the operator FN relative to GM is strongly monotone on Q with monotonicity
constant α
M
> 0, then there exists a unique variational Nash equilibrium x¯N of
GM . Moreover, for any variational Wardrop equilibrium x¯W
‖x¯N − x¯W‖ ≤ L2
α
M
√
M
. (5.2)
As a consequence, if α
M
√
M →∞ as M →∞, then ‖x¯N − x¯W‖ → 0 as M →∞.
(b) If the operator FW relative to GM is strongly monotone on Q with monotonicity
constant α
M
> 0, then there exists a unique variational Wardrop equilibrium x¯W
of GM . Moreover, for any variational Nash equilibrium x¯N
‖x¯N − x¯W‖ ≤ L2
α
M
√
M
. (5.3)
As a consequence, if α
M
√
M →∞ as M →∞, then ‖x¯N − x¯W‖ → 0 as M →∞.
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(c) If in each game GM the cost function J i(xi, σ(x)) takes the form (4.8), with vi = 0
and p being strongly monotone on X 0 with monotonicity constant α, then there
exists a unique σ¯ such that σ(x¯W) = σ¯ for any variational Wardrop equilibrium
x¯W of GM . Moreover, for any variational Nash equilibrium x¯N of GM and for any
variational Wardrop equilibrium x¯W of GM
‖σ(x¯N)− σ(x¯W)‖ ≤
√
2RL2
αM
. (5.4)
Hence, ‖σ(x¯N)− σ(x¯W)‖ → 0 as M →∞.1
We point out that (5.2) and (5.3) can be used to derive a bound on the average
strategies similar to (5.4).
Related Works
Proposition 7 ensures that, under minimal assumptions, any Wardrop equilibrium is
an ε-Nash equilibrium. Such result follows directly from the aggregative structure of
the game, and from the Lipschitz continuity of the cost functions. A similar idea is
used to prove analogous results in various previous contributions. For example, the case
of potential games is investigated in [AW04; Alt+06], routing games are considered in
[Alt+11], flow control and routing in communication networks are discussed in [ABS02],
while a similar argument is used in [Gra+16] for the case of average aggregative games
with no coupling constraints. Proposition 7 is a direct extension of these works to generic
aggregative games with coupling constraints.
Theorem 1 show that it is possible to derive bounds on the Euclidean distance be-
tween Nash and Wardrop equilibria at the price of introducing further assumptions. More
precisely, strong monotonicity of either the Nash or Wardrop operator ensures that the
actual strategies x¯N and x¯W converge to each other as M grows large. A weaker require-
ment, i.e., the strong monotonicity of p ensures instead convergence in the aggregate. To
the best of our knowledge, the only result bounding the Euclidean distance between the
two equilibria is obtained in [HM85]. Therein a similar bound to (5.4) is derived limit-
edly to routing/congestion games. However, [HM85] requires the population to increase
by means of identical replicas of the agents. We here prove that a similar argument
can be used to address the case of generic new agents. In addition, the first two results
of Theorem 1 address a more general class of aggregative games (i.e., not necessarily
congestion games) by employing a new type of argument, based on a sensitivity analysis
result for variational inequalities with perturbed strongly monotone operators [Nag13,
Thm. 1.14]. We note that the works [DN87; AW04; Alt+06] guarantee convergence of
1If p is Lipschitz with constant Lp, then in (5.4) L2 can be replaced by RLp, as by (5.1). This is
used in the application in Sections 7.1 and 7.2.
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Nash to Wardrop in terms of Euclidean distance, but do not provide a bound on the
convergence rate.
Finally, we observe that our results are derived in relation to variational equilibria.
Nevertheless, if there is no coupling constraint as in all the above-mentioned works, then
any equilibrium is a variational equilibrium. Hence our results subsume the previous.
5.2 Equilibrium efficiency: the price of anarchy
In this section we study the efficiency of Nash and Wardrop equilibria by means of the
concept of price of anarchy. The notion of equilibrium efficiency was first formalized in
[KP99] and is used to describe the performance degradation incurred when moving from
a centralized solution to distributed and strategic decision making. The motivations that
lead us to the study of the price of anarchy are essentially two. The first is analytical:
given an optimization problem and the corresponding competitive counterpart, we wish
to know how inefficient an equilibrium might be. The second stems from the possibility
to engineer the behaviour of a large population of strategic thinkers. For example, in
the application considered in Section 7.1, the system operator has the freedom to select
the price function p. In these cases we wish to understand how to modify the game so
as to make it as efficient as possible.
Similarly to previous section, we consider a sequence of games (GM)∞M=1, where each
game GM is defined as in (4.3) with arbitrary constraint sets {X i}Mi=1, and cost functions
of the following form
J i(xi, σ(x)) := p(σ(x) + d)>xi, d ∈ Rn. (5.5)
In order to simplify the exposition, throughout this section we consider the case when no
coupling constraint is present, i.e., C = RMn.2 We observe that the cost functions in (5.5)
have a similar structure to those in (4.8). More precisely, it is possible to reduce (5.5) to
(4.8), upon setting vi(xi) = 0 in the latter equation and introducing an additional player
whose constraint set is given by {x ∈ Rn | x = d ·M}. Since we are interested in the case
of large population, we do not purse this approach because the unboundedness of this
set (as M →∞) will complicate the analysis. The costs in (5.5) can be used to describe
applications where xi denotes the usage level of a certain commodity, whose per-unit
cost p depends on the average usage level plus some inflexible normalized usage level
d [MCH13; Che+14]. As the notion of equilibrium efficiency relates the behaviour of an
equilibrium allocation with that of a socially optimal one, we begin with the following
definition.
Definition 8 (Social optimizer). A set of actions xS = [x
1
S; . . . ;x
M
S ] ∈ RMn is a social
optimizer of GM if xS ∈ X and it minimizes the cost JS(σ(x)) := p(σ(x) + d)>(σ(x) + d).
2Most of the results hold with minor adaptations in the presence of coupling constraints too.
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Note that the cost JS is the sum of all the players costs, divided by M , and the additional
term p(σ(x) + d)>d. The reason why the latter term is included is that we want to
compute the total cost of buying the commodity for both the flexible (σ(x)) and inflexible
(d) users. This cost was first introduced in [MCH13] and successively used in [GGL15;
DMP17; DAS17]. For a given a game GM , we quantify the efficiency of equilibrium
allocations using the notion of price of anarchy [KP99]
PoAM :=
maxxN∈NEM JS(σ(xN))
JS(σ(xS))
,
where NEM ⊆ X is the set of Nash equilibria of GM and xS is a social optimizer of GM .
The price of anarchy captures the ratio between the cost at the worst Nash equilibrium
and the optimal cost; by definition PoAM ≥ 1. In the following we study the behavior
of PoAM , for three different classes of admissible price functions p.
5.2.1 Linear price function
Throughout this subsection we consider cost functions of the form (5.5), where the price
functions p is linear as detailed in Assumption 8. Linear price functions have been used
in [GGL15; DMP17] to model, e.g., the competitive charging of electric vehicles.
Assumption 3. The cost functions are as in (5.5), where the price function p takes the
form p(z + d) = C(z + d), with C = C> ∈ Rn×n, C  0.
Under Assumption 8, let Ls, Lp be the Lipschitz constants of JS, p, and α the mono-
tonicity constant of p.3 The following theorem shows that, under minimal assumptions,
any Wardrop equilibrium is also socially optimum irrespective of the population size M .
This is no longer the case for Nash equilibria, which nevertheless recover this property
when the population size grows.
Theorem 2 (PoAM bound and convergence to 1). Let Assumption 8 hold.
(a) Let each of the constraint set {X i}Mi=1 be closed, convex, non empty. Then, for any
fixed game GM in the sequence (GM)∞M=1, every Wardrop equilibrium xW is a social
optimizer, i.e., JS(σ(xW)) ≤ JS(σ(x)), ∀x ∈ X .
(b) Assume, in addition, that there exists a convex, compact set X 0 ⊂ Rn such that
∪Mi=1X i ⊆ X 0 for each GM in (GM)∞M=1. Define the constant c = RLS
√
2Lpα−1,
where R = maxy∈X 0{‖y‖}. Then,
JS(σ(xS)) ≤ JS(σ(xN)) ≤ JS(σ(xS)) + c/
√
M , (5.6)
3The function p(z + d) = C(z + d) is strongly monotone since C  0 with monotonicity constant
given by the smallest eigenvalue of C.
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for any fixed game GM in the sequence. Thus, if there exists Jˆ ≥ 0 s.t. JS(σ(xS)) >
Jˆ for every game in the sequence (GM)∞M=1, one has
1 ≤ PoAM ≤ 1 + c/
(
Jˆ
√
M
)
and lim
M→∞
PoAM = 1 .
Remark 2. The previous theorem extends the results of [MCH13; GGL15; DMP17;
DAS17] simultaneously allowing for arbitrary convex constraints, finite populations, and
non diagonal price function. Note that the condition JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ ≥ 0 is merely
technical and required to properly define PoAM . This condition is trivially satisfied in
the most of the applications considered, see, e.g., Section 7.1. Even if the latter condition
does not hold, the cost at any Nash equilibrium converges to the minimum cost as M →
∞, see (5.6).
5.2.2 Diagonal price function
In the following we study the efficiency of Nash and Wardrop equilibria when the cost
functions take the form (5.5) and the price function p(z+ d) has diagonal structure, i.e.,
the t-th component of p depends only on the corresponding component of the average.
We distinguish two cases depending on wether pt has the same structure for different
values of t, or not. Towards this goal, we first introduce two useful assumptions.
Assumption 4. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the constraint set X i is closed, convex, non empty.
For z ∈ 1
M
∑M
i=1X i, the function z 7→ p(z+d) is continuously differentiable and strongly
monotone while z 7→ p(z + d)>(z + d) is strongly convex. Let LS, Lp be the Lipschitz
constant of JS, p, and α be the monotonicity constant of p.
Assumption 5. There exists a convex, compact set X0 ⊂ Rn s.t. ∪Mi=1X i ⊆ X0 for
each game GM in (GM)∞M=1. Moreover, J i(xi, σ(x)) is convex in xi ∈ X i for all fixed
x−i ∈ X−i, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. We let R = maxy∈X0 ||y||.
Homogeneous price function
In this section we consider p(z+ d) to be a nonlinear function, and assume its t-th com-
ponent to depend only on the t-th component zt+dt, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Additionally,
we assume that the functions pt have the same structure for all the values of t. This de-
scribes, for example, electricity markets where the unit cost of electricity at every instant
of time is captured by a time invariant function depending on the total consumption at
that same instant.
Assumption 6. The price function p takes the form
p(z + d) =
[
f(z1 + d1), . . . , f(zn + dn)
]>
,
with f(y) : R>0 → R>0. Further X i ⊆ Rn≥0 and d ∈ Rn>0 .
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If f(y) is not linear, a simple check shows that, in general, ∇xj(∇xiJ i(xi, σ(x))) 6=
∇xi(∇xjJ j(xj, σ(x))) when i 6= j. Consequently, the game is not potential, [FP07, The-
orem 1.3.1]. Hence methods to bound the PoA based on the existence of an underlying
potential function [GGL15; DMP17], can not be used here. The following theorem pro-
vides a necessary and sufficient condition on the structure of f that ensures the efficiency
of the resulting equilibria.
Theorem 3 (PoAM convergence and counterexample). Suppose that Assumptions 4,
5 and 6 hold. Further assume that JS(σ(xS)) >Jˆ for some Jˆ ≥ 0, for every game in
(GM)∞M=1.
(a) If f(y) = αyk with α > 0 and k > 0, it holds
1 ≤ PoAM ≤ 1 + c/
(
Jˆ
√
M
)
and lim
M→∞
PoAM = 1 ,
with c = RLS
√
2Lpα−1 constant.
(b) For n ≥ 2, if f(y) satisfies the assumptions, but does not take the form αyk for
some α > 0 and k > 0, it is possible to construct a sequence of games (GM)∞M=1
for which limM→∞ PoAM > 1.
The counterexample relative to the second claim is constructed using X i = X¯ . In
other words our impossibility result holds also for the case of homogeneous populations.
This is not in contrast with the result in [MCH13] or [DAS17], because therein the sets
X¯ were assumed to be simplexes with upper bounds constraints. Here we claim that
there exists a convex set X¯ (not a simplex with upper bounds) such that PoAM does
not converge to 1.
Remark 3. The previous theorem is of fundamental importance in applications where
the system operator has the possibility to freely set the price function. In these cases,
Theorem 3 suggests the use of monomial price functions to guarantee the highest achiev-
able efficiency (all Nash equilibria become social optimizers for large M). If different
price functions are chosen, it is always possible to construct a problem instance such that
the worst Nash equilibrium is not a social optimizer.
Heterogeneous price function
In the previous subsection we showed that if the price function is not a monomial, then
PoAM may not converge to one. In this section we derive upper bounds for PoAM when
the price function belongs to a general class of functions, as formalized next.
Assumption 7. The price function p takes the form
p(z + d) =
[
l1(z1 + d1), . . . , ln(zn + dn)
]>
,
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where lt(y) : R≥0 → R≥0, lt ∈ L for all t and L is a given set of continuous and
nondecreasing price functions. Further let X i ⊆ Rn≥0 be non empty, closed and convex.
Note that Assumption 7 is less restrictive than Assumption 6 as we let the price
lt depend on the time instant t. The key idea in this case is to show that standard
results derived for Wardrop equilibria in routing games [Rou03], [CSS04] can be applied
to the setup studied here. The resulting bounds on PoAM can then be derived using the
convergence result in Theorem 1. Formally, given a game GM with cost functions as in
(5.5), we consider an equivalent nonatomic routing game over a parallel network with a
number of links equal to n, the dimension of decision variables xi. To present our next
result, we first introduce the quantity
β(L) := sup
l∈L
sup
v≥0
(
1
vl(v)
max
w≥0
[(l(v)− l(w))w]
)
.
defined in [CSS04, Eq 3.8]. Therein, the authors show that β(L) ≤ 1 and [1−β(L)]−1 =
α(L). The quantity α(L) describes, essentially, the worst-case price of anarchy over all
possible cost functions in the set L, as detailed in the following theorem. The key is to
show that the games considered here are (1, β(L))-smooth, as defined in [Rou09, Def.
1.1].
Theorem 4 (PoAM for heterogeneous price function).
(a) Suppose that Assumption 7 holds. Then for any fixed game GM and any Wardrop
equilibrium xW it holds
JS(σ(xW )) ≤ JS(σ(xS))α(L) (5.7)
(b) Further suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold, and there exists Jˆ ≥ 0 s.t. JS(σ(xS)) >
Jˆ for every game in (GM)∞M=1. Then, for any game GM in the sequence
JS(σ(xS)) ≤ JS(σ(xN)) ≤ JS(σ(xS))α(L) + c/
√
M,
and 1 ≤ PoAM ≤ α(L) + c/
(
Jˆ
√
M
)
, thus implying limM→∞ PoAM ≤ α(L), with
c = RLs
√
2Lpα−1.
Remark 4. In [Rou03, Table 1], α(L) is computed for classes of functions such as affine,
quadratic, polynomials. If L contains constant functions, then (5.7) is tight (see [Rou03]
and the application discussed in Section 7.1). This is not a contradiction of Theorems 2
and 3 because therein either constant functions are not allowed or the price function
pt is assumed to be independent of t. Theorems 2 and 3 can be seen as refinements of
Theorem 4 and guarantee that limM→∞ PoAM = 1 by restricting the admissible class of
price functions.
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5.3 Appendix
5.3.1 Proofs of the results presented in Section 5.1
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider any Wardrop equilibrium xW of GM (not necessarily a variational one).
By Definition 7, xW ∈ Q and for each agent i
J i(xiW, σ(xW)) ≤ J i(xi, σ(xW)), ∀xi ∈ Qi(x−iW).
It follows that for each agent i and for all xi ∈ Qi(x−iW)
J i(xiW, σ(xW))− J i
(
xi,
1
M
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
xjW
))
= J i(xiW, σ(xW))− J i(xi, σ(xW))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+J i(xi, σ(xW))− J i
(
xi,
1
M
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
xjW
))
≤ L2
∥∥∥∥∥σ(xW)−
(
1
M
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
xjW
))∥∥∥∥∥ = L2M
∥∥∥∥∥
(
xiW +
∑
j 6=i
xjW
)
−
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
xjW
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
L2
M
‖xiW − xi‖ ≤
2RL2
M
.
Hence xW is an ε-Nash equilibrium of GM with ε = 2RL2M .
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof.
(a) We first bound the distance between the operators FN and FW in terms of M .
By (4.6) it holds
‖FN(x)− FW(x)‖2 =
∥∥[∇xiJ i(xi, σ(x))]Mi=1 − [∇xiJ i(xi, z)|z=σ(x)]Mi=1∥∥2
=
M∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥ 1M∇zJ i(xi, z)|z=σ(x)
∥∥∥∥2 ≤ 1M2
M∑
i=1
L22 =
L22
M
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that J i(z1, z2) is Lipschitz in z2 on
X 0 with constant L2 by Assumption 2 and hence the term ‖∇zJ i(xi, z)|z=σ(x)‖ is
bounded by L2 by definition of derivative. Taking the square root, it follows that
‖FN(x)− FW(x)‖ ≤ L2√
M
. (5.8)
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for all x ∈ X 0. We exploit (5.8) to bound the distance between Nash and Wardrop
strategies. Since FN is strongly monotone on Q by assumption, VI(Q, FN) has a
unique solution x¯N by Lemma 1. Moreover, the distance between the solutions
of two variational inequalities differing in the operator used can be bounded us-
ing [Nag13]. Formally, for all solutions x¯W of VI(Q, FW) [Nag13, Thm. 1.14] shows
that
‖x¯N − x¯W‖ ≤ 1
α
M
‖FN(x¯W)− FW(x¯W)‖.
Combining this with equation (5.8) yields the result.
(b) As in the above, with Nash in place of Wardrop and vice versa.
(c) Any solution x¯W to the VI(Q,FW) satisfies
FW(x¯W)
>(x− x¯W) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q⇔
M∑
i=1
p(σ(x¯W))
>(xi − x¯iW) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q⇔
p(σ(x¯W))
>(σ(x)− σ(x¯W)) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q.
(5.9)
Any solution x¯N to the VI(Q,FN) satisfies
FN(x¯N)
>(x− x¯N) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q⇔
p(σ(x¯N))
>(σ(x)− σ(x¯N)) + 1
M2
M∑
i=1
(∇zp(z)|z=σ(x¯N)x¯iN)>(xi − x¯iN) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q.
(5.10)
Exploiting the strong monotonicity of p on X 0, one has
α‖σ(x¯W)− σ(x¯N)‖2 ≤ (p(σ(x¯W))− p(σ(x¯N)))>(σ(x¯W)− σ(x¯N))
= p(σ(x¯W))
>(σ(x¯W)− σ(x¯N))− p(σ(x¯N))>(σ(x¯W)− σ(x¯N))
≤
by (5.9)
−p(σ(x¯N))>(σ(x¯W)− σ(x¯N))
≤
by (5.10)
1
M2
M∑
i=1
(x¯iN)
>(∇zp(z)|z=σ(x¯N))>(x¯iW − x¯iN)
=
1
M2
M∑
i=1
(x¯iN)
>(∇zJ i(x¯iW, z)|z=σ(x¯N) −∇zJ i(x¯iN, z)|z=σ(x¯N))
≤ 1
M2
M∑
i=1
‖x¯iN‖(‖∇zJ i(x¯iW, z)|z=σ(x¯N)‖+ ‖∇zJ i(x¯iN, z)|z=σ(x¯N)‖)
≤ 2L2
M2
M∑
i=1
‖x¯iN‖ ≤
2L2
M2
M∑
i=1
R ≤ 1
M
2RL2,
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where we have used the Chauchy-Schwartz inequality, the triangular inequality,
and the Lipschitzianity of J i(z1, z2) in addition to (5.9) and (5.10). We conclude
that ‖σ(x¯W)− σ(x¯N)‖ ≤
√
2RL2
αM
.
5.3.2 Proofs of the results presented in Section 5.2
Before proving any of the claims in Section 5.2, we provide a lemma that will be useful
in the forthcoming analysis. Throughout the following proofs, we denote with Σ :=
1
M
∑M
i=1X i.
Lemma 7 (Equivalent characterizations of xW, xS). Let the cost functions be given as
in (5.5), and each of the constraint set {X i}Mi=1 be closed, convex, non empty. Addition-
ally, assume that the function z 7→ p(z + d) is continuously differentiable and strongly
monotone while z 7→ p(z + d)>(z + d) is strongly convex, for all z ∈ Σ. The following
holds.
(a) Given xW a Wardrop equilibrium, its average σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW), with FW :
Rn → Rn, FW(z) := p(z + d). The VI(Σ, FW) admits a unique solution σW. Let
us define XW := {x ∈ X s.t. 1M
∑M
j=1 x
j = σW}. Then any vector of strategies
xW ∈ XW is a Wardrop equilibrium.
(b) Given xS a social optimizer, its average σ(xS) solves VI(Σ, FS), with FS : Rn → Rn,
FS(z) := p(z+d) + [∇zp(z+d)](z+d). The VI(Σ, FS) admits a unique solution σS.
Define XS := {x ∈ X s.t. 1M
∑M
j=1 x
j = σS}. Then any vector of strategies xS ∈ XS
is a social optimizer.
Proof.
(a) The sets X i are convex and closed by assumption; further, for fixed z ∈ Σ, the
functions J i(xi, z) are linear and thus convex in xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. It
follows by Proposition 6 that a Wardrop equilibrium xW satisfies
4
[1M ⊗ p(σ(xW) + d)]>(x− xW) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X . (5.11)
Rearranging and dividing by M we get p(σ(xW)+d)
>( 1
M
∑M
j=1 x
i− 1
M
∑M
j=1 x
i
W) ≥
0, for all x ∈ X , or equivalently p(σ(xW) + d)>(z − σ(xW)) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Σ, that is,
σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW).
By assumption FW(z) = p(z + d) is strongly monotone and Σ is closed, convex
(since the sets X i are closed, convex), hence by [FP07, Thm. 2.3.3] VI(Σ, FW) has
4Proposition 6 goes in both directions here as there is no coupling constraint, see the discussion in
Section 4.2.
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a unique solution σW. By definition of variational inequality, for any z ∈ Σ it holds
p(σW + d)
>(z − σW) ≥ 0. By definition of xW ∈ XW, we have σ(xW) = σW. It
follows that p(σ(xW) + d)
>(z − σ(xW)) ≥ 0 for any z ∈ Σ. By definition of Σ, we
conclude that (5.11) holds for all x ∈ X . By Proposition 6, we conclude that xW
is a Wardrop equilibrium.
(b) By assumption the set X is convex and closed and JS(σ(x)) is convex. Hence, any
social optimizer xS satisfies the first order condition in Proposition 3
∇x[p(σ(x) + d)(σ(x) + d)]>|x=xS(x− xS) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X . (5.12)
Note that M∇xi(p(σ(x)+d)>(σ(x)+d)) = p(σ(xS)+d)+[∇zp(σ(xS)+d)](σ(xS)+
d) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Consequently, (5.12) is equivalent to [p(σ(xS) + d) +
∇zp(σ(xS) +d)(σ(xS) +d)]>(σ(x)−σ(xS)) ≥ 0 . Thus σ(xS) solves VI(Σ, FS). The
remaining claims are shown similarly to those for xW.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof.
(a) Note that Assumption 8 implies strong monotonicity of z 7→ p(z + d), and strong
convexity of z 7→ p(z+d)>(z+d). Thus the assumptions of Lemma 7 are satisfied.
Let xW be a Wardrop equilibrium. By Lemma 7 part 1, σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW).
Thanks to Assumption 8, FS(z) = C(z + d) + C
>(z + d) = 2C(z + d) = 2FW(z).
Since the two operators FW(z) and FS(z) are parallel for each z ∈ Σ, it follows
from the definition of variational inequality that σ(xW) must solve VI(Σ, FS) too.
Using Lemma 7 part 2 we conclude that xW must be a social optimizer.
(b) By definition JS(σ(xS)) ≤ JS(σ(xN)) and so 1 ≤ PoAM . Observe that the as-
sumptions on the sets {X i}Mi=1 together with Assumption 8 imply Assumption 1
and ensures that J i(z1, z2) is Lipschitz with respect to z2 in X 0. Thus, the as-
sumptions of Theorem 1 part 3 are satisfied. It follows that for any Nash equi-
librium xN and Wardrop equilibrium xW of the game GM , it holds ||σ(xW) −
σ(xN)|| ≤
√
2R2Lpα−1M−1. Thus, using the Lipschitz property of JS one has that
|JS(σ(xN)) − JS(σ(xW))| ≤ LSR
√
2Lpα−1M−1 = c
√
M−1. Since every Wardrop
equilibrium is socially optimum (previous point of this proof), one has |JS(σ(xN))−
JS(σ(xS))| ≤ c
√
M−1 and thus JS(σ(xN)) ≤ JS(σ(xS)) + c
√
M−1. The final result
regarding the price of anarchy follows from the latter inequality upon dividing both
sides by JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ ≥ 0.
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Proof of Theorem 3
Proof.
(a) We first show that any Wardrop equilibrium is a social optimizer. To do so, observe
that the function f(y) = αyk satisfies all the assumptions required by Lemma 7
(see Lemma 9 in the Appendix). Let xW be a Wardrop equilibrium of GM . By
Lemma 7, σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW). Thanks to Assumption 6 and the choice of
f(y),
FS(z) = (k + 1)[α(z1 + d1)
k, . . . , α(zn + dn)
k]> = (k + 1)FW(z) .
Hence σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FS) too. Using Lemma 7 we conclude that xW must be
a social optimizer. The proof is now identical to the proof of the second part of
Theorem 2.
(b) If f(y) does not take the form αyk for some α > 0 and k > 0, by Lemma 8 there
exists a point z¯ ∈ Rn>0 for which FW(z¯) and FS(z¯) are not aligned, i.e., for which
FS(z¯) 6= hFW(z¯) for all h ∈ R. We intend to construct a sequence of games GM so
that for every GM in the sequence the unique average at the Wardrop equilibrium
is exactly z¯, that is z¯ solves VI(Σ, FW), but z¯ does not solve VI(Σ, FS). This fact
indeed proves, by Lemma 7, that for any game GM the Wardrop equilibria of GM
are not social minimizers. By Theorem 1, σ(xN)→ σ(xW) as M →∞. Thus, PoA
cannot converge to 1.
In the following we construct a sequence of games with the above mentioned prop-
erties. To this end let us define X i := X¯ ⊆ Rn, so that Σ = X¯ with X¯ :=
{z¯+αv1 +βv2 α, β ∈ [0 1]}∩Rn≥0, where v1 := F¯W, v2 := (F¯>WF¯S)F¯W− (F¯>WF¯W)F¯S
and F¯W := FW(z¯), F¯S := FS(z¯); see Figure 5.1. The intuition is that −v2 is the
component of F¯S that lives in the same plane as F¯S and F¯W and is orthogonal
to F¯W , so that F¯
>
Wv2 = 0. Observe that Σ = X¯ is the intersection of a bounded
and convex set with the positive orthant and thus satisfies Assumptions 1, 5 and
6. It is easy to verify that z¯ ∈ X¯ and that FW(z¯)>(z − z¯) = α||FW(z¯)||2 ≥ 0 for
all z ∈ Σ = X¯ , so that z¯ solves VI(Σ, FW). Let us pick zˆ = z¯ + βv2. Note that
since z¯ > 0, for β small enough zˆ belongs to Rn>0 as well and thus to X¯ . Then
FS(z¯)
>(zˆ − z¯) = β(F¯>S F¯W)2 − β||F¯S||2||F¯W||2 < 0. The inequality is strict because
F¯W, F¯S are neither parallel nor zero (Lemma 8). Thus, z¯ does not solve VI(Σ, FS).
Lemma 8. For n ≥ 2, if f(y) satisfies Assumptions 1, 5 and 6, but does not take the
form αyk for some α > 0 and k > 0, then there exists z¯ ∈ Rn>0 such that FS(z¯) 6= hFW(z¯),
∀h ∈ R. Moreover, FS(z¯) 6= 0, FW(z¯) 6= 0.
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Proof. Let us consider the first statement. By contradiction, assume there exists β(z) :
Rn>0 → R such that FS(z) = β(z)FW(z) for all z ∈ Rn>0. This implies
f ′(zt + dt)(zt + dt) = (β(z1, . . . , zn)− 1)f(zt + dt) , (5.13)
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all z ∈ Rn>0, d ∈ Rn>0. By Assumption 6, f(zt + dt) >
0. Hence one can divide (5.13) for f(zt + dt) without loss of generality, and conclude
that β(z1, . . . , zn) = β1(z1) = · · · = βn(zn) with βi : R → R for all z ∈ Rn>0. For
n ≥ 2 the last condition implies β(z1, . . . , zn) = b constant. Equation (5.13) reads as
f ′(y)y = (b − 1)f(y) ∀y > 0, whose continuously differentiable solutions are all and
only f(y) = ayb−1. Note that if a ≤ 0 or b ≤ 1, Assumption 1 is not satisfied, while if
a > 0 and b > 1 we contradicted the assumption that f(y) did not take the form αyk
for some α > 0 and k > 0. Setting h = 0 in the previous claim gives FS(z¯) 6= 0. Since
f : R>0 → R>0, one has FW(z¯) := [f(z¯t + dt)]nt=1 6= 0.
Lemma 9. Suppose that the price function p is as in Assumption 6 with f(y) = αyk,
α > 0, k > 0. Then p satisfies Assumptions 4 and 5.
Proof. Note that ∇zp(z+ d) is a diagonal matrix with entry f ′(zt + dt) in position (t, t).
Since f ′(y) = αkyk−1 > 0 for all y > 0 and since zt + dt is positive by assumption for
all t, we get that p(z + d) is continuously differentiable and that ∇zp(z + d)  0, i.e.,
that z 7→ p(z + d) is strongly monotone. Similarly, one can show that the Hessian of
p(z + d)>(z + d) and the Hessian of J i(xi, σ(x)) with respect to xi are positive definite.
Thus, z 7→ p(z + d)>(z + d) and xi 7→ J i(xi, σ(x)) are strongly convex.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove only the first claim as the second can be shown as in Theorem 2. To
do so, we define Cσ1(σ2) := p(σ1 + d)
>(σ2 + d) so that JS(σ) = Cσ(σ). Let xW be any
Wardrop equilibrium. Then, the average σ¯ := σW solves VI(Σ, FW ), i.e., FW (σ¯)
>(σ −
σ¯) ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ. This can be seen following the proof of Lemma 7, and observing that
only convexity and closedness of X i are required. Equivalently, JS(σ¯) ≤ C σ¯(σ), ∀σ ∈ Σ.
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However,
C σ¯(σ) =
∑
t
lt(σ¯t + dt)(σt + dt)
= JS(σ) +
∑
t
[lt(σ¯t + dt)− lt(σt + dt)](σt + dt)
= JS(σ) +
∑
t
[lt(vt)− lt(wt)]wt
lt(vt)vt
lt(vt)vt
≤ JS(σ) +
∑
t
β(L)lt(vt)vt
= JS(σ) + β(L)JS(σ¯)
where we used vt := σ¯t + dt ≥ dt, wt := σt + dt ≥ dt and dt ≥ 0. The previous
relation holds for all σ ∈ Σ. Selecting σ = σS (the optimum average), we get JS(σ¯) ≤
JS(σS) + β(L)JS(σ¯). Rearranging we obtain (5.7).
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CHAPTER 6
Decentralized algorithms
In this chapter we are interested in the design of algorithms that converge to a Nash
or a Wardrop equilibrium of a given game GM , formally defined in (4.3). All the proofs
are reported in the Appendix (Section 6.3). The results presented in this chapter have
been published in [Pac+16; Pac+18]. Throughout the following sections we assume
that no agent i wishes to disclose information about his cost function J i or individual
constraint set X i, to other agents, or to a central operator. Thus, we turn our atten-
tion to decentralized algorithms. The advantage in using such algorithms is not limited
to privacy-preserving issues, but decentralized algorithms are generally preferred when
dealing with large scale systems for various reasons, including that of computational
tractability. For a comprehensive list of advantages and shortcomings in the use of dis-
tributed computing, we redirect the reader to the monograph [BT89]. In the following
we assume the presence of a central operator able to measure only aggregate quantities,
such as the population average σ(x), and to broadcast aggregate signals to the agents.
Figure 6.1 describes the setup more clearly, in relation to Algorithm 4. Based on this
information structure, we focus on the design of decentralized algorithms to obtain a
solution of either VI(Q, FN) or VI(Q, FW). As the techniques are the same for Nash
and Wardrop equilibrium, we consider the general problem VI(Q, F ), where F can be
replaced with FN or FW.
Throughout this chapter we assume linearity of the coupling constraints as by As-
sumption 8, and observe that this property arises in a range of applications, as detailed,
e.g., in [FK07, p. 188] and [YP17].
Assumption 8. The coupling constraint in (4.1) is of the form
x ∈ C := {x ∈ RMn |Ax ≤ b} ⊂ RMn, (6.1)
with A := [A(:,1), . . . , A(:,M)] ∈ Rm×Mn, A(:,i) ∈ Rm×n for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, b ∈ Rm.
Moreover, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the set X i can be expressed as X i = {xi ∈ Rn|gi(xi) ≤
0}, where gi : Rn → Rpi is continuously differentiable. The set Q, which can thus
be expressed as Q = {x ∈ RMn|gi(xi) ≤ 0, ∀i, Ax ≤ b}, satisfies Slater’s constraint
qualification [BV04, Eq. (5.27)]. Each agent i has information on the sub-matrix A(:,i)
in (6.1), i.e., he is aware of his influence on the coupling constraint.
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If the operator F associated with the variational inequality VI(Q, F ) is integrable1
and monotone on Q, that is, if there exists a convex function E(x) : RMn → R such that
F (x) = ∇xE(x) for all x ∈ Q, then VI(Q, F ) is equivalent to the convex optimization
problem [FP07, Sec. 1.3.1]
arg min
x∈Q
E(x).
Therefore a solution of VI(Q, F ) and thus a variational equilibrium can be found by ap-
plying any of the decentralized optimization algorithms available in the literature of con-
vex optimization [BT89]; the decentralized structure arises because each agent can evalu-
ate∇xiE(x) by knowing only his strategy xi and σ(x). Since the integrability assumption
guarantees that G is a potential game with potential function E(x) [MS96], decentralized
convergence tools for potential games such as [DHZ06; MAS09] can also be employed.
In light of this observation, our objective is to determine a solution of VI(Q, F ) when
F is not necessarily integrable, so that the previous methods do not apply. In oder to
construct a decentralized scheme, we begin by reformulating VI(Q, F ) in an extended
space [x;λ] following the spirit of primal-dual methods used in optimization. The variable
λ represents the Lagrange multipliers associated to the coupling constraint C. The
following two reformulations will be used to propose two corresponding decentralized
algorithms. Formally, for any given λ ∈ Rm≥0, we define the λ-dependent game as
G(λ) :=

agents {1, . . . ,M}
cost of agent i J i(xi, σ(x)) + λ>A(:, i)xi
individual constraint X i
coupling constraint RMn
, (6.2)
and introduce the extended VI(Y , T ), where
Y := X × Rm≥0 , T (x, λ) :=
[
F (x) + A>λ
−(Ax− b)
]
.
The following proposition draws a connection between VI(Q, F ), the game G(λ) and
VI(Y , T ).
Proposition 8. [Scu+12, Sec. 4.3.2] Let Assumptions 1 and 8 hold. The following
statements are equivalent.
(a) The vector x¯ is a solution of VI(Q, F ).
(b) There exists λ¯ ∈ Rm≥0 such that x¯ is a variational equilibrium of G(λ¯) and 0 ≤ λ¯ ⊥
b− Ax¯ ≥ 0.
1A necessary and sufficient condition for the integrability of the operator F is that ∇xF (x) =
∇xF (x)> for all x ∈ Q [FP07, Thm. 1.3.1].
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(c) There exists λ¯ ∈ Rm≥0 such that the vector [x¯; λ¯] is a solution of VI(Y , T ). 
While the proof is an adaptation of [Scu+12, Sec. 4.3.2], we provide a sketch of
it for completeness at the end of this chapter. In the following Sections 6.1 and 6.2
we exploit the equivalence between the statements in Proposition 8 to propose two
algorithms that converge to a Wardrop or Nash equilibrium. A numerical comparison
of their performance can be found in Chapter 12. We summarize in Table 6.1 the main
conditions that guarantee their convergence.
Nash Wardrop
Best-response
-
FW strongly monotone
(Algorithm 3) and Assumption 9
Gradient-based
FN strongly monotone FW strongly monotone
(Algorithm 4)
Table 6.1: Range of applicability of the presented algorithms, under Assumption 1
and Assumption 2.
6.1 Best-response algorithm for Wardrop equilibrium
Based on the equivalence between the first two statements of Proposition 8, we intro-
duce Algorithm 3. The algorithm features i) an outer loop, in which the central operator
updates and broadcasts to the agents the dual variables λ(k) based on the current con-
straint violation, and ii) an inner loop, in which the agents update their strategies to
reach a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G(λ(k)). Since G(λ(k)) is a game without cou-
pling constraints, the Wardrop equilibrium can be found, e.g., via the iterative algorithm
proposed in [Gra+16, Alg. 1]. In order to ease the forthcoming notation, we define for
each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} the best-response map to z ∈ 1
M
∑M
i=1X i and dual variables
λ ∈ Rm≥0 as
xibr(z, λ) := arg min
xi∈X i
J i(xi, z) + λ>A(:, i)xi. (6.3)
Assumption 9. For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and λ ∈ Rm≥0, the mapping z 7→ xibr(z, λ) is
single valued and Lipschitz with constant L. Moreover, one of the following holds.
(a) For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and λ ∈ Rm≥0, the mapping z 7→ xibr(z, λ) is non-expansive
(see Chapter 3).
(b) For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and λ ∈ Rm≥0, the mapping z 7→ z − xibr(z, λ) is strongly
monotone.
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Algorithm 3 (Best-response algorithm for Wardrop equilibrium)
1: Initialise k = 0, τ > 0, x(0) ∈ RnM , λ(0) ∈ Rm≥0
2: while not converged do
3: h = 0, x˜i(0) = x
i
(k), z(0) ∈ Rn.
4: while not converged do
5: x˜i(h+1) = x
i
br(z(h), λ(k)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
6: σ˜(h+1) =
1
M
∑M
j=1 x˜
j
(h+1)
7: z(h+1) = (1− 1h)z(h) + 1h σ˜(h+1)
8: h← h+ 1
9: end while
10: x(k+1) = x˜(h)
11: λ(k+1) = ΠRm≥0
(
λ(k) − τ(b− Ax(k+1))
)
12: k ← k + 1
13: end while
Convergence of the inner loop to a Wardrop equilibrium of the game G(λ(k)) is guar-
anteed by Assumption 9 in [Gra+16, Thm. 3 and Cor. 1]. Additionally, [Gra+16]
provides sufficient conditions for Assumption 9 to hold, relative to cost functions of the
form (4.10). More precisely, it is shown that Q  0 and C = C>  0 or Q  0 and
Q− C>Q−1C  0 imply Assumption 9 [Gra+16, Thm.2 ].
Theorem 5 (Convergence of Algorithm 3). Suppose that the operator FW in (4.6b) is
strongly monotone on X with constant α, that Assumptions 1, 8 and 9 hold, and that
X i is bounded for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. If τ < 2α‖A‖2 , then x(k) in Algorithm 3 converges to
a variational Wardrop equilibrium of G.
Two observations on Theorem 5 follow. First, we note that the convergence result
of Theorem 5 holds in the ideal case when, for every fixed λ(k), the inner loop converges
to the exact Wardrop equilibrium. Since this assumption is hardly satisfied due to the
finite precision offered by traditional computers, one would like to obtain a guarantee
on the convergence of the overall algorithm even if the internal loop provides only an
approximate solution. We do not further pursue this direction and instead leave this as
a future work. Second, we observe that the convergence speed of Algorithm 3 is, to the
best of our knowledge, an open question. Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize the
convergence rate in each of the two levels separately. In particular, if in Assumption 9 it
holds that z 7→ z−xibr(z, λ) is strongly monotone, then it is possible to modify line 7 with
z(h+1) ← (1 − 1µ)z(h) + 1µ σ˜(h+1) and guarantee geometric convergence for µ ∈ [0, 1] small
enough, see [Ber07, Thm. 3.6 (iii)]. The outer loop on the other hand has geometric
convergence under the additional assumption that the mapping Φ as defined in the proof
of Theorem 5 is not only co-coercive but also strongly monotone.
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To the best of our knowledge Algorithm 3 is the first algorithm that guarantees
convergence to a Wardrop equilibrium in games with coupling constraints using a best-
response algorithm. We note that, for the case of specific costs (4.10), [Gra17] proposes
a best-response algorithm that converges to a pair (x¯, λ¯) such that x¯ is a Wardrop
equilibrium of the game G(λ¯) satisfying the coupling constraint C. However such point
is not a Wardrop equilibrium because the complementarity condition 0 ≤ λ¯ ⊥ b −
Ax¯ ≥ 0 is not guaranteed. A gradient-step algorithm based on two nested loops for
Nash equilibrium with coupling constraints has been proposed in [Pan+10, Alg. 2] and
in [Pav07, Sec. 4].
6.2 Gradient-based algorithm for Nash and
Wardrop equilibria
In this section we devise a decentralized algorithm to achieve a Nash or a Wardrop
equilibrium using the reformulation of VI(Q, F ) as a variational inequality in the the
extended space Y , see Proposition 8.
Algorithm 4 proceeds as in the following. After an initialization phase, the agents
communicate their current decision variables to the central operator, which in turn broad-
casts the initial average and dual variable σ(0), λ(0) to all agents. At every subsequent it-
eration the agents update their decision variable and communicate their updated strategy
to the central operator, which in turn updates the dual variable to λ(k+1) and broadcasts
σ(k+1), λ(k+1) to the agents. Figure 6.1 describes the flow of information for Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 (Gradient-based algorithm for Nash equilibrium)
1: Initialise k = 0, τ > 0, x(0) ∈ RnM , λ(0) ∈ Rm≥0
2: while not converged do
3: σ(k) =
1
M
∑M
i=1 x
i
(k)
4: xi(k+1) = ΠX i
(
xi(k) − τ
(
∇xiJ i(xi(k), σ(x(k))) + A>(:,i)λ(k)
))
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
5: λ(k+1) = ΠRm≥0
(
λ(k) − τ(b− 2Ax(k+1) + Ax(k))
)
alg:eqouter
6: k ← k + 1
7: end while
Remark 5. While Algorithm 4 is presented here for the computation of a Nash equilib-
rium, the same algorithm can be used to compute a Wardrop equilibrium upon replacing
∇xiJ i(xi(k), σ(x(k))) with ∇xiJ i(xi(k), z)|z=σ(x) in line 4.
57
broadcast (one to all)
 (k), (k)
strategy update gather (all to one)
x(k+1)
operator computes  (k+1),  (k+1)
Figure 6.1: Information flow for Algorithm 4
The fundamental ingredient that guarantees the convergence of Algorithm 3 is the
strong monotonicity of the operator associated to the corresponding variational inequal-
ity, as formalized next.
Theorem 6. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 8 hold. Then
(a) Let FN in (4.6a) be strongly monotone on X with constant α and Lipschitz on X
with constant LF . Let τ > 0 s.t.
τ <
−L2F+
√
L4F+4α
2‖A‖2
2α‖A‖2 . (6.4)
Then x(k) in Algorithm 4 converges to a variational Nash equilibrium of G in (4.3).
(b) Let FW in (4.6b) be strongly monotone and Lipschitz on X with constants α, LF , re-
spectively. Let τ satisfies (6.4). Then Algorithm 4 with ∇xiJ i(xi(k), z)|z=σ(x) in place
of ∇xiJ i(xi(k), σ(x(k))) in line 4 converges to a variational Wardrop equilibrium.
Remark 6 (Convergence rate). If the operator F is not only monotone but also affine,
and the set X is a polyhedron, then Algorithm 4 converges R-linearly for τ sufficiently
small, i.e., lim supk→∞(‖y(k) − y¯‖)
1
k < 1, [Pac+16, Prop. 1].
We conclude this section observing that, while there are other gradient-based algo-
rithms that allow to solve VI(Y , T ) in a decentralized fashion, they typically require
a higher number of gradient steps in each iteration. For example, the extragradient
algorithm [FP07, Alg. 12.1.9] requires two updates for both x and λ at each iteration.
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6.3 Appendix
6.3.1 Proofs of the results presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Under Assumptions 1 and 8 the set Q, and consequently the sets {X i}Mi=1, X and
Y , are convex and satisfy Slater’s constraint qualification. The VI(Q, F ) is therefore
equivalent to its KKT system [FP07, Prop. 1.3.4]. Moreover, since X i satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification, the optimization problem of agent i in the game (6.2) is equiv-
alent to its KKT system, for each i. Finally, by [FP07, Prop. 1.3.4], the VI(Y , T ) is
equivalent to its KKT system. We do not report the three KKT systems here, but it
can be seen by direct inspection that they are identical [Scu+12, Section 4.3.2].
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We split the proof of the theorem into two parts. First we show convergence of
the inner loop and then of the outer loop.
Inner loop. Using the same approach of [Gra+16, Thm. 3 and Cor. 1], it is possible
to show that under Assumption 9 for any λ(k) ∈ Rm≥0 the sequences of z(h) and of x˜(h)
converge respectively to z¯ and to x¯ such that z¯ = 1
M
∑M
i=1 x
i
or(z¯, λ(k)) =:
1
M
∑M
i=1 x¯
i =
σ(x¯). In [Gra+16, Thm. 1] it is shown that the set {x¯i}Mi=1 is an ε-Nash equilibrium for
the game G(λ(k)), with ε = O( 1M ). In the following, we show that {x¯i}Mi=1 is actually a
Wardrop equilibrium of G(λ(k)). Indeed, for each agent i, by the definition of optimal
response in (6.3), one has
J i(x¯i, z¯) + λ>(k)A(:,i)x¯
i ≤ J i(xi, z¯) + λ>(k)A(:,i)xi,∀xi ∈ X i .
Using the fact that z¯ = σ(x¯), we get
J i(x¯i, σ(x¯)) + λ>(k)A(:,i)x¯
i ≤ J i(xi, σ(x¯)) + λ>(k)A(:,i)xi,
for all xi ∈ X i and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Thus {x¯i}Mi=1 is a Wardrop equilibrium of
G(λ(k)) by Definition 7.
Outer loop. We follow the steps of the proof of [Pan+10, Proposition 8]. For each
λ ∈ Rm≥0 define FW(x;λ) := FW(x) + A>λ. Such operator is strongly monotone in x on
Q with the same constant α as FW(x). It follows by Lemma 1, that G(λ) has a unique
variational Wardrop equilibrium which we denote by x¯W(λ). Note that the outer loop
update can be written as
λ(k+1) = ΠRm≥0 [λ(k) − τ(b− Ax¯W(λ(k)))],
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which is a step of the projection algorithm [FP07, Alg. 12.1.4] applied to VI(Rm≥0,Φ),
with Φ(λ) := b − Ax¯W(λ). To conclude, it suffices to show that λ(k) converges to a
solution λ¯ of such VI, because by [FP07, Prop. 1.1.3], λ¯ solves VI(Rm≥0,Φ) if and only if
0 ≤ λ¯ ⊥ (b − Ax¯W(λ¯)) ≥ 0. Having already proved convergence of the inner loop, the
conclusion then follows from the second statement of Proposition 8.
To show that the sequence λ(k) converges to a solution of the VI(Rm≥0,Φ), we prove
that the mapping Φ is co-coercive (see Chapter 3) with co-coercitivity constant cΦ =
α/‖A‖2 and apply [FP07, Thm. 12.1.8] to conclude the proof. Note that [FP07, Thm.
12.1.8] requires VI(Rm≥0,Φ) to have at least a solution; this is guaranteed by the equiv-
alence between the first two statements in Proposition 8 upon noting that a solution of
VI(Q,F ) exists by Lemma 1.
To show co-coercitivity of Φ, consider λ1, λ2 ∈ Rm≥0 and the corresponding unique
solutions x1 := x¯W(λ1) of VI(X ,FW +A>λ1) and x2 := x¯W(λ2) of VI(X ,FW +A>λ2). By
definition
(x2 − x1)>(FW(x1) + A>λ1) ≥ 0 , (6.5a)
(x1 − x2)>(FW(x2) + A>λ2) ≥ 0 . (6.5b)
Adding (6.5a) and (6.5b) we obtain (x2−x1)>(FW(x1)−FW(x2)+A>(λ1−λ2)) ≥ 0, i.e.,
(x2− x1)>A>(λ1−λ2) ≥ (x2− x1)>(FW(x2)−FW(x1)). Since FW is strongly monotone,
it follows from the last inequality that
(Ax2 − Ax1)>(λ1 − λ2) ≥ α‖x2 − x1‖2 . (6.6)
Since by definition ‖A(x2 − x1)‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖x2 − x1‖, then
‖x2 − x1‖2 ≥ ‖A(x2 − x1)‖
2
‖A‖2 . (6.7)
Combining (6.6), (6.7), and adding and subtracting b, we obtain
(b− Ax2 − (b− Ax1))>(λ2 − λ1) ≥ α‖A‖2‖b− Ax2 − (b− Ax1)‖
2,
hence Φ is co-coercive in λ with constant cΦ = α/‖A‖2.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We give the proof for a strongly monotone operator F , which is to be interpreted
as FN in the first statement and FW in the second statement. We divide the proof into
two parts: i) we prove that Algorithm 4 is a particular case of a class of algorithms known
as asymmetric projection algorithms (APA) [FP07, Alg. 12.5.1] applied to VI(Y , T ); ii)
we prove that our algorithm satisfies a convergence condition for APA. It can be shown
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that if τ satisfies (6.4) then also τ < 1/‖A‖ holds.
i) The APA are parametrized by the choice of a matrix D  0. For a fixed D a step of
the APA for VI(Y , T ) is
y(k+1) = solution of VI(Y , T kD), (6.8)
where y(k) is the state at iteration k and T
k
D(y) := T (y(k)) + D(y − y(k)). Every step of
the APA requires the solution of a different variational inequality that depends on the
operator T , on a fixed matrix D and on the previous strategies’ vector y(k). We choose
D :=
[
1
τ
IMn 0
−2A 1
τ
Im
]
, (6.9)
which by using the Schur complement condition can be shown to positive definite because
τ < 1/‖A‖. It is shown in [FP07, Sec. 12.5.1] that with the choice (6.9) the update (6.8)
coincides with the steps of Algorithm 4.
ii) As illustrated in the previous point, Algorithm 4 is the specific APA associated with
the choice of D given in (6.9). According to [FP07, Prop. 12.5.2], this algorithm con-
verges if the mapping G(y) = D
−1/2
s T (D
−1/2
s y) − D−1/2s (D − Ds)D−1/2s y is co-coercive
with constant 1, where Ds = (D+D
>)/2 and D−1/2s denotes the principal square root of
the symmetric positive definite matrix D−1s and is therefore symmetric positive definite.
Let us rename L := D
−1/2
s and Ly =
[
v
w
]
and simplify the expression of G(y)
G(y) = LT (Ly)− L(D −Ds)Ly
= L
([
F (v)
0
]
+
[
0 A>
−A 0
]
Ly +
[
0
b
])
− L
[
0 A>
−A 0
]
Ly
= L
([
F (v)
0
]
+
[
0
b
])
.
(6.10)
We now prove that G(y) is co-coercive with constant 1, i.e., that
(y1 − y2)>(G(y1)−G(y2))− ‖G(y1)−G(y2)‖2 ≥ 0. (6.11)
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Let us substitute (6.10) in the left-hand side of (6.11)
(y1 − y2)>(G(y1)−G(y2))− ‖G(y1)−G(y2)‖2
= (y1 − y2)>(L
[
F (v1)
0
]
− L
[
F (v2)
0
]
)− ‖L
[
F (v1)
0
]
− L
[
F (v2)
0
]
‖2
= (Ly1 − Ly2)>(
[
F (v1)− F (v2)
0
]
)− ‖L
[
F (v1)− F (v2)
0
]
‖2
= (
[
v1 − v2
w1 − w2
]
)>(
[
F (v1)− F (v2)
0
]
)−
[
F (v1)− F (v2)
0
]>
L2
[
F (v1)− F (v2)
0
]
= (F (v1)− F (v2))>[(v1 − v2)− [L2]11(F (v1)− F (v2))]
≥ α‖v1 − v2‖2 − ‖[L2]11‖‖F (v1)− F (v2))‖2
≥ (α− ‖[L2]11‖L2F ) ‖v1 − v2‖2 =: K‖v1 − v2‖2,
The proof is concluded if K ≥ 0. Let us compute [L2]11 = [D−1s ]11. By inverting the
block matrix Ds we get
[L2]11 = τ(I − τ 2A>A)−1  0. (6.12)
Since τ 2A>A is symmetric positive semidefinite, λmax(τ 2A>A) = τ 2‖A‖2 < 1 because
τ < 1/‖A‖ and ρ(τ 2A>A) < 1, i.e., the matrix is convergent. Hence, the Neumann series∑∞
k=0(τ
2A>A)k converges to (I − τ 2A>A)−1. Substituting in (6.12) yields
[L2]11 = τ
∞∑
k=0
(τ 2A>A)k  0 and ‖[L2]11‖ ≤ τ
∞∑
k=0
(τ 2‖A‖2)k = τ
1− τ 2‖A‖2 ,
where we used the fact that the geometric series converges since τ 2‖A‖2 < 1. Therefore
K ≥ α− τ
1−τ2‖A‖2L
2
F . By condition (6.4) we get ατ
2‖A‖2 + τL2F < α and thus
K ≥ α− ατ
2‖A‖2 − τL2F
1− τ 2‖A‖2 > 0.
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CHAPTER 7
Applications
In this chapter we verify the theoretical results derived in the previous two chapters. In
particular, we consider a coordination problem arising in the charging of electric vehicles,
and a selfish routing model used in road traffic network. All the proofs are reported in
the Appendix (Section 7.3). The results presented in this chapter have been published
in [PKL16; Pac+16; Pac+18].
7.1 Charging of electric vehicles
Electric-vehicles (EV) are foreseen to significantly penetrate the market in the coming
years [NB+10], therefore coordinating their charging schedules can provide useful services
for the operation of the grid, e.g., peak shaving, ancillary services [GTL13]. In the
following we model this problem as a game, where vehicles owners wish to minimize their
total electricity bill, while requiring a sufficient final state of charge. By assuming that
the electricity price depends on the aggregate consumption, [MCH13; Gra+16] formulate
the EV charging problem as an aggregative game and propose decentralized schemes, in
the absence of coupling constraints. In this section, we show how the results derived in
the previous chapters can be used to study this problem. In particular, our formulation
extends the existing literature by introducing coupling constraints and by relaxing the
assumptions required for the convergence of the corresponding algorithms.1 In addition,
we study the performance degradation of an equilibrium configuration, when compared
to the centralized optimal solution. Finally, we establish uniqueness of the dual variables
associated to the violation of the coupling constraints.
In the remainder of this section, we consider a population of M electric vehicles and
identify with agent i the corresponding vehicle i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Additionally, we identify
with sit the state of charge of vehicle i at time t. The time evolution of s
i
t is specified
by the discrete-time system sit+1 = s
i
t + b
ixit , t = 1, . . . , n, where x
i
t is the charging input
and the parameter bi > 0 captures the charging efficiency.
1Coupling constraints model limits on the aggregate peak consumption or on the local consumption
of EVs connected to the same transformer.
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Constraints
We assume that the charging input cannot take negative values and that at time t it
cannot exceed x˜it ≥ 0. The final state of charge is constrained to sin+1 ≥ ηi, where ηi ≥ 0
is the desired state of charge of agent i. Denoting with xi = [xi1, . . . , x
i
n]
> ∈ Rn, the
individual constraint of agent i can be expressed as
xi ∈ X i :=
{
xi ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ xit ≤ x˜it, ∀ t = 1, . . . , n∑n
t=1 x
i
t ≥ θi
}
, (7.1)
where θi := (bi)
−1
(ηi − si1), with si1 ≥ 0 the state of charge at the beginning of the time
horizon. Besides the individual constraints xi ∈ X i, we introduce the coupling constraint
x ∈ C :=
{
x ∈ RMn
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
i=1
xit ≤ Kt, ∀ t = 1, . . . , n
}
, (7.2)
indicating that at time t the grid cannot deliver more than MKt units of power to the
vehicles. In compact form (7.2) reads as (1>M ⊗ In)x ≤MK , where K := [K1, . . . , Kn]>.
Cost function
The cost function of each vehicle represents its electricity bill, which we model as
J i(xi, σ(x)) =
n∑
t=1
pt
(
dt + σt(x)
κt
)
xit =: p(σ(x))
>xi, (7.3)
where we have assumed that the energy price for each time interval pt : R≥0 → R>0
depends on the ratio between total consumption and total capacity (dt + σt(x))/κt,
where dt and σt(x) :=
1
M
∑M
i=1 x
i
t are the non-EV and EV demand at time t divided by
M and κt is the total production capacity divided by M as in [MCH13, Eq. (6)]. The
quantity κt is in general not related to Kt.
7.1.1 Theoretical guarantees
We define the game GEVM as in (4.3), with X i, C and J i(xi, σ(x)) as in (7.1), (7.2) and
(7.3) respectively. In the following corollary we refine the main results of Chapter 4, 5
and Chapter 6 for the EV application.
Corollary 1. Consider a sequence of games (GEVM )∞M=1. Assume that there exists x˜0 such
that x˜it ≤ x˜0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and for each game GEVM . Moreover,
assume that for each game GEVM the set Q = C ∩ X is non-empty and that for each t
the price function pt in (7.3) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
Lipschitz in [0, x˜0] with constant Lp. Then:
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(a) A Wardrop and a Nash equilibrium exist for each game GEVM of the sequence. Fur-
thermore, every Wardrop equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium with ε = 2n(x˜
0)2Lp
M
.
(b) The function p is strongly monotone, hence for each game GEVM there exists a unique
σ¯ such that σ(x¯W) = σ¯ for any variational Wardrop equilibrium x¯W of GEVM . More-
over for any variational Nash equilibrium x¯N of GEVM , ‖σ(x¯N)−σ(x¯W)‖ ≤ x˜0
√
2nLp
αM
,
where α is the monotonicity constant of p.
(c) Assume that there is no coupling constraint, i.e., C = RMn, that dt > 0 for all t,
and that
∑M
i=1 θ
i > 0. If pt
(
dt+σt(x)
κt
)
= α
(
dt+σt(x)
κt
)k
with α > 0, k > 0, then
1 ≤ PoAM ≤ 1 +O
(
1/
√
M
)
and lim
M→∞
PoAM = 1 .
(d) Assume that
min
t∈{1,...,n}
z∈[0,x˜0]
(
p′t(z)−
x˜0p′′t (z)
8
)
> 0. (7.4)
For each game GEVM the operator FN is strongly monotone. Hence, if Assumption 8
holds, Algorithm 4 converges to a variational Nash equilibrium of GEVM .
We note that the previous corollary provides guarantees on the equilibrium efficiency
for the case of polynomial price functions. Nevertheless, different results can be obtained
in the case of affine or diagonal price function by applying the bounds derived in Theo-
rems 2 and 4. In this respect, the third statement of Corollary 1 is purely exemplificative.
Uniqueness of dual variables
Corollary 1 shows that under condition (7.4) the operator FN of GEVM is strongly mono-
tone, hence the game GEVM admits a unique variational Nash equilibrium (Lemma 1).
We study here the uniqueness of the associated dual variables λ¯N introduced in Proposi-
tion 8. Guaranteeing unique dual variables is important to convince the vehicles owners
to participate in the proposed scheme, as λ¯N represent the penalty price associated to
the coupling constraint. Define Rtight ⊆ {1, . . . , n} as the set of instants in which C is
active. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the dual variables which relies
on a modification of the linear-independence constraint qualification [Wac13].
Lemma 10. Assume that condition (7.4) holds and consider the unique variational Nash
equilibrium x¯N of GEVM . If there exists a vehicle i such that x¯iN,t /∈ {0, x˜it} for all t ∈ Rtight
and x¯iN,t′ /∈ {0, x˜it′} for some t′ /∈ Rtight, then the dual variables λ¯N associated to the
coupling constraint (7.2) are unique.
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We note that the sufficient condition of Lemma 10 has to be verified a-posteriori as it
depends on the primal solution x¯N. In the numerical analysis presented in the following
such sufficient condition always holds. Uniqueness of the dual variables associated to the
coupling constraint of an aggregative game has been studied also in [YSM11, Thm. 4],
where the conditions in the bullets of Lemma 10 are not required, but p is restricted to
be affine.
7.1.2 Numerical analysis
The numerical study is conducted on a heterogeneous population of agents. We set the
price function to pt(zt) = 0.15
√
zt and n = 24. The agents differ in θ
i, randomly chosen
according to U [0.5, 1.5]; they also differ in x˜it, which is chosen such that the charge is
allowed in a connected interval, with left and right endpoints uniformly randomly chosen.
Within this interval, x˜it is constant and randomly chosen for each agent according to
U [1, 5], while outside this interval x˜it = 0. The demand dt is taken as the typical (non-
EV) base demand over a summer day in the United States [MCH13, Fig. 1]; κt = 12
kW for all t, and the upper bound Kt = 0.55 kW is chosen such that the coupling
constraint (7.2) is active in the middle of the night. Note that with these choices all the
assumptions of Corollary 1 are met. In particular, for the given choice of p condition (7.4)
holds because p′′t (z) < 0 for all z and all t. Figure 7.1 presents the aggregate consumption
at the Nash equilibrium found by Algorithm 4, with stopping criterion ‖(x(k+1), λ(k+1))−
(x(k), λ(k))‖∞ ≤ 10−4. Note that without the coupling constraint the quantity σ¯+d would
be constant overnight, as shown in [MCH13].
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Figure 7.1: Aggregate EV demand σ(x¯N) and dual variables λ¯N for M = 100, subject to
σ(x) ≤ 0.55 kW. The region below the dashed line satisfies σ(x) + d ≤ 0.55 kW+d.
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Figure 7.2 illustrates the bound ‖σ(x¯N)−σ(x¯W)‖ ≤ x˜0
√
2nLp
αM
of the second statement
of Corollary 1. The Wardrop equilibrium is computed with the extragradient algorithm
with stopping criterion ‖(x(k+1), λ(k+1)) − (x(k), λ(k))‖∞ ≤ 10−4. The framework intro-
duced above can also be used to enforce local coupling constraints, i.e., constraints on
a subset of all the vehicles. These can for instance be used to model capacity limits for
local substations as we discuss in [Pac+16, Fig. 4].
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Figure 7.2: Distance between the aggregates at the Nash and Wardrop equilibrium (solid
line). Corollary 1 ensures that such distance is upper bounded by x˜0
√
2nLpα−1/M . The
dotted line shows 1/
√
M proving that our bound captures the correct trend.
The case of linear price function
Different works in the EV literature [Gra+16; KCM11] use the cost (4.10), with Q  0
and C  0, diagonal. Existence of a Nash and of a Wardrop equilibrium is guaranteed
by Lemma 1, while Proposition 7 gives the ε-Nash property. Further, Lemma 4 shows
that the resulting operators FN and FW are strongly monotone with monotonicity con-
stant independent from M . Theorem 1 ensures then that ‖x¯N− x¯W‖ ≤ L2/(α
√
M), with
L2 = R · λM, where λM represents the largest eigenvalue of C. A Nash equilibrium can
be found using Algorithm 4, while a Wardrop equilibrium can be achieved using both
Algorithms 3 and 4. Figure 7.3 presents a comparison between the two algorithms in
terms of iteration count, where Q = 0.1In, C = In, c
i = d for all i. Figure 7.3 (top)
represents the number of strategy updates required to converge, i.e., the number of times
line 5 in Algorithm 3 or line 4 in Algorithm 4 is used. Figure 7.3 (bottom) depicts the
number of dual variables updates, i.e., the number of times line 11 in Algorithm 3 or
line 5 in Algorithm 4 is used. For both algorithms the number of iterations does not
seem to increase with the population size. Algorithm 4 requires fewer primal iterations,
while Algorithm 3 needs much fewer dual iterations.
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Figure 7.3: Primal (top) and dual (bottom) updates required to converge; mean and
standard deviation for 10 repetitions. As Algorithm 4 performs one primal and one dual
update in each iteration, the black lines appearing in the two figures coincide.
Equilibrium efficiency
In this section we verify the theoretical results on the efficiency of equilibria obtained in
Corollary 1, by means of numerical simulations. We consider four cases as follows.
Case 1. We set pt(y) = 0.15y
3 and choose x˜it to allow charging in [t
i
min, t
i
max], with
timin, t
i
max uniformly randomly distributed between 5pm and 10am; θ
i ∼
U [5, 15] and dt as in [MCH13, Fig. 1].
Cases 2-4. We set pt(y) = 0.15 from 5pm to 1am and pt(y) = 0.15y from 2am to 10am.
For all vehicles, we choose x˜it to allow charging from 5pm to 10am. Cases
2-4 differ in θi, dt as in the following table.
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Case θi dt
2 9 0n
3 9 as in [MCH13, Fig. 1]
4 U [5, 13] 0n
For each case, we report the (numerical) price of anarchy as a function of M in Figure 7.4
(top). Observe that case 1 and 4 feature heterogenous charging needs. For these cases,
we have randomly extracted 100 games GEVM (for any fixed M) and report the worst PoA
amongst the 100 realization. In order to plot the price of anarchy, we computed the ratio
between one (instead of the worst) Nash equilibrium of GEVM and the social optimum.
This choice is imposed by the fact that computing all Nash equilibria of GEVM is in general
a hard problem.2 In Figure 7.4 (bottom) we plot the difference between the cost at the
Nash and at the social optimizer, relative to case 1.
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Figure 7.4: Price of anarchy (top), and cost difference between Nash and social optimum
(bottom) as a function of M .
2This is due to the fact that the operator associated with the variational inequality of the Nash
problem is not guaranteed to be strongly monotone since condition (7.4) does not hold due to the
choices of p(t) in Cases 1-4. To compute a Nash equilibrium we applied the extragradient algorithm
[FP07], which is though not guaranteed to converge. We thus verified a posteriori that the point where
the algorithm stopped was a Nash equilibrium.
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Thanks to the choice of parameters and price function, the third statement in Corol-
lary 1 guarantees that limM→∞ PoAM = 1. The numerical results reported in Figure 7.4
(top, black line) are consistent with it: the ratio between the cost at the Nash and the
cost at the social optimum converges to one. In addition to this, Figure 7.4 (bottom)
shows that also the difference between these costs converges to zero, as guaranteed in
the proof of Theorem 3 by the boundedness of X0. Case 2 has been constructed so that
the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium features the worst possible asymptotic price of
anarchy within the class of affine cost functions (for which α(L) = 4/3, see [Rou03]).
The numerics of Figure 7.4 (top, red line) show that PoAM (i.e., the efficiency of Nash
equilibria) converges to 1.33 ≈ 4/3 = α(L). Cases 3 and 4 are a modification of case 2.
While the presence of base demand (case 3) helps in lowering the price of anarchy, the
impact of heterogeneity (case 4) on the asymptotic price of anarchy is minor (blue and
green plots in Figure 7.4).
7.2 Route choice in a road network
As second application we consider that of traffic routing in a road network. Traffic
congestion is a well-recognized issue in densely populated cities, and the corresponding
economic costs are significant [AS94]. Since every driver seeks his own interest (e.g.,
minimizing the travel time) and is affected by the others’ choices via congestion, a classic
approach is to model the traffic problem as a game [Daf80]. In the following we focus
on a stationary model that aims at capturing the basic interactions among the vehicles
flow during rush hours. Building upon our theoretical findings, we derive results specific
for the route choice game. Moreover, we perform a realistic numerical analysis based on
the data set of the city of Oldenburg in Germany [Bri02]. Specifically, we investigate via
simulation the effect of road access limitations, expressed as coupling constraints [San75].
We consider a strongly-connected directed graph (V , E) with vertex set V = {1, . . . , V },
representing geographical locations, and directed edge set E = {1, . . . , E} ⊆ V ×V , rep-
resenting roads connecting the locations. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} represents a driver
who wants to drive from his origin oi ∈ V to his destination di ∈ V .
Constraints
Let us introduce the vector xi ∈ [0, 1]E to describe the strategy (route choice) of agent
i, with [xi]e representing the probability that agent i transits on edge e [DP05]. To
guarantee that agent i leaves his origin and reaches his destination with probability 1,
the strategy xi has to satisfy
∑
e∈in(v)
[xi]e −
∑
e∈out(v)
[xi]e =

−1 if v = oi
1 if v = di
0 otherwise,
∀ v ∈ V ,
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where in(v) and out(v) represent the set of in-edges and the set of out-edges of node v.
We denote the graph incidence matrix by B ∈ RV×E, so that [B]ve = 1 if edge e points
to vertex v, [B]ve = −1 if edge e exits vertex v and [B]ve = 0 otherwise. The individual
constraint set of agent i is then
X i := {x ∈ [0, 1]E |Bx = bi}, (7.5)
where bi ∈ RV is such that [bi]v = −1 if v = oi, [bi]v = 1 if v = di and [bi]v = 0 otherwise.
We introduce the constraint
x ∈ C := {x ∈ RME | 1
M
∑M
i=1 x
i
e ≤ Ke, ∀ e = 1, . . . , E}, (7.6)
expressing the fact that the number of vehicles on edge e cannot exceed MKe. Such
coupling constraint can be imposed by authorities to decrease the congestion in a specific
road or neighborhood, with the goal of reducing noise or pollution.
Cost function
We assume that each driver i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} wants to minimize his travel time and, at
the same time, does not want to deviate too much from a preferred route x˜i ∈ X i. We
model this objective with the following cost function
J i(xi, σ(x)) =
γi
2
‖xi − x˜i‖2 +
E∑
e=1
te(σe(xe))x
i
e, (7.7)
with γi ≥ 0 a weighting factor, xe := [x1e, . . . , xMe ]>, σe(xe) = 1M
∑M
i=1 x
i
e and te(σe(xe))
the travel time on edge e.
Travel time
This subsection is devoted to the derivation of the analytical expression of the travel
time te(σe(xe)). The reader not interested in the technical details of the derivation can
proceed to the expression of te(σe(xe)) in (7.10), which is illustrated in Figure 7.5.
In the following, we introduce the quantity De(xe) =
∑M
i=1 x
i
e to describe the total
demand on edge e and consider a rush-hour interval [0, h]. We assume that the instan-
taneous demand equals De(xe)/h at any time t ∈ [0, h] and zero for t > h. Additionally,
we assume that edge e can support a maximum flow Fe (vehicles per unit of time) and
features a free-flow travel time te,free. As we are interested in comparing populations of
different sizes, we further assume that the peak hour duration h is independent from the
population size M and that the road maximum capacity flow Fe scales linearly with the
population size, i.e., Fe(M) = fe ·M , with fe constant in M . The consideration under-
pinning this last assumption is that the road infrastructure scales with the number of
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vehicles to accommodate the increasing demand, similarly as what assumed in [MCH13]
for the energy infrastructure.
If De(xe)/h ≤ Fe then every car has instantaneous access to edge e and no queue
accumulates, hence the travel time equals te,free. We focus in the rest of this paragraph
on the case De(xe)/h > Fe. An increasing queue forms in the interval [0, h] and decreases
at rate Fe for t > h. The number of vehicles qe(t) queuing on edge e at time t obeys
then the dynamics
q˙e(t) =
{
De(xe)
h
· 1[0,h](t)− Fe if qe(t) ≥ 0
0 otherwise,
qe(0) = 0, (7.8)
where 1[0,h] is the indicator function of [0, h]. The solution qe(t) to (7.8) is hence
qe(t) =

(
De(xe)−Feh
h
)
t if 0 ≤ t ≤ h
De(xe)− Fe t if h ≤ t ≤ De(xe)/Fe
0 if t ≥ De(xe)/Fe.
(7.9)
As a consequence, the total queuing time at edge e (i.e, the queuing times summed over
all vehicles) is the integral of qe(t), which equals De(xe)(De(xe)−Feh)/(2Fe); the queuing
time is then (De(xe)− Feh)/(2Fe).
Since σe(xe) =
1
M
∑M
i=1 x
i
e =
1
M
De(xe), the travel time is
tPWAe (σe(xe)) =
{
te,free if σe(xe) ≤ feh
te,free +
σe(xe)−feh
2fe
otherwise,
and is reported in Figure 7.5. Note that tPWAe is a continuous and piece-wise affine
function of σe(xe), but it is not continuously differentiable, hence Assumption 1 would
not hold. Therefore, we define te appearing in (7.7) as the smoothed version of t
PWA
e
te(σe(xe)) =

te,free if σe(xe) ≤ feh−∆e
te,free +
σe(xe)−feh
2fe
if σe(xe) ≥ feh+ ∆e
aσe(xe)
2 + bσe(xe) + c otherwise,
(7.10)
where the values of ∆e, a, b, c are such that te is continuously differentiable
3, as illus-
trated in Figure 7.5. We note that the function te(σe(xe)) is used within a stationary
traffic model but includes the average queuing time which is based on the dynamic
function (7.9). A thorough analysis of a dynamic traffic model is subject of future work.
Finally, we remark that a travel time with similar monotonicity properties can be
derived from the piecewise affine fundamental diagram of traffic [LZ11, Fig. 7], but
te(σe(xe)) would present a vertical asymptote which is absent here.
3The values are ∆e = 0.5(
√
(feh)2 + 4feh − feh), a = 1/(8fe∆e), b = 1/(4fe) − h/(4∆e), c =
te,free + (feh)
2/(8fe∆e)− h/4− (∆e)/(8fe).
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Figure 7.5: Piece-wise affine travel time tPWAe (σe(xe)) and its smooth approximation
te(σe(xe)) as functions of σe(xe).
7.2.1 Theoretical guarantees
We define the route-choice game GRCM as in (4.3), with X i as in (7.5), C as in (7.6) and
J i(xi, σ(x)) as in (7.7), (7.10). In the following we summarize the main results from the
previous chapters.
Corollary 2. Consider the sequence of games (GRCM )∞M=1. Assume that for each game
GRCM the set Q = C ∩ X is non-empty, that h > 0 and te,free, fe > 0 for each e ∈ E.
Moreover, assume that there exists γˆ > 0 such that γi ≥ γˆ for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, for all
M . Then:
(a) The operator FW is strongly monotone, hence each game GRCM admits a unique
variational Wardrop equilibrium. For every M satisfying
M > max
e∈E
1
32fe∆eγˆ
(7.11)
the operator FN is strongly monotone, hence each game GRCM admits a unique varia-
tional Nash equilibrium. Every Wardrop equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium with
ε = E
Mfmin
, where fmin = mine∈E fe.
(b) For any variational Nash equilibrium x¯N of GRCM , the unique variational Wardrop
equilibrium x¯W of GRCM satisfies
‖x¯N − x¯W‖ ≤
√
E
2fminγˆ
√
M
.
(c) For any M , Algorithm 4 with operator FW converges to a variational Wardrop equi-
librium of GRCM . For M satisfying (7.11), Algorithm 4 with operator FN converges
to a variational Nash equilibrium of GRCM .
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7.2.2 Numerical analysis
For the numerical analysis we use the data set of the city of Oldenburg [Bri02], whose
graph features 175 nodes, 213 undirected edges, and is reported in Figure 7.6.4 For each
agent i the origin oi and the destination di are chosen uniformly at random. Regarding
the cost (7.7), te,free is computed as the ratio between the road length, which is provided
in the data set, and the free-flow speed. Based on the road topology, we divide the roads
into main roads, where the free-flow speed is 50 km/h, and secondary roads, where the
free-flow speed is 30 km/h. Moreover, we assume a peak hour duration h of 2 hours, and
for all e ∈ E , we set fe = 4 · 10−3 vehicles per second, which corresponds to 1 vehicle
every 4 seconds for a population of M = 60 vehicles. Finally, the parameter γi is picked
uniformly at random in [0.5, 3.5] and x˜i is such that x˜ie = 1 if e belongs to the shortest
path from oi to di, while x˜ie = 0 otherwise. The shortest path is computed based on
{te,free}Ee=1. Note that with the above values the bound (7.11) becomes M > 16.14, which
is satisfied for relatively small-size populations.
We compute the Wardrop equilibrium with Algorithm 4 relatively to a population of
M = 60 drivers without coupling constraint, i.e., with Ke = 1 for all e ∈ E . We report
in Figure 7.6 the corresponding queuing time te(σe(xe))− te,free as by (7.10).
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Figure 7.6: The queuing time reported in green-red color scale. Note that this pattern
changes if one modifies the pairs origin-destination.
4The graph in the original data set features 6105 vertexes and 7035 undirected edges. We reduce it
by excluding all the nodes that are outside the rectangle [3619, 4081] × [3542, 4158] and all the edges
that do not connect two nodes in the rectangle. The resulting graph is strongly connected.
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We illustrate in Figure 7.7 the change in the queuing time of an entire neighborhood
when introducing a coupling constraint that upper bounds the total number of cars on
a single edge, relatively to a Wardrop equilibrium with M = 60. Finally, we illustrate
the second statement of Corollary 2 by reporting in Figure 7.8 the distance between
the unique variational Wardrop equilibrium and the variational Nash equilibrium found
by Algorithm 4.
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Figure 7.7: On the left, the queuing time in a neighborhood without any coupling con-
straints; 10% of the population transits on edge 95, and the queuing time is 7.28 minutes.
On the right, the queuing time in presence of a coupling constraint allowing at most 3%
of the entire population on edge 95; the queuing time is reduced to 1.42 minutes, but it
visibly increases on the edges of the alternative route.
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Figure 7.8: Distance between Nash and Wardrop variational equilibria. The quantity
1/
√
M illustrates the trend of the bound in Corollary 2 and not the specific constant.
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7.3 Appendix
7.3.1 Proofs of the results presented in Sections 7.1 and 7.2
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof.
(a) First, we show that Assumption 1 holds. Indeed the sets X i in (7.1) are con-
vex and compact, the function g in (4.1) is affine and hence convex, and Q is
non-empty by assumption. For each z fixed, the function J i(xi, z) is linear hence
convex in xi. We prove in the last statement that FN is strongly monotone. This
is equivalent to ∇xFN(x)  0 by Lemma 2, which by definition of FN(x) implies
∇xi(∇xiJ i(xi, σ(x)))  0, which implies convexity of J i(xi, σ(x)). Finally, J i(z1, z2)
is continuously differentiable in [z1; z2] because pt is twice continuously differen-
tiable. Having verified Assumption 1, Lemma 1 guarantees the existence of a
Nash and of a Wardrop equilibrium. The ε-Nash property is guaranteed by Propo-
sition 7 upon verifying Assumption 2. This holds because: i) ∪Mi=1X i ⊆ [0, x˜0]n, ii)
J i(z1, z2) is Lipschitz in z2 on [0, x˜
0]n with Lipschitz constant L2 = RLp, iii) (5.1)
holds and iv) pt is assumed Lipschitz in [0, x˜
0] with Lipschitz constant Lp for all t.
We conclude by noting that R = x˜0
√
n.
(b) The fact that each pt is strictly increasing in [0, x˜
0] implies that ∇zp(z)  0 in
[0, x˜0]n, where p(z) :=
[
p1(
d1+z1
κ
), . . . , pn(
dn+zn
κ
)
]>
. In turn ∇zp(z)  0 guarantees
strong monotonicity of p in [0, x˜0]n by Lemma 2. This, together with Assumption 1
and Assumption 2 verified above, allows us to use the third result in Theorem 1.
(c) Given the special form of the sets {X i}Mi=1 and the price pt
(
dt+σt(x)
κt
)
, Assump-
tions 4, 5 and 6 are satisfied. In addition since
∑M
i=1 θ
i > 0, it must be that
JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ for some Jˆ ≥ 0. Thus, the assumptions of Theorem 3.
(d) The strong monotonicity of FN follows immediately thanks to Lemma 5. Addition-
ally, Assumption 1 holds as previously shown. Since Assumption 8 holds, we can
directly employ Theorem 6 and conclude the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. The constraints in (7.1), (7.2) can be expressed as Γx ≤ γ with
Γ =

IMn
−IMn
−IM ⊗ 1>n
1>M ⊗ In
 , γ =

x˜
0
−θ
MK
 ,
where θ = [θ1, . . . , θM ]>, and x˜ = [[x˜it]
n
t=1]
M
i=1. Let us partition the constraint matrix Γ
into its individual part Γ1 and coupling part Γ2
Γ =
[
Γ1
Γ2
]
, Γ1 =
 IMn−IMn
−IM ⊗ 1>n
 , Γ2 = [1>M ⊗ In] (7.12)
and γ = [γ>1 , γ
>
2 ]
> accordingly. The KKT conditions for VI(Q, FN) at the primal solution
x¯N are [FP07, Prop. 1.3.4]
FN(x¯N) + Γ
>
1 µ+ Γ
>
2 λ = 0,
0 ≤ µ ⊥ γ1 − Γ1x¯N ≥ 0, (7.13a)
0 ≤ λ ⊥ γ2 − Γ2x¯N ≥ 0. (7.13b)
Define µ˜ and λ˜ as the dual variables corresponding to the active constraints (the other
dual variables must be zero due to (7.13a) and (7.13b)). The KKT system (7.13) in µ˜, λ˜
only reads
Γ˜>1 µ˜+ Γ˜
>
2 λ˜ = −FN(x¯N),
µ˜, λ˜ ≥ 0 , (7.14)
where Γ˜1, Γ˜2 contain the subset of rows of Γ1,Γ2 corresponding to active constraints. To
conclude the proof we need to show that (7.14) has a unique solution λ˜. To this end
we apply the subsequent Lemma 11. To verify its assumption, we note that its negation
is equivalent, given the expressions of Γ˜1, Γ˜2 in (7.12), to the existence of R
′ ⊆ Rtight
such that for each vehicle i it holds x¯iN,t ∈ {0, x˜ir} for all t ∈ R′ or x¯iN,t ∈ {0, x˜it} for
t ∈ {1, . . . , n} \R′ and such R′ cannot exist by assumption.
Lemma 11. Consider A1 ∈ Rm×n1, A2 ∈ Rm×n2, b ∈ Rm. If the implication A1x1 +
A2x2 = 0 ⇒ x1 = 0 holds, then the linear system of equations A1x1 + A2x2 = b has at
most one solution in x1.
Proof. Assume Ax˜ = b and Axˆ = b, then A1x˜1 + A2x˜2 = b and A1xˆ1 + A2xˆ2 = b imply
A1(xˆ1 − x˜1) + A2(xˆ2 − x˜2) = 0, which by assumption implies xˆ1 = x˜1.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Proof.
(a) Satisfaction of Assumption 1 and the consequent existence of a variational Nash
and of a variational Wardrop equilibrium for any M can be shown as in Corollary 1.
The operator FW for the cost (7.7) reads
FW(x) = [γ
i(xi − xˆi) + t(σ(x))]Mi=1.
where t(σ(x)) := [te(σe(xe))]
E
e=1. Since te(σe(xe)) in (7.10) is a monotone function
of σe(xe), the operator t(σ(x)) is monotone. Then FW is strongly monotone with
constant γˆ because it is the sum of a monotone and a strongly monotone operator
with constant γˆ. As a consequence, each GRCM admits a unique variational Wardrop
equilibrium.
To prove strong monotonicity of FN we use the result of Lemma 2.
5 We first
note that each te only depends on the corresponding σe, hence ∇xFN(x) can be
permuted into diagonal form similarly to what done in (4.21). It then suffices
to show γˆIM +
1
M
t′e(σe)IM +
1
M2
t′′e(σe)xe1
>
M  0 for all σe and for all e. This
matrix is indeed positive definite if σe(xe) /∈ [feh − ∆e, feh + ∆e], because then
t′e(σe) ≥ 0 and t′′e(σe) = 0 by (7.10). For σe(xe) ∈ [feh − ∆e, feh + ∆e] it suf-
fices to show γˆIM +
1
M24fe∆e
xe1>M  0, because t′e(σe) ≥ 0 and t′′e(σe) = 14fe∆e .
By Lemma 6, λmin
(
xe1>M + 1Mx
>
e
)
/2 ≥ −M
8
, which proves strong monotonicity of
FN under (7.11). Consequently, if M satisfies (7.11) then GRCM admits a unique vari-
ational Nash equilibrium. Finally, we verify Assumption 2 in order to use Propo-
sition 7. We have X 0 = [0, 1]E and t is continuously differentiable and hence Lips-
chitz in X 0, with constant Lp = 1/(2fmin). Moreover, R := maxy∈X 0{‖y‖} =
√
E.
Using (5.1) concludes the proof.
(b) Since all the assumptions of Theorem 1 have just been verified, it is a direct con-
sequence of its second statement.
(c) As Assumption 8 holds trivially (the others have already been verified), we ap-
ply Theorem 6 and conclude the proof.
5Lemma 2 requires FN to be continuously differentiable, which is not the case here. The more general
result [Sch+96, Prop. 2.1] extends the statement of Lemma 2 to operators which are not continuously
differentiable. It then suffices to show ∇xFN(x)  0 for σ(x) in each of the three intervals defined
by (7.10), because in each of them FN is continuously differentiable.
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Part II
Programmable machines:
game design
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CHAPTER 8
Introduction
In this part of the thesis we focus on large scale cooperative systems composed of pro-
grammable machines, which we refer as multiagent systems. As discussed in the overview
of Chapter 1, one of the main challenges in the control of large scale cooperative sys-
tems rests in the design of control algorithms that achieve a given global objective by
relying solely on local information. The problem of designing local control algorithms
is typically posed as an optimization problem (finite or infinite dimensional), where the
system-level objective is captured by an objective function (functional), while physical
laws and informational availability are incorporated as constraints on the decision vari-
ables. The design is complete once a distributed decision making algorithm has been
found, satisfying the constraints and maximizing the objective function [DD03; Cor+02].
A well-established approach to tackle this problem consists in the design of a central-
ized maximization algorithm, that is later distributed by leveraging the structure of the
problem considered. Examples in continuous optimization include algorithms such as
distributed gradient ascent, primal-dual and Newton’s method [BT89; NO09; WOJ13].
While the existing approaches, including the above-mentioned one, have produced a va-
riety of algorithms for the control of distributed systems, the design question has not
been entirely solved. A perspective article recently appearing in Science Robotics sum-
marizes the difficulties:“There are currently no systematic approaches for designing such
multidimensional feedback loops” [Yan+18, p. 6].
8.1 The game-design framework
A promising approach, termed game design, has recently emerged as a tool to comple-
ment the partial understanding offered by more traditional techniques [Sha07]. The game
design approach is tightly connected with the notion of equilibrium in game theory, and
its origin stems from a novel engineering perspective on this field. While game theory has
originated as a set of tools to model the interaction of multiple decision makers (players)
[VM07], its relevance to distributed control stems from the observation that players of
a game are required to take local decisions based on partial information of the entire
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system. Motivated by this consideration, the seminal works of [MS07; AMS07] proposed
the use of game theoretic tools to tackle distributed optimization problems arising in
the area of multi-agent systems. Rather than using game theory to describe existing
interactions, [AMS07] suggested a paradigm shift and proposed the use of game theory
to design control architectures with the aim of meeting a given system level objective.
In lieu of directly specifying a decision-making process, the game design approach
consists in assigning local utility functions to the agents, so that their selfish maximiza-
tion translates in the achievement of the system level objective. The potential of this
technique stems from the possibility to inherit a pool of algorithms from the literature
of learning in games [Blu93; FL98; MS12; YP17] that are distributed by nature, asyn-
chronous, and resilient to external disturbance [AMS07].
Given an optimization problem we wish to solve distributedly, the game design pro-
cedure proposed in [Sha07; MW13] is summarized in Figure 8.1 and consists in the
following steps:1
1) Utility design: assign utility functions to each agent and an equilibrium concept
for the corresponding game.
2) Algorithm design: devise a distributed algorithm to guide agents to the chosen
equilibrium concept.
Optimization problem
Game design
1) Utility design:
- assign utility functions to each agent
- choose equilibrium concept for the game
2) Algorithm design:
- devise distributed algorithm guiding
agents to chosen equilibrium concept
Distributed algorithm with
performance guarantees
Figure 8.1: Game theoretic approach for the design of distributed control systems.
The objective of the game design procedure is to obtain an efficient and distributed
algorithm for the solution of the original optimization problem. While the introduction of
an auxiliary equilibrium problem might seem artificial at first, this approach has recently
produced a host of new results [Gai09; MAS09; RPM17; Geb+16]. Observe that, in order
1In the following, we identify the agents of the optimization problem and their local constraint sets
with the players of the game and their action sets.
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for the game design procedure to be relevant to the original optimization problem, the
utility functions need to be carefully designed so that the chosen equilibrium (equilibria)
coincide with the global optimizer(s) of the original problem, or is provably close to.
Within the boundaries of the game design procedure discussed above, it is important
to highlight that agents are not modeled as competing units, but the system operator
is rather designing their utilities to distribute the global objective. For this purpose,
agents are considered as purely programmable machines endowed with computational
and communication capabilities. Game theory represents, in this context, a mere set of
tools that can be exploited to derive distributed algorithms with provable performance
certificates, and not a modeling language describing the behaviour of egoistic agents.
While the field of learning in games offers readily available algorithms to coordinate
agents towards an equilibrium in a distributed fashion (i.e., it addresses the second step
of Figure 8.1), the utility design problem is much less tracked.
The goal of Part II of this thesis is to provide a framework to compute the equilibrium
efficiency as a function of the given utility functions, and to optimally select utilities
so as to maximize such efficiency.
8.2 The general multiagent maximum coverage
In this section we introduce the problem considered in Part II of this thesis.
Consider R = {r1, . . . , rm} a finite set of resources, where each resource r ∈ R is
associated with a value vr ≥ 0 describing its importance. Further let N = {1, . . . , n} be
a finite set of agents. Every agent i ∈ N selects ai, a subset of the resources, from the
given collection Ai ⊆ 2R, i.e., ai ∈ Ai. The welfare of an allocation a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈
A := A1 × · · · × An is given by
W (a) :=
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vrw(|a|r), (8.1)
where W : 2R × · · · × 2R → R, |a|r = |{i ∈ N s.t. r ∈ ai}| captures the number of
agents selecting resource r in allocation a, and w : [n]→ R≥0 is called the welfare basis
function. Informally, w scales the value of each resource depending on how many agents
selected it. The goal is to find a feasible allocation maximizing the welfare, i.e.,
aopt ∈ arg max
a∈A
W (a) . (8.2)
We refer to the above problem as to the general multiagent weighted maximum cov-
erage (GMMC) problem, due to its connections with coverage problems as discussed in
the forthcoming Section 8.3.
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Observe that we have not posed any constraint on the structure of the sets {Ai}i∈N
in the sense that they are not required to represent matroid constraints, knapsack con-
straints, etc. At this stage, they are a mere collection of subsets of R.
Since the problem in (8.2) is NP-hard (see the discussion in Section 8.3), we seek an
efficient algorithm (or a class of algorithms) to determine an approximate solution, ide-
ally with the best possible approximation ratio. Additionally, we request the algorithm
to be distributed as detailed in Section 10.1. We pursue this goal by means of the game
theoretic approach previously introduced.
8.2.1 Applications
In the following we discuss two classes of problems that can be solved by using the tech-
niques discussed in the second part of this thesis.
Multiagent task assignment problems
In a multiagent task assignment problem we are given a list of tasks to be performed,
as well as a list of agents. The goal is to match agents and tasks so as to maximize
a given welfare function representing the quality of the matching. Such function is
typically additive over the tasks and some of the tasks may require a minimum number
of agents to be completed. It is typically assumed that the more agents participate
in the execution of a task, the higher the welfare generated from that task, and that
the problem exhibits diminishing returns. Practical examples of problems belonging to
this class include vehicle-target assignment [Mur00; AMS07], sensor deployment [CL05;
MAS09], satellite assignment [QBL15] problems.
Distributed maximum coverage
In a distributed maximum coverage problem we are given a list of resources with their
respective value and a list of agents. Each agent has access to a collection of subsets of the
resources, while different agents typically have access to different collections (due to, e.g.,
geographical or other limitations). The goal is to allocate the agents so as to maximize
the total value of covered resources. A large number of problems can be cast into this
framework. Examples include staff scheduling [Ern+04], facility location [Far+12] and
wireless scheduling [CK08] (see [Hoc97] for an overview of the applications). More recent
applications include, among others, distributed caching in wireless networks [Goe+06; De
+17], multi-topic searches [SG09], influence maximization [Kar+17], vehicle scheduling
in mobility-on-demand platforms [SC17; Aga+12].
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8.3 Related work
The work presented in Part II of this thesis is multidisciplinary in that it sits at the
interface between approximation theory, distributed optimization and game theory. In
the followings we present the most relevant connections to each of these areas and cor-
responding related works.
Maximum coverage and approximation guarantees
The general multiagent maximum coverage (GMMC) problem defined in Section 8.2 and
studied in Part II of this thesis is tightly connected with the maximum coverage problem
defined in [Fei98].
In a maximum coverage problem we are given a ground set of elements, and a collec-
tion of subsets of the ground set. The objective is to select n subsets from the collection,
so as to maximize the total number of covered elements. The greedy algorithm achieves
a 1− 1/e approximation in polynomial time, and no polynomial algorithm can approxi-
mate the solution within any ratio better than 1−1/e+  (for all  > 0) unless P = NP ,
[Fei98]. This inapproximability result applies to all extensions discussed next (including
the GMMC problem), since they hold the maximum coverage problem as a special case.
A generalization of the maximum coverage problem is the weighted maximum cover-
age problem. In a weighted maximum coverage we are given a ground set of elements,
and a collection of subsets of the ground set. Every element in the ground set is given a
weight. The goal is to select n subsets from the collection in order to maximize the total
weight of covered elements. The greedy algorithm gives the best possible polynomial
approximation ratio of 1 − 1/e. The proof is no longer based on the result of [Fei98],
but on the more general result in submodular maximization subject to cardinality con-
straints [NWF78].
Algorithms based on a continuous relaxation of the previous problems are also avail-
able. In particular the result in [Cal+11] applies to the problem of monotone sub-
modular maximization subject to matroid constraints, and thus provides a solution for
the weighted maximum coverage. The algorithm of [Cal+11] computes a non integer
solution, which is then rounded using the pipage algorithm producing a 1 − 1/e ap-
proximation. Relative to the problem of monotone submodular maximization over a
matroid constraint, a more refined result is available when the objective function has
known (total) curvature c. The notion of curvature has been introduced in [CC84] and
describes how far a given function is from being modular. In this case, [SVW17] has
recently provided a 1− c/e approximation and has showed that no polynomial time al-
gorithm can give a better approximation. The latter work improves upon the (1−e−c)/c
of [CC84]. Observe that the maximum coverage problem has c = 1, so that [SVW17]
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matches [Fei98].
Multiagent versions of the weighted maximum covering problem have been introduced
independently in [CK04] with the name of maximum coverage problem with group budget
constraints and in [Gai09] with the name of general covering problems. This class of
problems subsumes the previous ones; we refer to it as to the class of multiagent weighted
maximum coverage (MMC) problems. In a MMC problem we are given not one, but n
collections of subsets. The objective is to select one set from each collection so as to
maximize the total weight of covered elements. Relative to MMC problems, the greedy
algorithm provides a 1/2 approximation [CK04], and the local search algorithm proposed
in [Gai09] achieves the optimal 1− 1/e, under technical assumptions.
The GMMC problem studied in Part II of this thesis is a generalization of the MMC
problem in that we allow for a function w to rescale the weight of each element depending
on how many agents cover such element. Any MMC problem can be recovered by the
corresponding GMMC problem by setting w(j) = 1 in (8.1). Any weighted maximum
coverage problem can be recovered from a GMMC problem, upon setting w(j) = 1
in (8.1) and Ai = Aj for all i, j. Further classes of problems such as the multiple-
choice knapsack problem or the standard knapsack problem [Pis95] can be obtained from
the MMC problem (and thus from the GMMC problem). The former problem can be
recovered assuming Ai to represent knapsack constraints. The latter problem is obtained
by additionally imposing Ai = Aj for all i, j. Observe that when the welfare basis w is
increasing and concave (in the discrete sense), the welfare function W defined in (8.1) is
monotone submodular. Submodular functions are subject of intense study due to their
ability to model engineering problems that feature diminishing returns. Similarly, if w is
increasing and convex, W is monotone supermodular. Figure 8.2 summarizes the main
classes of problems discussed.
maximum coverage
weighted
maximum coverage
MMC
GMMC
Figure 8.2: Classes of problems discussed in Section 8.3.
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Distributed combinatorial optimization
While distributed algorithms have been studied since the early nineties in the context of
continuous (and convex) optimization [BT89], the interest in their combinatorial coun-
terpart is more recent.
Particular attention has been devoted to the problem of maximizing a submodular
function subject to various form of constraints such as cardinality, matroid or knapsack
constraints. This is due to the potential applications of submodular maximization in
different fields featuring “large-scale” systems. A non-exhaustive list includes sensor
allocation [SCL16; KSG08], data summarization [Mir+16], task-assignment problems
[QBL15]. While centralized algorithms are available to produce good approximations
(e.g., the greedy algorithm and its variations [Fei98]), their sequential implementation
makes them unsuited for parallel and distributed execution. In this respect, there has
been recent effort in distributing such algorithms using the so called MapReduce pro-
gramming approach [DG08]. In [Mir+16; Bar+15] and references therein, the authors
propose to divide the original optimization problem into smaller parts and to solve each
of them on a different machine. The solution is determined by patching together the par-
tial results and is certified to achieve a competitive approximation ratio. Nevertheless,
the approach still requires a central coordinator.
Other classes of combinatorial problems for which distributed algorithms have been
recently proposed include graph coloring, maximum coverage, and multiple-choice knap-
sack [BE13; Gai09; MYR17]. Finally, [MHK18] provides distributed algorithms for sub-
modular maximization problems, but admissible objective functions are required to be
the sum of agents’ individual contributions (unlike here).
Game design and utility design approach
The problem of designing local utility functions so as to maximize the efficiency of the
emerging equilibria find its roots in the economic literature relative to the design of
optimal taxations [Ram27]. The approach has been applied to the design of engineering
systems only recently. More in details, the use of game theoretic learning algorithms for
the distributed solution of optimization problems has been proposed in [AMS07], and
since then a number of works have followed a similar approach [SSR09; Gai09; Cha+11;
SWL11]. We redirect the reader to [MS18] for a general overview on equilibrium learning
algorithms in distributed control. What has been less understood so far, is how to provide
performance certificates for a given set of utility functions, and more fundamental how
to select utility functions so as to maximize such performance certificates.
The performance degradation of an equilibrium allocation compared to the optimal
solution has been subject of intense research in the field of algorithmic game theory
(through the notions of price of anarchy, price of stability [KP99; SM03]). Nevertheless,
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the results available therein are not helpful for the design problem studied here. The
widely used smoothness framework proposed in [Rou09] has brought a number of different
results under a common language and has produced tightness guarantees for different
problems [Rou09; RST17]. Unfortunately the latter framework requires the sum of
the utility functions to be equal (or less equal) to the welfare function (budget-balance
condition). While this assumption is well justified for a number of problems modeled
through game theory (e.g., cost sharing games [MS01]), it has little bearing on the design
of local utility functions studied here.
The utility design problem considered here has been addressed limitedly to specific
applications, e.g., concave cost sharing, reverse carpooling problems [MP17; ME12] or
confined to particular design methodologies such as the Shapley value or marginal con-
tribution [MR14; PSM16].
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CHAPTER 9
Mathematical preliminaries
In this chapter we introduce the mathematical tools required to move forward and present
the results of Chapter 10 and Chapter 11.
9.1 Strategic-form games and equilibrium concepts
Definition 9 (Strategic-form game). A strategic form game G = (N, {Ai}Ni=1, {ui}Ni=1)
is a tuple where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, Ai is the action set of player
i ∈ N , and ui : A → R is the utility function of player i ∈ N , where A := A1×· · ·×An.
A strategic-form game is called finite if the set A is finite.
Informally, a game is fully specified in its strategic form if every player is given an
action set and a utility function depending on the choice of all the players. We refer
to a := (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A as to an allocation. We will often represent an allocation
as a = (ai, a−i), where a−i := (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) denotes the allocations of all
players but i ∈ N .
In the following we consider strategic-form games only. We do not repeat this in the
forthcoming statements for ease of presentation.
Definition 10 (Nash equilibrium (NE), [Nas50]). A feasible allocation ane ∈ A is a
pure Nash equilibrium for the game G, if no player can increase his utility function by
unilaterally deviating from his equilibrium allocation, i.e., if
ui(a
ne) ≥ ui(ai, ane−i) ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N.
We denote with ne(G) the set of pure Nash equilibria of G.
In the remaining of this thesis we will refer to a pure Nash equilibrium as just a Nash
equilibrium, if no confusion arises. It is not difficult to show that Nash equilibria may
not exist. This and many other reasons motivate the definition of mixed Nash equilibria.
Towards this goal, we first introduce the concept of mixed strategy. A mixed strategy σi
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is a probability distribution over the action space of player i, i.e., σi ∈ ∆(Ai). A mixed
strategy profile σ := (σ1, . . . , σn) is a distribution σ ∈ Σ := ×i∈N∆(Ai).
Definition 11 (Mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE), [Nas50]). A mixed strategy profile
σmne ∈ Σ is a mixed Nash equilibrium for the game G if no player can increase his
expected utility by deviating to a pure strategy, i.e., if
Ea∼σmne [ui(a)] ≥ Ea∼σmne [ui(a′i, a−i)] ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N.
We denote with mne(G) the set of mixed Nash equilibria of G.
In the previous definition player i compares Ea∼σmne [ui(a)] with the expected value of
his utility when he deviates and selects the pure strategy a′i. It is possible to show that
this is equivalent to requiring player i not to improve even if selecting a mixed strategy
σi ∈ ∆(Ai). Thus, an equivalent definition could be given with respect to deviations in
mixed strategies. Additionally, observe that the set of mixed Nash equilibria contains
the set of pure Nash equilibria.
Mixed Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist in any game where the actions sets are
finite, as shown in the celebrated paper by John Nash, [Nas50].
Proposition 9 (Existence of MNE, [Nas50]). Any finite game admits a MNE.
Despite the fact that existence of mixed Nash equilibria is guaranteed, the problem
of computing a MNE is, in general, intractable [DGP06]. For this reason, we consider
the following enlarged class of equilibria.
Definition 12 (Coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE), [MV78]). A probability distribution
σcce ∈ ∆(A) is a coarse correlated equilibrium for the game G if no player can increase
his expected utility by deviating to a pure strategy, i.e., if
Ea∼σcce [ui(a)] ≥ Ea∼σcce [ui(a′i, a−i)] ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N. (9.1)
We denote with cce(G) the set of CCE of G.
The only difference in the definitions of mixed Nash equilibrium and corse correlated
equilibrium is in that σmne is required to be a product distribution σmne ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai),
while σcce ∈ ∆(A) is not. It follows that the set of coarse correlated equilibria is a
superset of the set of mixed Nash equilibria. The interest in CCE stems from the fact
that, unlike MNE and NE, they are computationally tractable [LW94; Nis+07]. We will
return to this in Section 9.4.
We conclude introducing the last equilibrium concept. To do so, we first consider a
welfare function W : A → R≥0 and define the allocation aopt ∈ A as an allocation such
that W (aopt) ≥ W (a) for all a ∈ A.
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Definition 13 (Average coarse correlated equilibrium (ACCE opt),[NR10]). Given a game
G and a function W : A → R≥0, a probability distribution σacce ∈ ∆(A) is an average
coarse correlated equilibrium with respect to the allocation aopt ∈ A if
Ea∼σacce
[∑
i
ui(a)
]
≥ Ea∼σacce
[∑
i
ui(a
opt
i , a−i)
]
.
We denote with acceopt(G) the set of ACCE opt of G.
Average coarse correlated equilibria are a superset of coarse correlated equilibria.
This is because the previous condition can be obtained from Definition 12 by summing
the condition (9.1) over all players, and selecting a′ = aopt.
It follows that the equilibrium sets previously defined are all nested
ne(G) ⊆ mne(G) ⊆ cce(G) ⊆ acceopt(G).
While NE, MNE, CCE are well studied and regularly used equilibrium concepts, the
notion of ACCE opt is rather novel. The latter equilibrium concept will be used here
as a purely conceptual tool in connection with the study of equilibrium efficiency, see
Section 9.3.1.
9.2 Potential games and congestion games
In the previous section we have introduced three fundamental equilibrium concepts.
Additionally, we have commented on their existence and on their tractability (or lack
thereof). In this section we refine the analysis to potential games and congestion games.
Potential games
Definition 14 (Potential game, [MS96]). A strategic-form game is a potential game if
there exists a function ϕ : A → R such that
ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i) = ϕ(ai, a−i)− ϕ(a′i, a−i) ∀a ∈ A, ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N.
The function ϕ is called potential function.
Informally, a game is potential if the variation in each player’s utility experienced
when deviating from ai to a
′
i can be captured by the function ϕ, and such function
is the same for all the players i ∈ N . The condition is reminiscent of the notion of
conservative force and corresponding potential field taken form Physics. Indeed, for
games with continuous action space, the two notions coincide.
An immediate consequence of the previous definition is the existence of a pure NE.
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Proposition 10 (Existence of pure NE in potential games, [MS96]). Any finite potential
game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a? ∈ A a global maximizer of the potential. Since the actions sets are
finite, a? is guaranteed to exist. By definition of maximizer and of potential game, it is
ui(a
?
i , a
?
−i)− ui(a′i, a?−i) = ϕ(a?i , a?−i)− ϕ(a′i, a?−i) ≥ 0 ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N .
Thus, a? is a pure Nash equilibrium.
It can be similarly shown that any local maximizer of the potential function ϕ is a
pure Nash equilibrium.
Definition 15. (Local maximizer) Given a function ϕ : A → R with A = A1×· · ·×An,
an allocation a? ∈ A is a local maximizer of ϕ if ϕ(a?) ≥ ϕ(a′i, a?−i) for all a′i ∈ Ai and
for all i ∈ N .
The previous observation builds a fundamental bridge between optimization problems
and equilibrium problems as it suggests a seemingly simple technique to compute a NE
for the class of potential games: determine a local maximizer of the potential function.
Additionally, it suggests a natural dynamics to compute one such equilibrium.
Definition 16 (Best-response dynamics (BR)). Let t ∈ N0 indicate the time step of
the algorithm and at ∈ A the corresponding allocation. The best-response dynamics is
presented in Algorithm 5. Ties are broken according to a pre-specified rule (any rule).
In the best-response dynamics, players take ordered turns and update their choice
by selecting their best action, given the current actions of the others. While the BR
dynamics is not guaranteed to converge for a general game, this is the case if we restrict
to the class of potential games.
Algorithm 5 Best-response dynamics (round-robin)
1: Initialise a0 ∈ A; t← 0
2: while not converged do
. Best response
3: i← (t mod n) + 1
4: at+1i ← arg maxai∈Ai ui(ai, at−i)
5: at+1 ← (at+1i , at−i)
6: t← t+ 1
7: end while
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Proposition 11 (Convergence of the BR dynamics, [MS96]). The best-response dynam-
ics converges, for any initial condition a0 ∈ A, to a NE in a finite number of steps, for
any potential and finite game.
Proof. The proof is based on the use of the potential function as a Lyapunov function.
After every round of the BR dynamics either no player improved his utility, in which
case we are at a Nash equilibrium, or at least the utility of one player has increased. In
the latter case, ϕ has increased too. Since ϕ is upper bounded by its maximum value,
the BR dynamics must converge. Additionally, since ϕ strictly increases in every round,
the best-response dynamics can not return to an allocation visited in the past. Thus,
convergence in a finite number of steps follows by the finiteness of A.
Three important comments follow. First, we considered here a round-robin best
response algorithm, i.e., an algorithm where the players revise their decision in a given
order. Similar statements to those in Proposition 11 can be made almost surely if the
players updating their decision are uniformly randomly selected. This will produce a
totally asynchronous algorithm. Second, note that the claim in Proposition 11 holds
even if the players were to update their actions using a better-response dynamics, instead
of a best-response dynamics. In the better-response dynamics, players update their
previous choice by selecting an action that improves their utility, but need not be the
best. Third, observe that the best-response dynamics (better-response dynamics) might
be slow to converge, in that it could visit all the allocations in A before settling to a
NE. Additionally, the task of finding a best-response (line 4 in Algorithm 5) might also
be intractable. We return to this in Section 9.4.
Congestion games
Congestion games are defined as follows.
Definition 17 (Congestion game, [Ros73]). Consider R a finite set of resources and for
every resource r ∈ R a function wr : N→ R≥0. A congestion game is a normal-form fi-
nite game where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, Ai ⊆ 2R and ui(a) =
∑
r∈ai wr(|a|r)
are the action set and utility function of player i, respectively. The quantity |a|r repre-
sents the number of players selecting resource r in allocation a,
|a|r := {i ∈ N s.t. r ∈ ai}
The next proposition shows that congestion games are a subclass of potential games.
Thus, existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed as well as convergence of the
best-response dynamics, see Proposition 10 and Proposition 11.
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Proposition 12 (Congestion games are potential, [Ros73]). Congestion games are po-
tential games with potential function ϕ given by
ϕ(a) =
∑
r∈R
|a|r≥1
|a|r∑
j=1
wr(|a|r). (9.2)
Thus, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist.
The potential function in (9.2) is often referred to as Rosenthal’s potential.
9.3 Price of anarchy and smoothness
The notions of price of anarchy and price of stability have been introduced to quantify the
efficiency of the equilibrium allocations with respect to centralized optimal allocations
[KP99; SM03]. Let us consider a strategic-form game G = (N, {Ai}Ni=1, {ui}Ni=1) and a
corresponding welfare function W : A → R≥0. The function W measures the quality
of a given allocation, and can be used to model the achievement of a global objective.
The price of anarchy represents the ratio between the welfare at the worst performing
equilibrium and the optimal welfare. Consequently, it provides a bound on the efficiency
for all the equilibria. In the following we assume that W (aopt) > 0 so that the notion of
price of anarchy is well posed.
Definition 18 (Price of anarchy (PoA), [KP99]). Consider the strategic-form game G
and the welfare function W : A → R≥0.
(a) The price of anarchy for the class of NE is defined as
PoAne := min
a∈ne(G)
W (a)
W (aopt)
.
(b) The price of anarchy for the class of MNE is defined as
PoAmne := min
σ∈mne(G)
Ea∼σ [W (a)]
W (aopt)
.
Replacing the set mne(G) with cce(G) or acceopt(G), one obtains the corresponding
definitions for PoAcce and PoAacce.
Observe that the expression W (aopt) also depends on the game instance G considered
but we do not indicate it explicitly, for ease of presentation. By definition, the price
of anarchy is bounded between zero and one. The higher the price of anarchy, the
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more efficient the worst performing equilibrium. Since ne(G) ⊆ mne(G) ⊆ cce(G) ⊆
acceopt(G) as seen in Section 9.1, it follows that
PoAne ≥ PoAmne ≥ PoAcce ≥ PoAacce ,
i.e., the efficiency degrades as we move to a richer class of equilibria.
As a prototypical example to clarify the concept of price of anarchy, consider that
of a road traffic network where a large number of drivers traveling from a certain origin
to their corresponding destination. If each driver was to minimize his own travel time,
this will result in an equilibrium configuration such as the NE. Instead, if the system
operator was to instruct the drivers on which route to take, he will try to minimize the
total travel time, i.e., the sum over all the drivers’ individual travel time. The price of
anarchy precisely capture the ratio between these two quantities.
While we present results relative to welfare maximization problems, analogous defi-
nitions and claims are available in case of cost minimization.
Definition 19 (Smooth game, [Rou09]). Consider the strategic-form game G and the
welfare function W : A → R≥0. The pair (G,W ) is (λ, µ)-smooth if for some λ, µ ≥ 0 it
holds ∑
i∈N
ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a) , ∀a, a′ ∈ A. (9.3)
The following proposition provides a lower bound on the ratio between the expected
welfare at any CCE and the optimum, i.e., it gives a bound on the price of anarchy
relative to the specific instance G considered.
Proposition 13 (PoA bound,[Rou09]). Consider a (λ, µ)-smooth game with
∑
i∈N ui(a) ≤
W (a) for all a ∈ A. Then, for any coarse correlated equilibrium σcce of G it holds
Ea∼σcce [W (a)]
W (aopt)
≥ λ
1 + µ
.
Proof. Consider σcce any CCE of G. Setting a′i = a
opt
i in Definition 19 it is
0 ≤ Ea∼σcce [ui(a)]− Ea∼σcce
[
ui(a
opt, a−i)
] ∀i ∈ N.
Summing over the agents one obtains
0 ≤ Ea∼σcce
[∑
i
ui(a)
]
− Ea∼σcce
[∑
i
ui(a
opt
i , a−i)
]
≤ Ea∼σcce
[∑
i
ui(a)
]
− λW (aopt) + µEa∼σcce [W (a)]
≤ −λW (aopt) + (1 + µ)Ea∼σcce [W (a)] ,
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where we used the linearity of the expectation, the definition of (λ, µ)-smooth game, and
the assumption for which
∑
i∈N ui(a) ≤ W (a). The claim follows from W (a) ≥ 0
Ea∼σcce [W (a)]
W (aopt)
≥ λ
1 + µ
.
The smoothness framework has proved useful in bringing a number of different results
under a common language and has produced tight bounds on the price of anarchy for
different problems [Rou09; RST17]. Its strength amongst others, lies in the recipe it
provides to obtain performance bounds for a large class of equilibria. Indeed, as seen in
the previous section, pure NE (and MNE) are a subclass of CCE. Thus, for any pure
Nash equilibrium ane of G it also holds
W (ane)
W (aopt)
≥ λ
1 + µ
.
The proof presented in Proposition 13 shows that once a game has been shown
to be (λ, µ)-smooth, the corresponding bound on the price of anarchy follows easily
(only linearity of the expectation is additionally used). Thus, the main difficulty in
proving bounds on the price of anarchy using a smoothness argument resides in proving
the smoothness property itself, i.e., in selecting λ and µ so that (9.3) holds for all
a, a? ∈ A. These parameters have been determined for certain classes of games. A non-
comprehensive list include scheduling games [CDT12], location and valid utility games
[Vet02], affine congestion games [Rou09], first-price auctions [KZ12; ST13], second-price
auctions [CKS08].
9.3.1 The question of tightness
An important question we discuss in this section is the capability of the smoothness
framework to give good (ideally tight) bounds on the price of anarchy. Given a game G,
we define the best bound on the price of anarchy attainable via a smoothness argument as
SPoA := sup
λ,µ≥0
λ
1 + µ
s.t. (λ, µ) satisfy (9.3) .
Observe that SPoA ≤ PoA as Proposition 13 provides only a bound on the equilibrium
efficiency. The next proposition shows that SPoA is tight for the class of ACCE opt.
Proposition 14 (Smoothness is tight for ACCE opt, [NR10]). For any given game G it is
SPoA = PoAacce = min
σ∈acceopt(G)
Ea∼σ [W (a)]
W (aopt)
.
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The previous proposition provides a positive result, in that it shows that SPoA
matches the “true” price of anarchy for the class of ACCE opt. Nevertheless, this result is
rather weak. Indeed, it has been shown by means of counterexamples that the best bound
on the price of anarchy achievable using a smoothness argument is not tight in the class of
CCE, [NR10; PCM18]. That is, there are instances G where SPoA < PoAcce and SPoA
provides a rather weak bound on PoAcce, [PCM18]. It follows that the best smoothness
bound can not be tight for any of the subclasses of CCE including MNE and NE.
9.4 Complexity of computing equilibria
The goal of this section is to present an overview on the complexity issues related to the
equilibrium computation problem. We do not delve in the details of different complexity
classes, but simply try to highlight which equilibrium concepts are “hard” to compute
and which are “easy”.
We divide the presentation in four parts. First, we present an intractability result for
pure and mixed Nash equilibria. Second, we restrict our attention to congestion games
and show that the best-response dynamics converges in polynomial time under structural
assumptions on the actions sets {Ai}i∈N . Third, we show that coarse correlated equi-
libria are tractable in general. We conclude discussing the tradeoff between equilibrium
efficiency and computational tractability.
Pure and mixed Nash equilibria are intractable
We begin with a negative result showing that the problem of computing a pure NE is
intractable, even if we restrict to the class of congestion games. In the following PLS
represents the complexity class known as polynomial local search. Loosely speaking the
PLS class models the difficulty of finding a local optimum solution in the sense of
Definition 15. The PLS class lives in between the classes P and NP and there is strong
evidence suggesting that PLS 6⊆ P , where P is the class of problems that can be solved
polynomially. As a matter of fact, many concrete problems including the local Max-Cut
problem are in the PLS class and no efficient algorithm is available. We redirect the
reader to [Rou16] for an introduction to the polynomial local search class.
Proposition 15 (Computing a pure NE is PLS-complete, [FPT04]). The problem of
computing a pure NE in a congestion game is PLS-complete.
It follows that for a general strategic form and finite game (not necessarily a con-
gestion game), computing a pure Nash equilibrium is as hard as the hardest problem in
the PLS class. Any modification of the original problem (e.g., determining if a game G
has a pure NE, determining the NE that maximizes a given welfare function) makes it
NP-complete [GGS05; CS02].
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Computing a mixed Nash equilibrium is also an intractable problem. Its complexity
has been settled in [DGP06; CD06] with the introduction of the PPAD complexity class.
Similarly to the PLS class, the PPAD class lives in between the classes P and NP and
despite the great interest in the topic, there are currently no known efficient algorithms
to tackle these problems [DGP06].
Proposition 16 (Computing a MNE is PPAD-complete, [DGP06; CD06]). The prob-
lem of computing a MNE in a strategic-form finite game is PPAD-complete.
Nash equilibria are tractable in matroid congestion games
While computing a (pure) Nash equilibrium is intractable even if restricting to the class
of congestion games, it is possible to obtain a more positive result by imposing structural
constraints on the actions sets.
Definition 20 (Matroid, [Wel10]). A tupleM = (R, I) is a matroid if R is a finite set,
I ⊆ 2R is a collection of subsets of R, and the following two properties hold:
- If B ∈ I and A ⊆ B, then A ∈ I;
- If A ∈ I, B ∈ I and |B| > |A|, then there exists an element r ∈ B \ A s.t.
A ∪ {r} ∈ I.
Definition 21 (Basis of a matroid, [Wel10]). A set S ∈ I such that for all r ∈ R \ S,
(S ∪ r) /∈ I is called a basis of the matroid.
It can be shown that all basis have the same number of elements, which is known as
the rank of the matroid and indicated with rank(M), [Wel10]. An example of matroid
is that of uniform matroid defined as follows.
Definition 22 (Uniform matroid, [Wel10]). Given a finite set R with |R| = m, let
I ⊆ 2R be the collection of all subsets with a number of elements k ≤ m. M = (R, I) is
a matroid, rank(M) = k and M is called the uniform matroid of rank k.
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which the best-response
dynamics of Algorithm 5 has polynomial running time for the class of congestion games.
The main assumption amounts to requiring each of the player’s allocation set to coincide
with the set of bases of some matroid.
Proposition 17. [ARV08, Thm. 2.5] Consider a congestion game G and assume the ac-
tion sets Ai are the set of bases for a matroidMi = (R, Ii) over the set R. Then, players
reach a (pure) Nash equilibrium after at most n2m maxi∈N rank(Mi) best responses.
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Example 3. The case when Ai contains only sets with a single element (singletons) does
satisfy the assumptions of the previous proposition, even if a player does not have access
to all the possible resources. One such example is the following: R = {r1, . . . , rm},
m > 2, Ai = {{r1}, {r2}}. Define Ii = {∅, {r1}, {r2}}. We have that Mi := (R, Ii) is a
matroid of rank 1 and that Ai is a set of bases for Mi.
On the negative side, a few examples that do not satisfy the requirements are pre-
sented next. Consider R = {r1, . . . , rm}, m ≥ 3 and Ai = {{r1}, {r2, r3}}. The set
Ai can not form the set of bases for any matroid Mi, as all bases must have the same
number of elements while {r1} and {r2, r3} do not have this property. A more involved
example that does not satisfy the requirements is the following: R = {r1, . . . , rm},
m ≥ 4 and Ai = {{r1, r2}, {r3, r4}}. For the given Ai to be the set of bases of a matroid
Mi = (R, Ii), it must be that {r1, r2} ∈ Ii and {r3, r4} ∈ Ii. But due to definition of
matroid, it must also be {r1} ∈ Ii (Definition Definition 20, first property), so that also
{r1, r3, r4} ∈ Ii (Definition 20, second property). Thus Ai can not be the set of bases for
a matroid Mi = (R, Ii), as any possible choice of Ii will contain at least one set with
more elements than {r1, r2} ∈ Ai.
Remark 7. The previous theorem gives conditions under which the maximum number
of best responses required to converge to a Nash equilibrium is polynomially bounded in
the number of players and resources. If it is possible to compute a single best response
polynomially in the number of resources, then it is possible to compute a NE in polynomial
time using the best-response algorithm.
Coarse correlated equilibria
Contrary to NE and MNE, (approximate) coarse correlated equilibria can be computed
in polynomial time. We limit ourself to report this result in the following proposition.
Formally, an ε-CCE is defined as a distribution σ ∈ ∆(A) such that the equilibrium
condition in Definition 12 holds up to an additive ε ≥ 0 term, i.e.,
Ea∼σ [ui(a)] + ε ≥ Ea∼σ [ui(a′i, a−i)] ∀a′i ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N.
Proposition 18 (ε-CCE can be computed efficiently, [LW94; Rou16]). For every ε > 0,
an ε-CCE can be computed polynomially using the multiplicative-weight algorithm.
The tradeoff between tractability and efficiency
This section connects the efficiency result presented in Section 9.3 with the complexity
results presented in Section 9.4. In the former section we have seen that PoAne ≥
PoAmne ≥ PoAcce and thus the equilibrium efficiency (PoA) degrades by moving from
NE to MNE and from MNE to CCE. In the latter section we have seen that NE and
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MNE are tractable in limited cases, while CCE are tractable in general. This shows a
fundamental tradeoff between equilibrium efficiency and corresponding tractability: the
larger the class of equilibria we consider, the easier to compute one, but the lower the
corresponding efficiency. This is depicted in Figure 9.1.
ne
PLS-complete
(congestion game)
mne
PPAD-complete
"-cce
polynomial Poacce

Poamne

Poane
Figure 9.1: Hierarchy of equilibria, corresponding complexity and efficiency.
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CHAPTER 10
Tight price of anarchy and utility design:
a linear program approach
We seek approximation algorithms for the solution of GMMC problems defined in Sec-
tion 8.2. Towards this goal, we adopt the game design approach discussed in Chapter 8
and consisting of two separate steps: utility design and algorithm design. In this chapter
we formulate and solve the utility design problem. More precisely, in Section 10.1 we
pose the utility design problem and introduce the game-theoretic notion of price of anar-
chy. We observe that any algorithm capable of computing an equilibrium, will inherit an
approximation ratio matching the price of anarchy. Thus, in a quest to construct good
approximating algorithms, we turn our attention to quantifying the price of anarchy. In
Section 9.3 we show that standard approaches used to characterize the price of anarchy
are rather conservative and not suited for the design problems we are interested in (The-
orem 7). Motivated by this observation, in Section 10.3 we provide a novel technique
based on a linear programming reformulation to characterize the price of anarchy (The-
orems 8 and 9) as a function of the utility functions assigned to the agents. This result
is provably tight. We conclude the chapter by addressing the utility design question in
Section 10.4. In particular, we show how the problem of designing utility functions so
as to optimize the price of anarchy can be posed as a tractable linear program in n + 1
variables (Theorem 10).
All the proofs are reported in the Appendix (Section 10.5). The results presented in
this chapter have been published in [PCM18; PM18b].
10.1 The price of anarchy as performance metric
Within the combinatorial framework considered, finding a solution to the GMMC prob-
lem, i.e., determining a feasible allocation that maximizes the welfare function
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vrw(|a|r),
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defined in (8.1) is an NP-hard problem. Based on such observation, we focus on deriving
efficient and distributed algorithms for attaining approximate solutions to the maximiza-
tion of W , ideally with the best possible ratio. In the following, each agent is assumed
to have information only regarding the resources that he can select, i.e., regarding the
resources r ∈ Ai ⊆ R. Agents are requested to make independent choices in response
to this local piece of information. Rather than directly specifying a decision-making
process, we adopt the game design approach discussed in Chapter 8 and depicted in
Figure 8.1. The idea is to carefully define an auxiliary problem, namely an equilibrium
problem, which will guide the search and serve as a proxy for the original maximization of
W . The motivations and advantages of this approach have been discussed in Chapter 8.
In the following we focus on the first component of the game design approach: the
utility design problem.
The utility design problem amounts to the choice of local utility functions that
adhere to the above mentioned informational constraints, and whose corresponding
equilibria offer the highest achievable performance.
We naturally identify the agents of the original optimization problem and their local
constraint sets {Ai}i∈N with the players of the game and their action sets. In the
following we will use the terms agents and players interchangeably.
In order to tackle the utility design problem, each agent is assigned a local utility
function ui : A → R≥0 of the form
ui(a) :=
∑
r∈ai
vrw(|a|r)f(|a|r) , (10.1)
where f : [n]→ R≥0 describes the fractional benefit that each agent receives by selecting
resource r in allocation a. The function f constitutes our design choice; we refer to it
as to the distribution rule or simply the distribution. Observe that each utility function
in (10.1) satisfies the required informational constraints in that it only depends on the
value of the resources that the agent selected, the distribution rule f and the number of
agents that selected the very same resource.
Remark 8 (On the choice of the utility functions). In principle one needs not to restrict
himself to utility functions of the form (10.1). The reasons for choosing utilities as in
(10.1) are as follows. First, the utility functions (10.1) satisfy the required informational
constraints, as just discussed. Second, restricting ourselves to the above mentioned util-
ities reduces the design problem to a hopefully tractable problem. Indeed, the utilities
(10.1) are fully determined if the distribution rule f is so. While designing the distribu-
tion rule f amounts to choosing n real numbers, the problem in its full generality consists
in choosing the value of ui(a) for all a ∈ A and for all i ∈ N , clearly a large number
of decision variables (exponential in the worst case in both the number of agents and in
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the number of resources since A = A1 × · · · × An and Ai ⊆ 2R). Third, utilities of
the form (10.1) will ensure equilibrium existence and convergence of the best-response
dynamics, as explained after this remark. Fourth, even when restricting to this special
class of utilities, we will obtain performance certificates that are competitive with the
state of the art approximation algorithms. We will return to this in the next chapter
in Section 11.1.1 and Remark 15. Finally, we observe that a different and apparently
less restrictive choice of utilities might entail assigning different distribution rules fi to
different players i ∈ N . However, it is possible to show that working in this larger set
of admissible utility functions will not improve the best achievable performance.1 For all
these reasons, in the followings we focus on utility functions of the form (10.1).
The game introduced above and identified with the agents set N , the actions sets
{Ai}i∈N and the utilities {ui}i∈N in (10.1) is a normal-form finite game, according to
Definition 9. Additionally, such game belongs to the class of congestion games due to
the special structure of the actions sets and utilities, see Definition 17. Thus, a pure
Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for any choice of f thanks to Proposition 12.
In the forthcoming analysis we focus on the solution concept of pure Nash equilibrium,
which we will refer to as just an equilibrium. Recall that an allocation ane ∈ A is a pure
Nash equilibrium if ui(a
ne) ≥ ui(ai, ane−i) for all alternative allocations ai ∈ Ai and for all
agents i ∈ N (see Definition 10). We identify one instance of the game introduced above
with the tuple
G = (R, {vr}r∈R, N, {Ai}i∈N , f) , (10.2)
and for ease of notation remove the subscripts of the above sets, e.g., use {Ai} instead
of {Ai}i∈N .
In the following we require a system operator to robustly design a distribution rule,
that is to design f without any prior information regarding the resource set R, the value
of the resources {vr} or the action sets of the agents {Ai}. The only datum available to
the system designer is an upper bound on the number of players in the game, i.e., |N | ≤ n.
This request stems from the observation that the previous pieces of information may be
unreliable, or unavailable to the system designer due to, e.g., communication restrictions
or privacy concerns. Formally, given a distribution rule f , we introduce the following
family of games
Gf := {(R, {vr}, N, {Ai}, f) s.t. |N | ≤ n} ,
containing all possible games G where the number of agents is bounded by n. In the
forthcoming analysis, we restrict our attention to the class of games where the number
of players is exactly n. This is without loss of generality. Indeed the latter class of games
and the class of games where the number of players is upper bounded by n have the same
price of anarchy. To see this, note that the price of anarchy of any game with l players
1While we do not provide a proof of this statement, a similar conclusions was found in [Gai09].
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1 < l < n can be obtained as the price of anarchy of a game with n players where we
add a resource valued v0 = 0 and set Ai = {v0} for the additional n− l players.
We measure the performance of a distribution rule f adapting the concept of price
of anarchy introduced in [KP99] and reported in Definition 18 as
PoA(f) := inf
G∈Gf
(
mina∈ne(G) W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
)
, (10.3)
where ne(G) denotes the set of Nash equilibria of G. While the optimal value at the
denominator of (10.3) also depends on the instance G considered, we do not indicate it
explicitly, for ease of presentation. The quantity PoA(f) characterizes the efficiency of
the worst-performing Nash equilibrium relative to the corresponding optimal allocation
over all instances in the class Gf . According to the previous definition, 0 ≤ PoA(f) ≤ 1
and the higher the price of anarchy, the better performance certificates we can offer.
It is important to highlight that whenever an algorithm is available to compute one
such equilibrium, the price of anarchy also represents the approximation ratio of the
corresponding algorithm over all instances G ∈ Gf . For this reason, the price of anarchy
defined in (10.3) will serve as the performance metric in all the forthcoming analysis.
Remark 9 (On the choice of pure NE as equilibrium concept). The choice of pure NE
as equilibrium concept has the benefit of providing us with potentially better performance
guarantees compared to that offered by, e.g., mixed Nash equilibria or coarse correlated
equilibria, as PoAne ≥ PoAmne ≥ PoAcce, see Section 9.3. The drawback of this choice
is the general intractability of pure Nash equilibria. Indeed, computing a pure Nash
equilibrium is hard (PLS-complete, as discussed in Proposition 15) even when limited to
the class of games considered here (congestion games). Nevertheless we have seen that
under structural assumptions on the sets {Ai} similar to those used in combinatorial
optimization, computing a pure NE is a polynomial task (Proposition 17). Finally, the
approximation guarantees offered by PoAne are deterministic, while the bounds provided
by PoAmne and PoAcce are in expected value. An antipodal choice might entail using the
notion of CCE instead of NE as computing one such equilibrium is known to be tractable
in general. The price to pay for this is a potentially worsened performance certificate
since PoAcce ≤ PoAne.
The utility design problem can be decomposed in two tasks:
i) providing a bound (or ideally an exact characterization) of the price of anarchy as
a function of f ;
ii) optimizing this expression over the admissible distribution rules.
In Section 10.3 we address i), while in Section 10.4 we tackle ii).
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10.2 The limitations of the smoothness framework
In this section we recall the definition of smooth games introduced in Section 9.3, and
show that the corresponding best achievable bounds on the price of anarchy are not
tight, but rather conservative when applied to utility design problems.
Before delving in the details of the smoothness framework, we introduce the notion
of budget-balanced and sub budget-balanced utility functions.
Definition 23 (Budget-balanced utility functions). Consider a strategic-form game with
actions sets {Ai}, utilities {ui}, and a welfare function W : A → R≥0. The utility
functions are budget-balanced if for all a ∈ A∑
i∈N
ui(a) = W (a).
The utility functions are sub budget-balanced if
∑
i∈N ui(a) ≤ W (a) for all a ∈ A.
The notion of smooth game has been introduced in [Rou09] and has been successively
employed to obtain tight bounds on the price of anarchy for different classes of games.
Recall from Definition 19 that the game (10.2) together with the welfare function (8.1)
are (λ, µ)-smooth if for some λ, µ ≥ 0 it holds∑
i∈N
ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a), ∀a′, a ∈ A. (10.4)
Proposition 13 showed that the price of anarchy of a (λ, µ)-smooth game G is bounded.
More precisely, given G a (λ, µ)-smooth game with
∑
i∈N ui(a) ≤ W (a) ∀a ∈ A, the
ratio between the total welfare at any coarse correlated equilibrium and the optimum is
lower bounded by
Ea∼σcce [W (a)]
W (aopt)
≥ λ
1 + µ
, ∀σcce ∈ cce(G).
Since ne(G) ⊆ cce(G), it follows immediately
W (ane)
W (aopt)
≥ λ
1 + µ
, ∀ane ∈ ne(G).
Note that the smoothness framework forces us to restrict the attention to utilities sat-
isfying
∑
i∈N ui(a) ≤ W (a), else no guarantee is provided by Proposition 13. This
corresponds to requesting f(j) ≤ 1/j. Thus, in the remaining of this section only, we
consider utilities satisfying this constraint.
The next lemma shows that when we are allowed to freely choose the players’ utilities
(i.e., if we are interested in design problems), the best achievable smoothness guarantee
is obtained when the assigned utilities are budget-balanced.
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Lemma 12. Suppose
∑
i∈N ui(a) = W (a). Consider a different set of utilities u˜i(a)
such that
∑
i∈N u˜i(a) ≤
∑
i∈N ui(a) for all a ∈ A. If the game with utilities u˜i(a) is
(λ, µ)-smooth, then the game with utilities ui(a) is also (λ, µ)-smooth.
Proof. By assumption the game with utilities u˜i(a) is (λ, µ)-smooth and
∑
i ui(a) ≥∑
i u˜i(a), so that for all a, a
′ ∈ A∑
i∈N
ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥
∑
i∈N
u˜i(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a).
Thus, the game with utilities ui(a) is (λ, µ)-smooth too.
Observe that the statement of Lemma 12 holds true in general and does not depend
on the specific form of the utility functions or of the welfare considered here.
Lemma 12 suggests to design utilities that are budget-balanced, as sub budget-
balanced utilities can never be advantageous with regards to the performance guarantees
associated with smoothness. This observation turns out to be misleading, in that there
are utility functions that are sub budget-balanced, but give a better performance certifi-
cate compared to what the smoothness argument can offer, as shown next.
Consider f a distribution rule satisfying f(j) ≤ 1/j for all j ∈ [n], the best bound on
the price of anarchy (10.3) that can be obtained via smoothness, is given by the solution
to the following program
SPoA(f) := sup
λ,µ≥0
λ
1 + µ
s.t. (λ, µ) satisfy (10.4) for all G ∈ Gf .
Observe that SPoA(f) ≤ PoA(f) as Proposition 13 provides only a bound on the equi-
librium efficiency. In the following we show that the best smoothness bound captured by
SPoA(f) is not representative of the “true” price of anarchy PoA(f) defined in (10.3).
To do so, we illustrate the gap between these two quantities in the special case of multi-
agent weighted maximum coverage (MMC) problems (see Section 8.2). MMC problems
are a special class of the resource allocation problems considered here. They are obtained
setting w(j) = 1 for all j ∈ [n]. Before stating the result, we introduce the distribution
rule
fG(j) = (j − 1)!
1
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n−1
i=j
1
i!
1
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n−1
i=1
1
i!
, j ∈ [n] . (10.5)
as originally defined in [Gai09, Eq. (5)].
Theorem 7 (Limitations of the smoothness framework). Consider the class of
MMC problems, i.e., fix w(j) = 1 for all j ∈ [n].
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(a) For any choice of f , the best bound on the price of anarchy that can be achieved
using a smoothness argument is
SPoA(f) ≤ 1
2− 1/n := b(n)
n→∞−−−→ 1
2
.
(b) The distribution (10.5) satisfies fG(j) ≤ 1/j and achieves
PoA(fG) = 1− 11
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n
i=0
1
i!
n→∞−−−→ 1− 1
e
, (10.6)
where e is Euler’s number.
(c) For all n > 2, SPoA(fG) < PoA(fG) .
Remark 10 (The limitations of smoothness are structural). While the previous theorem
compares the performance guarantees offered by SPoA(f) and PoA(f) we recall that
SPoA(f) bounds the equilibrium efficiency for any coarse correlated equilibrium, while
PoA(f) provides a certificate limitedly to pure NE. Thus, one might think that the result
of the previous theorem is simply an artifact due to this observation and to the fact that
ne(G) ⊆ cce(G). This is not the case and the limitations of the smoothness framework
are structural. Indeed, it can be shown that fG has the same price of anarchy of (10.6)
even in the larger set of CCE.2
The quantity b(n) bounding the best possible performance certificate offered by the
smoothness framework, and the guarantee offered by the “true” price of anarchy for fG
are presented in Figure 10.1 (left). Additionally, the distribution rules fG(j) and 1/j are
depicted in Figure 10.1 (right). The gap between b(n) and PoA(fG) is significant: for
a system with, e.g., n = 20 agents, PoA(fG) produces a performance certificate that is
at least 25% higher than what SPoA(fG) can offer. Thus, the smoothness framework is
not the right tool to study the utility design problems considered here. First, it restricts
the set of admissible distribution rule to f(j) ≤ 1/j. Second, even for distribution rules
satisfying this assumption, it provides performance certificates that are too conservative.
Finally, we observe that the notion of local smoothness (a refinement of the original
notion introduced in [RS15]) will not be useful here in improving SPoA.
10.3 A tight price of anarchy
In the previous section we have highlighted the limitations of the smoothness framework
when applied to utility design problems. In this section we propose a novel approach for
2While [Gai09, Thm. 3] provides a proof limitedly to mixed Nash equilibria, it is not difficult to
extend such proof to CCE.
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Figure 10.1: Left: best achievable bound b(n) on the price of anarchy using a smoothness
argument, and actual price of anarchy PoA(fG) for the distribution fG in (10.5). Right:
distribution rule fG and 1/j for n = 10.
the exact characterization of PoA(f) as defined in (10.3). More precisely, we reformulate
the problem of computing the price of anarchy as a tractable linear program (LP) involv-
ing the components of w and of f (Theorems 8 and 9). This section is dedicated to the
problem of characterizing the price of anarchy in its full generality, while in Chapter 11
we specialize the results to a class of submodular and supermodular problems.
In all the forthcoming analysis we make the following regularity assumptions on
admissible welfare basis functions and distribution rules.
Standing Assumptions. The sets Ai ⊆ 2R are nonempty and Ai \∅ 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N .
Further, ∃r ∈ R s.t. vr > 0 and r ∈ ai ∈ Ai for some i ∈ N . The welfare basis function
w : [n] → R>0 satisfies w(j) > 0 for all j ∈ [n]. A distribution rule f : [n] → R≥0
satisfies f(1) ≥ 1, f(j) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [n]. The latter is equivalent to f ∈ F , with
F := {f : [n]→ R≥0 s.t. f(1) ≥ 1, f(j) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [n]} .
The non-emptiness of Ai ensures feasibility of the welfare maximization introduced
in Section 8.2. The assumptions Ai \ ∅ 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N and ∃r ∈ R s.t. vr > 0 ensure
that the problem is non degenerate, in that every agent has the possibility to select at
least one resource, and not all the resources have a value of zero. Finally, observe that
the assumption f(1) ≥ 1 is without loss of generality for all distributions with f(1) > 0.
Indeed, If f(1) 6= 1, but f(1) > 0, it is possible to scale the value of the resources and
reduce to the case f(1) = 1.
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10.3.1 Primal formulation
An informal introduction
While (10.3) corresponds to the definition of price of anarchy, it also describes a (seem-
ingly difficult) optimization problem. The aim of this section, is to transform the def-
inition of price of anarchy into a finite dimensional LP that can be efficiently solved.
Towards this goal, we provide here an informal introduction (based on four steps), as we
believe the reader will benefit from it. The formal derivation and justification of each of
these steps is postponed to Theorem 8 and its proof.
Step 1: we observe that the price of anarchy computed over the family of games G ∈ Gf
is the same of the price of anarchy over the reduced family of games Gˆf , where the fea-
sible set of every player only contains two allocations: (worst) equilibrium and optimal
allocation, that is Aˆi = {anei , aopti }, Gˆf := {(R, {vr}, N, {Aˆi}, f)}. Thus, definition (10.3)
reduces to
PoA(f) = inf
G∈Gˆf
(
W (ane)
W (aopt)
)
,
s.t. ui(a
ne) ≥ ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
where we have constrained ane to be an equilibrium. We do not include the additional
constraints requiring ane to be the worst equilibrium and aopt to provide the highest
welfare. This is because the infimum over Gˆf and the parametrization we will introduce
to describe an instance G (in step 4) will implicitly ensure this.
Step 2: we assume without loss of generality that W (ane) = 1 and get
PoA(f) = inf
G∈Gˆf
1
W (aopt)
,
s.t. ui(a
ne) ≥ ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
W (ane) = 1 .
(10.7)
Step 3: we relax the previous program as in the following
PoA(f) = inf
G∈Gˆf
1
W (aopt)
,
s.t.
∑
i∈N
ui(a
ne)− ui(aopti , ane−i) ≥ 0 ,
W (ane) = 1 ,
(10.8)
where the n equilibrium constraints (one per each player) have been substituted by their
sum. We show that the relaxation gives the same price of anarchy of (10.7).
Step 4: for a given instance in the reduced family Gˆf , computing the efficiency amounts
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to identifying an optimal allocation and the corresponding worst Nash equilibrium. The
additional difficulty appearing in (10.8) is in how to describe a generic instance G ∈ Gˆf
and on how to compute the infimum over all such (infinite) instances. To do so, we
introduce an efficient parametrization that fully describes the objective function and the
decision variables of the previous problem. This allows to reduce (10.8) and obtain the
result in the following Theorem 8.
The linear program
The following theorem makes the reasoning presented in Section 10.3.1 formal and con-
stitutes the second result of this manuscript.
In order to capture all the instances in Gˆf , we use a parametrization inspired by
[War12] and introduce the variables θ(a, x, b) ∈ R defined for any tuple of integers
(a, x, b) ∈ I, where
I := {(a, x, b) ∈ N3≥0 s.t. 1 ≤ a+ x+ b ≤ n} ,
IR := {(a, x, b) ∈ I s.t. a·x·b = 0 or a+ x+ b = n} .
Note that IR contains all the integer points on the planes a = 0, b = 0, x = 0, a+x+b = n
bounding I. The set I is depicted in Figure 10.2 for the case of n = 3.
a
x
b
1
2
3
1
2
3
0
1
2
3
1
Figure 10.2: The black circles represent all the points belonging to I, n = 3.
In the remainder we write
∑
a,x,b instead of
∑
(a,x,b)∈I , for readability. Additionally,
given a distribution rule f : [n] → R≥0, and a welfare basis function w : [n] → R>0,
we extend their definition, with slight abuse of notation, to f : [n + 1]0 → R≥0 and
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w : [n + 1]0 → R≥0, where we set the first and last components to be identically zero,
i.e., f(0) = w(0) = 0, f(n+ 1) = w(n+ 1) = 0.3
Theorem 8 (PoA as a linear program). Given f ∈ F , the price of anarchy (10.3) is
PoA(f) =
1
W ?
,
where W ? is the value of the following (primal) linear program in the unknowns θ(a, x, b) ∈
R≥0, (a, x, b) ∈ I
W ? = max
θ(a,x,b)
∑
a,x,b
1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b)
s.t.
∑
a,x,b
[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0∑
a,x,b
1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1
θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0 ∀(a, x, b) ∈ I .
(10.9)
The proof is based on the four steps previously discussed.
Given a distribution rule f , the solution to the previous program returns both the
price of anarchy, and the corresponding worst case instance (encoded in θ(a, x, b), see
the proof of the Step 4 in Section 10.5). Observe that the number of decision variables
in (10.9) is |I| = 1
2
∑n
j=0(j + 2)(j + 1)− 1 = n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)/6− 1 ∼ O(n3), while only
two scalar constraints are present (neglecting the positivity constraint). The previous
program can thus already be solved efficiently. Nevertheless, we are only interested in
the expression of PoA(f) (i.e., ultimately in the value of the program), and therefore
consider the dual counterpart of (10.9) in the following.
10.3.2 Dual formulation
Thanks to strong duality, it suffices to solve the dual program of (10.9) to compute
the price of anarchy (10.3). While the dual program should feature two scalar decision
variables and O(n3) constraints, the following theorem shows how to reduce the number
of constraints to only |IR| = 2(n2 + 1)− 1 ∼ O(n2). The overarching goal is to progress
towards an explicit expression for PoA(f).
3This adjustment does not play any role, but is required to avoid the use of cumbersome notation in
the forthcoming expressions. Else, e.g., f(a+ x+ 1) and w(a+ x+ 1) in (10.9) will not be defined for
a+ x = n.
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Theorem 9 (Dual reformulation of PoA). Given f ∈ F , the price of anarchy (10.3) is
PoA(f) = 1/W ? , where W ? is the value of the following (dual) program
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. 1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)− µ1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)+
+ λ[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)] ≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR
(10.10)
The proof of the previous theorem (see Section 10.5) suggests that a further simpli-
fication can be made when f(j)w(j) is non-increasing for all j. In this case the number
of constraints reduces to exactly n2, as detailed in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Consider a given f ∈ F .
(a) Assume f(j)w(j) non increasing for j ∈ [n]. Then PoA = 1/W ?, where
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1)]
∀j, l ∈ [0, n], 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)]
∀j, l ∈ [0, n], j + l > n.
(10.11)
(b) If additionally f(j) ≥ 1
j
f(1)w(1) minl∈[n] lw(l) , then
λ? = max
l∈[n]
w(l)
l
1
f(1)w(1)
.
Mimicking the proof of the previous corollary, it is possible to obtain a similar result
when f(j)w(j) is instead non-decreasing. While the requirements on f(j)w(j) being non
increasing might seem restrictive at first, similar assumptions were made relative to a
simpler class of problems in [MR14; Gai09]. We remark that this requirement is added
to obtain an explicit expression for the price of anarchy. If this is not the goal, one can
compute PoA(f) using Theorem 9 without imposing any additional assumption.
Remark 11 (Explicit expression of PoA(f)). Observe that, if the optimal value λ? is
known a priori, as in the second statement from the previous corollary, the quantity W ?
(and consequently the price of anarchy) can be computed explicitly from (10.11) as the
maximum between n2 real numbers depending on all the entries of f and w. To see
this, divide both sides of the constraints in (10.11) by w(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and observe
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that the solution µ? is then found as the maximum of the resulting right hand side. The
corresponding value of W ? is given by the following expression.
W ? = max

max
j 6=0
1≤j+l≤n
j,l∈[0,n]
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ?[jf(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j+1)
w(j)
]
max
j 6=0
j+l>n
j,l∈[0,n]
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ?[(n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j+1)
w(j)
]
(10.12)
Equation (10.12) is reminiscent of the result obtained using a very different approach in
[MR14, Thm. 6] (limited to Shapley value) and [Gai09, Thm. 3] (limited to set covering
problems and sub budget-balanced utilities).
Finally, observe that for the case of MMC problems discussed in Section 10.2 (it is
w(j) = 1 for all j ∈ [n]) the assumption required in the first statement of the previous
corollary reduces to f(j) non increasing. That is, the previous corollary gives us an
expression for the PoA(f) also for utilities that do not satisfy
∑
i∈N ui(a) ≤ W (a), as
instead required in [Gai09]. We discuss further connections with these works and others
in Chapter 11.
10.3.3 Related works
The idea of using an auxiliary linear program to study the equilibrium efficiency has
appeared in few works in the literature [NR10; Bil12; KM14; Tha17]. Note that, all the
aforementioned works assume the budget-balance condition to hold true. In [NR10], the
authors pose the problem in an abstract form and the corresponding linear program is
used as a conceptual tool, rather than as a machinery to explicitly compute the price
of anarchy. While [Bil12] provides result for polynomial latency functions in weighted
congestion games, the techniques proposed in [Bil12; KM14; Tha17] require an ad-hoc
bound on the dual objective to obtain a bound on the price of anarchy. This is not the
case with our approach. Additionally, we note that the linear programming reformula-
tions of [NR10] capture the price of anarchy for a given problem instance, while in this
work we consider the worst case instance over an admissible class of problems. This
additional requirement complicates the analysis, but will produce algorithms that are
provably robust to the presence of uncertainty, and are thus better suited for engineering
implementation. Finally, we observe that a direct transposition of the approach in, e.g.,
[NR10] to our setting would produce a linear program whose size grows exponentially in
the number of resources, making it impossible to solve for real world applications.
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10.4 Optimal utility design via linear programming
Given w and a distribution rule f , Theorem 9 and Corollary 3 have reduced the compu-
tation of the price of anarchy to the solution of a tractable linear program. Nevertheless,
determining the distribution rule maximizing PoA(f), i.e., giving the best performance
guarantees, is also a tractable linear program. The following theorem makes this clear.
Theorem 10 (Optimizing PoA(f) is a linear program). For a given welfare basis w, the
design problem
arg max
f∈F
PoA(f)
is equivalent to the following LP in n+ 1 scalar unknowns
f ? ∈ arg min
f∈F , µ∈R
µ
s.t. 1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)− µ1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)+
+ af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1) ≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR
(10.13)
The corresponding optimal price of anarchy is
PoA(f ?) =
1
µ?
,
where µ? is the value of the program (10.13).
Remark 12. The importance of this results stems from its applicability for the game
design procedure outlined in Chapter 8. More precisely, the previous theorem provides
a solution to the utility design problem introduced in Section 10.1. As a matter of fact,
Theorem 10 allows to compute the optimal distribution rule, for any given welfare ba-
sis function (satisfying the Standing Assumptions), and thus to solve the utility design
problem. Applications of these results are presented in Chapters 11 and 12.
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10.5 Appendix
10.5.1 Proofs of the results presented in Section 10.2
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We prove the first and third claims only, as the second statement is shown in
[Gai09, Thm. 3].
(a) The claim in Proposition 13 requires f(j) ≤ 1/j, so that we need to restrict to
this class of admissible utility functions to apply any smoothness argument. We
proceed dividing the proof in two parts. First, we consider the valid distribution
rule fSV defined for all j ∈ [n] as fSV(j) := 1/j, and show that the best smoothness
parameters are (1, 1− 1/n) so that
SPoA(fSV) =
1
2− 1/n = b(n).
Second, we show that for any distribution with f(j) ≤ fSV(j) for all j ∈ [n] it
holds SPoA(f) ≤ SPoA(fSV). From this, we conclude SPoA(f) ≤ b(n) = 12−1/n for
all admissible distribution rules.
Part 1: with the special choice of fSV, the proof of [Gai09, Thm. 2] shows that for
any pair of feasible a, a′ and any G ∈ Gf , it holds∑
i∈N
ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ W (a′)− χSVW (a) ,
where χSV = max
j∈[n−1]
{jfSV(j)− fSV(j + 1), (n− 1)fSV(n)} ,
from which χSV = 1−1/n. Thus the game is (1, 1−1/n)-smooth and it follows that
SPoA(fSV) ≥ 12−1/n . To show that there is no better pair (λ, µ) we show that the
price of anarchy is exactly 1
2−1/n . To do so, we consider the instance G proposed
in [RPM17, Fig. S2] and observe that W (aopt) = 2− 1/n while W (ane) = 1. Thus,
SPoA(fSV) ≤ PoA(fSV) ≤ 12−1/n . Since the lower and upper bounds obtained for
SPoA(fSV) match, we conclude that SPoA(fSV) =
1
2−1/n .
Part 2: Consider any distribution rule such that f(j) ≤ fSV(j) for all j ∈ [n]. Let
us define the set
A(f) :=
{
(λ, µ) s.t. for all a, a′ ∈ A, for all G ∈ Gf∑
i∈N
r∈ai
vrf(|(a′i, a−i)|r)w(|(a′i, a−i)|r) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a)
}
,
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and analogously for A(fSV). With this notation, the claim we intend to prove
reduces to
sup
(λ,µ)∈A(f)
λ
1 + µ
≤ sup
(λ,µ)∈A(fSV)
λ
1 + µ
. (10.14)
To show the latter, we prove that A(f) ⊆ A(fSV). Consider a feasible tuple
(λ, µ) ∈ A(f); by definition of A(f) it is∑
i∈N
r∈ai
vrf(|(a′i, a−i)|r)w(|(a′i, a−i)|r) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a),
∀a, a′ ∈ A, G ∈ Gf . Since fSV(j) ≥ f(j), it follows that∑
i∈N
r∈ai
vrfSV(|(a′i, a−i)|r)w(|(a′i, a−i)|r) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a),
∀a, a′ ∈ A, G ∈ Gf . Thus (λ, µ) ∈ A(fSV) too, from which we conclude that
A(f) ⊆ A(fSV) and (10.14) must hold.
(c) Follows from the previous claims upon noticing that b(n) < PoA(fG) for n > 2
(while b(n) = PoA(fG) for n = 2).
10.5.2 Proofs of the results presented in Section 10.3
Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. The proof formalizes the steps introduced in Section 10.3.1.
Step 1: We intend to show that the price of anarchy computed over G ∈ Gf is the
same of the price of anarchy computed over a reduced set of games. Consider
a game G ∈ Gf and denote with ane the corresponding worst equilibrium
(as measured by W ) and with aopt an optimal allocation of G. For every
such game G, we construct a new game Gˆ, where Gˆ := (R, {vr}, N, {Aˆi}, f)
and Aˆi = {anei , aopti } for all i ∈ N . That is, the feasible set of every player
in Gˆ contains only two allocations: an optimal allocation, and the (worst)
equilibrium of G. With slight abuse of notation we write Gˆ(G) to describe
the game Gˆ constructed from G as just discussed. Observe that G and Gˆ
have the same price of anarchy, i.e.,
mina∈ne(G) W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
=
mina∈ne(Gˆ) W (a)
maxa∈AˆW (a)
.
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Denote with Gˆf the class of games Gˆf := {Gˆ(G) ∀G ∈ Gf} . Observe that
Gˆf ⊆ Gf (by definition) and since for every game G ∈ Gf , it is possible to
construct a game Gˆ ∈ Gˆf with the same price of anarchy, it follows that
(10.3) can be computed as
PoA(f) = inf
Gˆ∈Gˆf
(
mina∈ne(Gˆ) W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
)
.
Step 2: Lemma 13 ensures for any game G, every equilibrium configuration has
strictly positive welfare. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that
W (ane) = 1, where ane represents the worst equilibrium of G.4 The price of
anarchy reduces to
PoA(f) = inf
Gˆ∈Gˆf
1
W (aopt)
,
s.t. ui(a
ne) ≥ ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
W (ane) = 1 .
Steps 3, 4: While in Section 10.3.1 these steps have been introduced separately for ease
of exposition, their proof is presented jointly here. First observe, from the
last equation, that PoA(f) = 1/W ?, where
W ? := sup
Gˆ∈Gˆf
W (aopt) ,
s.t. ui(a
ne) ≥ ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
W (ane) = 1 .
(10.15)
We relax the previous program as in the following
V ? := sup
Gˆ∈Gˆf
W (aopt) ,
s.t.
∑
i∈N
ui(a
ne)− ui(aopti , ane−i) ≥ 0 ,
W (ane) = 1 ,
(10.16)
where the n equilibrium constraints (one per each player) have been sub-
stituted by their sum. Thus, V ? ≥ W ?, but it also holds V ? ≤ W ? as
Lemma 14 proves, so that V ? = W ?.
In the following we show how to transform (10.16) in (10.9) by intro-
ducing the variables θ(a, x, b), (a, x, b) ∈ I. This parametrization has
4If, for a given game G, this is not the case, it is possible to construct a new game (by simply rescaling
the value of the resources) such that W (ane) = 1. Note that the new game has the same game price of
anarchy of G.
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been introduced to study covering problems in [War12], and will be used
here to efficiently represent the quantities appearing in (10.16). To be-
gin with, recall that each feasible set is composed of only two allocations,
that is Aˆi = {anei , aopti }. For any given triplet (a, x, b) in I, we thus define
θ(a, x, b) ∈ R≥0 as the total value of resources that belong to precisely a+x
of the sets anei , b+ x of the sets a
opt
j , for which exactly x sets have the same
index (i.e., i = j). These O(n3) variables suffice to fully describe the terms
appearing in (10.16). Indeed, extending the formulation of [War12] to the
welfare defined in (8.1) and the utilities defined in (10.1), we can write
W (aopt) =
∑
(a,x,b)∈I
1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b) ,
W (ane) =
∑
(a,x,b)∈I
1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) .
The relaxed equilibrium constraint∑
i∈N
ui(a
ne)− ui(aopti , ane−i) ≥ 0
reduces to∑
i∈N
ui(a
ne)− ui(aopti , ane−i)
=
∑
(a,x,b)∈I
[(a+ x)f(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)
− xf(a+ x)w(a+ x)]θ(a, x, b)
=
∑
(a,x,b)∈I
[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0 .
Substituting the latter expressions in (10.16), one gets
W ? = sup
θ(a,x,b)
∑
a,x,b
1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b)
s.t.
∑
a,x,b
[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0∑
a,x,b
1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1
θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0 ∀(a, x, b) ∈ I .
To transform the latter expression in (10.9) (i.e., the desired result) it suf-
fices to show that the supremum is attained. To see this observe that the
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decision variables θ(a, x, b) live in a compact space. Indeed θ(a, x, b) are
constrained to the positive orthant for all (a, x, b) ∈ I. Additionally, the
decision variables with a + x 6= 0 must be bounded due to the constraint
W (ane) = 1 ∑
(a,x,b)∈I
a+x≥1
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1 ,
where w(j) 6= 0 by assumption. Finally, the decision variables left, i.e.,
those of the form θ(0, 0, b), b ∈ [n] are bounded due to the equilibrium
constraint, which can be rewritten as∑
b∈[n]
bf(1)w(1)θ(0, 0, b) ≤
∑
(a,x,b)∈I
a+x≥1
[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b),
where f(1)w(1) 6= 0 by assumption.
Lemma 13. For any game G ∈ Gf , it holds
W (ane) > 0 for all ane ∈ ne(G) .
Proof. Let us consider a fixed game G ∈ Gf . By contradiction, let us assume that
W (ane) = 0 for some ane ∈ ne(G). It follows that all the players must have distributed
themselves on resources that are either valued zero, or have selected the empty set
allocation (since w(j) > 0). Thus, their utility function must also evaluate to zero.
However, by Standing Assumptions, there exists a player p and a resource r ∈ ap ∈ Ap
with vr > 0. Observe that no other player is currently selecting this resource, else
W (ane) > 0. If player p was to deviate and selected instead ap, his utility would be
strictly positive (since f(1) > 0). Thus ane is not an equilibrium: a contradiction.
Repeating the same reasoning for all games G ∈ Gf yields the claim.
Lemma 14. Consider W ? and V ? defined respectively in (10.15) and (10.16). It holds
that V ? ≤ W ?.
Proof. Since (10.16) is equivalent to (10.9) as shown in the proof of Theorem 8, we will
work with (10.9) to prove V ? ≤ W ?. To do so, for any θ(a, x, b), (a, x, b) ∈ I feasible
solution of (10.9) with value v, we will construct an instance of game Gˆ satisfying the
constraints of the original problem (10.15) too. This allows to conclude that V ? ≤ W ?.
To ease the notation we will use
∑
a,x,b in place of
∑
(a,x,b)∈I .
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Consider θ(a, x, b), (a, x, b) ∈ I a feasible point for (10.9) with value v. For every
(a, x, b) ∈ I and for each i ∈ N we create a resource r(a, x, b, i) and assign to it the value
of θ(a, x, b)/n, i.e., vr(a,x,b,i) = θ(a, x, b)/n ∀i ∈ N . We then construct the game Gˆ by
defining ∀i ∈ N , Aˆi = {anei , aopti } and assigning the resources as follows
anei = ∪nj=1 {r(a, x, b, j) s.t. a+ x ≥ 1 + g(i, j)} ,
aopti = ∪nj=1 {r(a, x, b, j) s.t. b+ x ≥ 1 + h(i, j)} ,
where
g(i, j) :=(j − 1 + (n− 1)(i− 1)) mod n ,
=(j − i) mod n
h(i, j) :=(j + (n− 1)(i− 1)) mod n
=(j − i+ 1) mod n .
We begin by showing W (ane) = 1 and W (aopt) = v. Aside from the cumbersome
definition of g and h, it is not difficult to verify that for any fixed resource (i.e., for every
fixed tuple (a, x, b, j)), there are exactly a+ x (resp. b+ x) players selecting it while at
the equilibrium (resp. optimum) allocation. It follows that
W (ane) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
a+x>0
vr(a,x,b,j)w(a+ x)
=
∑
j∈[n]
∑
a+x>0
θ(a, x, b)
n
w(a+ x)
=
∑
a,x,b
1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1 ,
With an identical reasoning, one shows that
W (aopt) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
b+x>0
vr(a,x,b,j)w(b+ x)
=
∑
a,x,b
1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b) = v .
Finally, we prove that ane is indeed an equilibrium, i.e., it satisfies ui(a
ne)−ui(aopti , ane−i) ≥
0 for all i ∈ N . Towards this goal, we recall that the game under consideration is a
congestion game with potential ϕ : A → R≥0
ϕ(a) =
∑
r∈R
|a|r∑
j=1
vrw(j)f(j)
It follows that ui(a
ne)−ui(aopti , ane−i) = ϕ(ane)−ϕ(aopti , ane−i) and so we equivalently prove
that
ϕ(ane)− ϕ(aopti , ane−i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N .
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Thanks to the previous observation, according to which every resource (a, x, b, j) is cov-
ered by exactly a+ x players at the equilibrium, we have
ϕ(ane) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b)
n
a+x∑
j=1
w(j)f(j)
=
1
n
∑
a,x,b
n θ(a, x, b)
a+x∑
j=1
w(j)f(j) .
Additionally, observe that there are b resources selected by one extra agent and a re-
sources selected by one less agent when moving from ane to (aopti , a
ne
−i). The remaining
resources are chosen by the same number of agents. It follows that
ϕ(ane)− ϕ(aopti , ane−i) =
1
n
∑
a,x,b
n θ(a, x, b)
a+x∑
j=1
w(j)f(j)
− 1
n
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b)
(
b
a+x+1∑
j=1
w(j)f(j) + a
a+x−1∑
j=1
w(j)f(j) + (n− a− b)
a+x∑
j=1
w(j)f(j)
)
=
1
n
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b) (aw(a+ x)f(a+ x)− bw(a+ x+ 1)f(a+ x+ 1)) ≥ 0 ,
where the inequality holds because θ(a, x, b) is assumed feasible for (10.9). This concludes
the proof.
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. We divide the proof in two steps. In the first step we write the dual of the original
program in (10.9). With the second step we show that only the constraints obtained for
(a, x, b) ∈ IR are binding.
Step 1. Upon stacking the decision variables θ(a, x, b) in the vector y ∈ R`, ` = |I|, and
after properly defining the coefficients c, d, e ∈ R`, the program (10.9) can be compactly
written as
W ? = max
y
c>y
s.t. − e>y ≤ 0 , (λ)
d>y − 1 = 0 , (µ)
− y ≤ 0 . (ν)
The Lagrangian function is defined for λ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0 as L(y, λ, µ, ν) = c>y − λ(−e>y)−
µ(d>y − 1)− ν>(−y) = (c> + λe> + ν − µd>)y + µ, while the dual function reads as
g(λ, µ, ν) = µ if c> + λe> + ν> − µd> = 0 ,
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and it is unbounded elsewhere. Hence the dual program takes the form
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. c+ λe− µd ≤ 0 ,
which corresponds, in the original variables, to
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. 1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)− µ1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)+
+ λ[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)] ≤ 0 ∀(a, x, b) ∈ I .
(10.17)
By strong duality5, the value of (10.9) matches (10.17).
Step 2. In this step we show that only the constraints with (a, x, b) ∈ IR are necessary
in (10.17), thus obtaining (10.10).
Observe that when (a, x, b) ∈ I and a + x = 0, b can take any value 1 ≤ b ≤ n,
and these indices are already included in IR. Similarly for the indices (a, x, b) ∈ I with
b + x = 0. Thus, we focus on the remaining constraints, i.e., those with a + x 6= 0
and b + x 6= 0. We change the coordinates from the original indices (a, x, b) to (j, x, l),
j := a+ x, l := b+ x. The constraints in (10.17) now read as
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(j − x)f(j)w(j)− (l − x)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)] ,
= w(l) + λ[jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1) + x(f(j + 1)w(j + 1)− f(j)w(j))]
(10.18)
where (j, x, l) ∈ Iˆ and Iˆ = {(j, x, l) ∈ N3≥0 s.t. 1 ≤ j−x+ l ≤ n, j ≥ x, l ≥ x, j, l 6= 0}.
In the remaining of this proof we consider j fixed, while l, x are free to move within Iˆ.
This corresponds to moving the indices in the rectangular region defined by the blue and
green patches in Figures 10.3 and 10.4. Observe that for j = n it must be l = x (since
−x + l ≤ 0 and l − x ≥ 0), i.e., in the original coordinates b = 0, which represents the
segment on the plane b = 0 with a + x = n. These indices already belong to IR. Thus,
we consider the case j 6= n and divide the reasoning in two parts.
a) Case of f(j + 1)w(j + 1) ≤ f(j)w(j).
The term f(j + 1)w(j + 1) − f(j)w(j) is non-positive and so the most binding
constraint in (10.18) is obtained picking x as small as possible. In the following we
fix l as well (recall that we have previously fixed j). This corresponds to considering
points on a black line on the plane j =const in Figure 10.3). Since it must be x ≥ 0
and x ≥ j + l− n, for fixed j and l we set x = max{0, j + l− n}. In the following
we show that these constraints are already included in (10.10).
5The primal LP (10.9) is always feasible, since θ(0, 1, 0) = 1/w(1), θ(a, x, b) = 0 ∀ (a, x, b) ∈ I\(0, 1, 0)
satisfies all the constraints in (10.9).
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- If j + l ≤ n, i.e., if a + b + 2x ≤ n, we set x = 0. These indices correspond
to points on the plane x = 0, (1 ≤ a + b ≤ n) bounding the pyramid and so
they are already included in IR.
- If j + l > n, i.e., if a + b + 2x > n, we set x = j + l − n, i.e., a + b + x = n.
These indices correspond to points on the plane a + b + x = n, and so they
are included in IR too.
a
x
b
a+ x+ b = nl =const
a+ 2x+ b = n
j + l = n
j =const
j + l ≥ nj =const
j + l < n
1
Figure 10.3: Indices representation for case a).
b) Case of f(j + 1)w(j + 1) > f(j)w(j).
The term f(j+1)w(j+1)−f(j)w(j) is positive and so the most binding constraint
in (10.18) is obtained picking x as large as possible. In the following (after having
fixed j) we fix l as well (this means we are moving on a black line on the plane
j =const in Figure 10.4). Since it must be x ≤ l, x ≤ j and x ≤ j + l − 1, we set
x = min{j, l}. In the following we show that these constraints are already included
in (10.10).
- If j ≤ l, i.e., if a ≤ b, we set x = j, i.e., a = 0. These indices correspond to
points on the plane a = 0, (1 ≤ x+ b ≤ k) and so they are included in IR.
- If j > l, i.e., if a > b, then we set x = l, i.e., b = 0. These indices correspond
to points on the plane b = 0, (1 ≤ a+ b ≤ k) and so they are included in IR.
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ax
b
a+ x+ b = n
l =const
a = b
j = l
j =const
j > lj =const
j ≤ l
1
Figure 10.4: Indices representation for case b).
Proof of Corollary 3
Proof.
(a) Following the proof of Theorem 9 (second step, case a)), we note that if f(j)w(j)
is non increasing for j ∈ N , the only binding indices are those lying on the the two
surfaces x = 0, 1 ≤ a+ b ≤ n and a+ x+ b ≤ n. The surface x = 0, 1 ≤ a+ b ≤ n
gives
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1)] (10.19)
for 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n and j, l ∈ [n]0, where we used j, l instead of a, b. The surface
a+ x+ b = n gives
µw(n− b) =λ[af(n− b)w(n− b)− bf(n− b+ 1)w(n− b+ 1)] + w(n− a)
which can be written as
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)] (10.20)
for j + l > n and j, l ∈ [n]0, where we have used the same change of coordinates
of the proof of Theorem 9, i.e., j = a + x = n − b, l = b + x = n − a. Thus,
we conclude that (10.19) and (10.20) are sufficient to describe the constraints in
(10.10), and the result follows.
(b) First, observe that for j = 0, it must be l ∈ [n]. Additionally, note that the second
set of constraints (those with j+ l > n) is empty. The first set of constraints yields
λ ≥ w(l)
l
1
f(1)w(1)
for l ∈ [n]. Define
λ? = max
l∈[n]
w(l)
l
1
f(1)w(1)
,
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and observe that any feasible λ must satisfy λ ≥ λ?. Second, observe that for
l = 0, it must be j ∈ [n]. Additionally, the second set of constraints (those with
j + l > n) is empty. The first set of constraints yields µ ≥ λjf(j) for j ∈ [n].
In the following we show that the most binding constraint amongst all those in
(10.11) is of the form µ ≥ αλ + β, with α ≥ 0 (i.e., the most binding constraint
is a straight line in the (λ, µ) plane pointing north-east). Consequently, the best
choice of λ so as to satisfy the constraints and minimize µ is to select λ as small
as possible, i.e., λ = λ?. See Figure 10.5 for an illustrative plot.
 
µ
( ?, µ?)
Constraints (0, l)
Constraints (j, 0)
Constraints (j, l)
with j, l 6= 0
Feasible region
1
Figure 10.5: Illustration of the three classes of constraints used in the proof of Corollary 3.
As shown previously, the constraints with j = 0 are straight lines parallel to the µ
axis, while the constraints with l = 0 are straight line of the form µ ≥ λjf(j) (and
thus point north-east in the (λ, µ) plane). We are thus left to check the constraints
with j 6= 0 and l 6= 0.
To do so, we prove that if one such constraint (identified by the indices (j, l))
has negative slope, the constraint identified with (j, 0) is more binding. Since the
constraint (j, 0) is of the form µ ≥ jλjf(j) (and thus has non-negative slope), this
will conclude the proof. We split the reasoning depending on wether 1 ≤ j+ l ≤ n
or j + l > n as the constraints in (10.11) have a different expression.
- Case of 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n: to complete the reasoning, in the following we assume
that jf(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j+1)
w(j)
< 0, and show that the constraint (j, 0) is more
binding, i.e., that
λjf(j) ≥ w(l)
w(j)
+ λjf(j)− λlf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
,
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which is equivalent to showing
w(l)
w(j)
− λlf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
≤ 0 . (10.21)
Since jf(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j+1)
w(j)
< 0 it must be
l > j
f(j)w(j)
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
≥ j ,
by non-increasingness of f(j)w(j). Thus it must be l ≥ j + 1. Consequently,
by non-increasingness of f(j)w(j) it is w(l) ≤ f(j + 1)w(j + 1)/f(l) and we
can bound the left hand side of (10.21) as
w(l)
w(j)
− λlf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
≤ f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)f(l)
− λlf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
=
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
f(j)w(j)
(
1
f(l)
− λl
)
f(j) .
The claim (10.21) is shown upon noticing that f(l) ≥ 1
l
minl∈[n] lw(l)f(1)w(1) =
1
lλ?
(by assumption), and thus
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
f(j)w(j)
(
1
f(l)
− λl
)
f(j) ≤ f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
f(j)w(j)
(λ? − λ) lf(j) ≤ 0 ,
since we have already shown that λ ≥ λ? for every feasible λ.
- Case of j + l > n: to complete the proof we proceed in a similar fashion to
what seen in the previous case. In particular, we assume that (n − l)f(j) −
(n−j)f(j+1)w(j+1)
w(j)
< 0, and show that the constraints (j, 0) is more binding,
i.e., that
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ(n− l − j)f(j)− λ(n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
) ≤ 0 . (10.22)
Since (n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j+1)
w(j)
< 0, it must be
n− j > (n− l) f(j)w(j)
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
≥ n− l
by non-increasingness of f(j)w(j). Thus it must be l ≥ j + 1. Consequently,
by non-increasingness of f(j)w(j) we can bound the left hand side of (10.22)
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as
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ(n− l − j)f(j)− λ(n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
≤ f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)f(l)
+ λ(n− l − j)f(j)− λ(n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
=
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)f(j)
(
1
f(l)
− λ(n− j)
)
f(j) + λ(n− l − j)f(j)
≤ f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)f(j)
(
1
f(l)
− λ(n− j) + λ(n− l − j)
)
f(j)
≤ f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)f(j)
(
1
f(l)
− λl
)
f(j) ≤ 0 ,
where the chain of inequality is proven similarly to what done in the case of
1 ≤ j + l ≤ n, using the non-decreasingness of f(j)w(j) and the fact that
f(l) ≥ 1
lλ?
by assumption.
10.5.3 Proofs of the results presented in Section 10.4
Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. We first observe that the problem arg maxf∈F PoA(f) is well posed, in the sense
that the supremum supf∈F PoA(f) is attained for some f ∈ F . A proof of this is reported
in the following Lemma 15.
The (well posed) problem arg maxf∈F PoA(f) is equivalent to finding the distribution
rule that minimizes W ? given in Theorem 9, i.e.,
f ? ∈ arg min
f∈F
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. 1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)− µ1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)+
+ λ[af(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)] ≤ 0 ∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR .
The previous program is non linear, but the decision variables λ and f always appear
multiplied together. Thus, we define f˜(j) := λf(j) for all j ∈ [n + 1]0 and observe that
the constraint obtained in (10.10) for (a, x, b) = (0, 0, 1) gives f˜(1) = λf(1) ≥ 1, which
also implies λ ≥ 1/f(1) > 0 since f(1) > 0 (by assumption of f ∈ F). Folding the min
operators gives
f˜ ? ∈ arg min
f˜∈Rn≥0
f˜(1)≥1
, µ∈R
µ
s.t. 1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)− µ1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)+
+ af˜(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bf˜(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1) ≤ 0 ∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR .
(10.23)
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Finally, observe that f˜ ? is feasible for the original program, since f˜ ? ∈ F . Additionally,
we note that f˜ ? and f ? give the same price of anarchy (since f˜(j) = λf(j), λ > 0 and
the equilibrium conditions are invariant to rescaling). Thus f˜ ? solving (10.23) must be
optimal. The optimal price of anarchy value follows.
Lemma 15. The supremum supf∈F PoA(f) is attained in F .
Proof. Recall that F is defined as follows
F := {f : [n]→ R≥0 s.t. f(1) ≥ 1, f(j) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [n]}.
To conclude, we show that any distribution f ? achieving a performance equal to
sup
f∈F
PoA(f)
is bounded (i.e., all the components are bounded), so that it must be f ? ∈ F . To do
so, consider a fixed distribution f ∈ F , and construct from it fM . The distribution
fM is defined as follows: fM(j) = M , with M ∈ R≥0 for some fixed j ∈ [n], while it
exactly matches f for the remaining components. In the following we show that there
exists Mˆ ∈ R≥0 such that PoA(fM) < PoA(f) for all M ≥ Mˆ . Thus fM can not
attain supf∈F PoA(f) for M ≥ Mˆ as the corresponding f would give a better price of
anarchy. Repeating this reasoning for any f ∈ F , one concludes that the distribution
rule achieving supf∈F PoA(f) must be bounded along the j-th component. Repeating
the reasoning for all possible j ∈ [n], one obtains the claim.
To conclude we are left to show that ∃Mˆ ∈ R≥0 such that PoA(fM) < PoA(f) for
all M ≥ Mˆ . To do so, observe that the price of anarchy of f ∈ F can be computed
as PoA(f) = 1/W ?, where W ? is the solution to the primal problem in (10.9). Since
the decision variables of (10.9) live in a compact space (and the primal is feasible, see
the footnote in the proof of Theorem 9), we have W ? < +∞ and so PoA(f) > 0, i.e.,
PoA(f) is bounded away from zero. On the other hand, thanks to Theorem 9, the price
of anarchy of fM can be computed for any M as PoA(fM) = 1/W
?
M , where
W ?M = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. 1{b+x≥1}w(b+ x)− µ1{a+x≥1}w(a+ x)+
+ λ[afM(a+ x)w(a+ x)− bfM(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)] ≤ 0 ∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR
First, observe that for any feasible λ, it must be λ ≥ 1
fM (1)
, else the constraints obtained
form the previous linear program with a = x = 0, b = 1 would be infeasible. Further,
consider the constraints with b = 0, x = 0, a = j ≥ 1. They amount to
µ ≥ λjfM(j) ≥ j
fM(1)
fM(j) =
jM
fM(1)
,
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where fM(1) > 0 by Standing Assumptions and fM ∈ F . It follows that
PoA(fM) =
1
W ?M
≤ fM(1)
jM
.
Thus, it is possible to make PoA(fM) arbitrarily close to zero, by selecting M sufficiently
large. It follows that ∃Mˆ ∈ R≥0 such that PoA(fM) < PoA(f) for all M ≥ Mˆ , since
PoA(f) is bounded away from zero, as previously argued. This concludes the proof.
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CHAPTER 11
Submodular, supermodular,
covering problems
In the previous chapter we have addressed the problem of characterizing and optimizing
the price of anarchy as a function of the chosen utilities. In this chapter we specialize
the general result of Theorems 9 and 10 to the case when W is monotone submodular,
supermodular, or a coverage function. We show how previously fragmented results from
other authors can now be obtained as special case of the more general Theorem 9.
Relative to the submodular case, in Section 11.1 we give an explicit expression for
the price of anarchy (Theorem 11), and apply the result to obtain the efficiency of the
Shapley value and marginal contribution distribution rule (Corollary 4). This is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first exact characterization of the price of anarchy in the
submodular settings, and the first exact characterization of the performance associated
to the Shapley value and marginal contribution distribution rule. Additionally, we show
how the distribution rule designed maximizing the price of anarchy outperforms the very
recent 1−c/e approximation of [SVW17], relative to submodular maximization problems.
In Section 11.2 we consider the special case of MMC problems (see Section 8.2 for their
definition) and obtain a tight expression (Theorem 12) for the price of anarchy relying
solely on the Standing Assumptions. We further show how the expression subsumes pre-
vious results obtained under the additional assumptions therein required (Corollary 5).
The distribution rule designed to maximize the price of anarchy achieves a 1 − 1/e
approximation.
In Section 11.3 we consider the case when W is supermodular and obtain an explicit
expression for the price of anarchy (Theorem 13), extending previous results. Finally,
we show that the Shapley value distribution rule is optimal, but observe that the utility
design approach provides very poor approximation guarantees limitedly to this case.
Throughout this chapter we assume that the Standing Assumptions introduced in
Chapter 10 continue to hold. All the proofs are reported in the Appendix (Section 11.4).
The results presented in this chapter have been published in [PCM18; PM18b].
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11.1 The case of submodular welfare function
In this section we focus on the case when the welfare basis function w is non-decreasing
and concave (in the discrete sense). This results in the welfare function in (8.1) being
monotone submodular. Submodular functions model problems with diminishing returns
and are used to describe a wide range of engineering applications such as satellite assign-
ment problems [QBL15], Adwords for e-commerce [DJ12], and combinatorial auctions
[LLN06], among others. For the considered class of problems, we show (Theorem 11)
that characterizing the price of anarchy reduces to computing the maximum between
n(n + 1)/2 ∼ O(n2) numbers. Using this result, we give an explicit expression of the
price of anarchy for the well known Shapley value and marginal contribution distribution
rule (Corollary 4). We then show how to design f so as to maximize the performance
measured by PoA(f). Finally, we compare our performance certificates with existing
approximation results.
We begin by formally introducing two distribution rules that have attracted the re-
searchers’ attention due to their simple interpretation and to their special properties: the
Shapley value distribution rule and the marginal contribution distribution rule [FH13].
Definition 24. The Shapley value and marginal contribution distribution rules are iden-
tified with fSV an fMC, respectively. For j ∈ [n], they are given by
fSV(j) =
1
j
,
fMC(j) = 1− w(j − 1)
w(j)
.
Observe that the Shapley value distribution rule is the only distribution rule for
which the sum of all the players utility exactly matches the total welfare. The marginal
contribution distribution rule takes its name from the observation that (10.1) reduces to
ui(a) =
∑
r∈ai
vrw(|a|r)fMC(|a|r)
=
∑
r∈ai
vr(w(|a|r)− w(|a|r − 1)) = W (a)−W (∅, a−i) ,
i.e., player’s i utility function represent its marginal contribution to the total welfare,
that is the difference between W (a) and the welfare generated when player i is removed
from the game.
Assumption 10. Throughout this section we assume that the function w is non-decreasing
and concave, in the following sense
w(j + 1) ≥ w(j) ,
w(j + 1)− w(j) ≤ w(j)− w(j − 1) ∀j ∈ [n− 1] .
Further we assume that w(1) = 1.
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The requirement w(1) = 1 is without loss of generality. Indeed, If w(1) 6= 1, it
is possible to normalize its value and reduce to the case w(1) = 1 (since w(1) > 0
by Standing Assumptions). As a consequence of Assumption 10, the function W (a) is
monotone and submodular, i.e., it satisfies the following:
Monotonicity:
∀ a, b ∈ A s.t. ai ⊆ bi ∀i ∈ N =⇒ W (a) ≤ W (b) .
Submodularity:
∀ a, b ∈ A s.t. ai ⊆ bi ∀i ∈ N,
∀ c ∈ 2Rn s.t. a′i := ai ∪ ci ∈ Ai, b′i := bi ∪ ci ∈ Ai ∀i ∈ N,
=⇒ W (a′)−W (a) ≥ W (b′)−W (b) .
While Theorem 9 gives a general answer on how to determine the price of anarchy,
it is possible to exploit the additional properties given by Assumption 10 to obtain an
explicit expression of PoA(f).
Theorem 11 (PoA for submodular welfare). Consider f a distribution rule such that
f(j)w(j) is non increasing and f(j) ≥ fMC(j) for all j ∈ [n]. Then, PoA(f) = 1/W ?,
W ? = max
l≤j∈[n]
{
w(l)
w(j)
+ min(j, n− l)f(j)−min(l, n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
}
, (11.1)
or equivalently
W ? = min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ w(l) + jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + (n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and j + l ≥ n .
(11.2)
The proof amounts to showing that λ appearing in Corollary 3 can be computed a
priori, and takes the value λ? = 1. The requirements on f(j)w(j) being non increasing
and f(j) ≥ fMC(j) might seem restrictive at first. Nevertheless, similar assumptions
where made in [MR14; Gai09] relative to a simpler class of problems. Additionally, the
Shapley value and marginal contribution distribution rules (and many others) satisfy
these assumptions. Thus, a direct application of Theorem 11 returns the exact price of
anarchy of fSV and fMC, as detailed next.
Corollary 4 (Tight PoA for fSV and fMC).
(a) The PoA for the Shapley value distribution rule is PoA(fSV) = 1/W
?
SV, where
W ?SV = max
l≤j∈[n]
{
w(l)
w(j)
+ min(j, n− l)1
j
−min(l, n− j) w(j + 1)
(j + 1)w(j)
}
. (11.3)
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(b) The PoA for the marginal contribution distribution rule is PoA(fMC) = 1/W
?
MC,
where
W ?MC = 1 + max
j∈[n]
{
1
w(j)
min(j, n− j)[2w(j)− w(j − 1)− w(j + 1)]
}
(11.4)
The previous Corollary shows that the price of anarchy of the Shapley value and
marginal contribution distribution rule can be computed as the maximum of n(n+ 1)/2
and n numbers, respectively.
Remark 13 (Connection with [MR14]). The quantity (11.3) can be equivalently written
as
W ?SV = 1 + max
l≤j∈[n]
{
w(l)
w(j)
− 1
j
[max{j + l − n, 0}+ min{l, n− j}β(j)]
}
, (11.5)
where β(j) :=
j
j + 1
w(j + 1)
w(j)
.
The previous expression partially matches the result in [MR14, Thm. 6], where the
authors used a different approach to obtain a bound on the price of anarchy for the larger
class of coarse correlated equilibria, but limitedly to fSV and singleton problems. More
precisely, [MR14, Thm. 6] provides a bound of the price of anarchy relative to fSV,
as the minimum between two expression. While their first expression exactly matches
(11.5), the second one is not present here. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that such
additional expression is redundant, as the first one is always the most constraining.1
This allows us to conclude that the bound obtained in [MR14, Thm. 6] precisely matches
the one in (11.5). Additionally, since our result is provably tight for the class of Nash
equilibria, and the result in [MR14] provides a lower bound for CCE, such bound is tight
as well (in the set of CCE) and the worst performing coarse correlated equilibrium is,
simply, a pure Nash equilibrium.
For the submodular welfare case considered here, it is still possible to determine the
distribution rule f ? that maximizes PoA(f) as the solution of a tractable linear program
either directly employing the more general result in Theorem 10 or using the following
linear program derived from (11.2), which additionally constrains the admissible distri-
1This statement is not formally shown here, in the interest of space. Its proof amounts to showing
that the second expression appearing in [MR14, Thm. 6] is always upper bounded by (11.5), thanks to
the concavity of w.
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butions f to satisfy f(j) ≥ fMC(j) and f(j)w(j) to be non increasing,
f ? ∈ arg min
f∈Fs, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ w(l) + jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + (n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and j + l ≥ n ,
(11.6)
where Fs = {f ∈ F | f(j) ≥ fMC(j), f(j + 1)w(j + 1) ≤ f(j)w(j) ∀j ∈ [n]}. Extensive
numerical simulations have shown that both these approaches return the same optimal
value, so that the additional constraints f ∈ Fs required in (11.6) do not rule out the
optimal distribution derived solving the linear program in Theorem 10. This statement
can be formally proved, for example, by showing that any distribution rule satisfying the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system of the LP in (11.6) is also a solution to the KKT
system of the LP in Theorem 10. We do not further purse this direction here.
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Figure 11.1: Comparison between the approximation ratio (11.11) and the price of an-
archy of the optimal distribution rule f ? (determined as the solution of the LP in The-
orem 10), Shapley value fSV and marginal contribution fMC distribution rules. The
problems considered features |N | ≤ n = 20 agents and a welfare basis of the form
w(j) = jd with d ∈ [0, 1] represented over the x-axis.
Figure 11.1 compares the price of anarchy (and thus the approximation ratio of any
algorithm capable of computing a Nash equilibrium) of the Shapley value, marginal
contribution and optimal distribution rule f ?, in the case when w(j) = jd with d ∈ [0, 1],
|N | ≤ 20. They have been computed using respectively (11.3), (11.4), where f ? has been
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determined as the solution to the LP appearing in Theorem 10. For values of d ∈ [0.5, 1]
the Shapley value distribution rule performs close to the optimal, but its performance
degrades for d ∈ [0, 0.5] and for d = 0 it reaches the lower bound of 1/2, as predicted for
the class of valid utility games defined in [Vet02, Thm. 5]. The marginal contribution
rule instead, performs the worst amongst the considered distribution rules. While f ?
will always perform better or equal than any other distribution, it is unclear if, and to
what extent, fSV outperforms fMC in the general settings. The expressions in (11.3) and
(11.4) can nevertheless be used to provide an answer to this question.
11.1.1 Improved approximation and comparison with
existing result
In this section we compare the approximation guarantees offered by the utility design
approach with other recent result in the maximization of submodular functions.
A monotone submodular maximization problem is defined as follows. We are given
a set X, and a collection of subsets S ⊆ 2X . Given a monotone and submodular set
function g : 2X → R≥0, the objective is to find a set s ∈ S maximizing g. If the collection
of subsets S is a matroid, we term the problem a monotone submodular maximization
problem subject to matroid constraints. For the latter class of problems, the best ap-
proximation ratio achievable in polynomial time has been very recently shown to be
[SVW17]
1− c
e
, (11.7)
where c represents the curvature of the welfare function and e the Euler’s number. The
curvature is formally defined as [CC84]
c := 1− min
e∈X
g({e})−g(∅)6=0
g(X)− g(X \ {e})
g({e})− g(∅) (11.8)
For this class of problems, no polynomial time algorithm can do better than (11.7) on
all instances, even if the matroid is the uniform matroid, i.e., in the case of cardinality
constraints [SVW17]. The GMMC problems studied here differs from the problem of
maximizing a submodular function subject to matroid constraints, in that we are given
not one, but n collections of sets. Thus, to compare the approximation results, in the
following we restrict to GMMC problems where Ai = Aj = A¯ ⊆ 2R. We allow for some
set to appear multiple times in A¯ so as to cover the case when different agents select the
same set. The objective is to select n subsets from A¯ so as to maximize W as defined
in (8.1). The problem can be transformed in a monotone submodular maximization
problem subject to cardinality constraints. To do so, let us enumerate all the subsets as
in A¯ = {A1, . . . , Ak}. We set X := [k], S = 2[k] and identify with s = (s1, . . . , sl) ∈ [k]l
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an element of S (note that l ≤ k). We define g : 2X → R≥0 for any s ∈ S as
g(s) :=
∑
r∈(∪jAsj )
vrw(|s|r) , (11.9)
where |s|r = |{i s.t. r ∈ Asi}|. Selecting n subsets (n ≤ k) from A¯ to maximize W (a) is
then equivalent to solving
max
s∈S, |s|≤n
g(s) . (11.10)
The problem in (11.10) belongs to the class of monotone submodular maximization
subject to cardinality constraints. Indeed, g(s) is monotone and submodular due to
Assumption 11. Additionally the number of elements in s is constrained to be less or
equal to n. Thus, the approximation ratio (11.7) holds for (11.10). The curvature can
be determined using (11.8), and amounts to c = 1 +w(n− 1)−w(n).2 In Figure 11.1 we
plot the approximation ratio (11.7) for the class of problems considered here, with the
choice of w(j) = jd, i.e., we plot (red curve) the quantity
App = 1− 1 + w(n− 1)− w(n)
e
, (11.11)
for d ∈ [0, 1]. We observe that the optimal distribution rule f ? outperforms (11.11) for
different values of d, so that, when there exists an algorithm capable of computing a
Nash equilibrium in polynomial time (see Proposition 17), the approach presented here
gives improved guarantees compared to (11.7).
Remark 14. It is important to note that this is not in contradiction with the inap-
proximability result presented in [SVW17], as we are not solving a general submodular
maximization problem, but the welfare function in (11.9) has a special form.
11.2 Covering problems
In this section we specialize the previous results to the case of multiagent weighted max-
imum coverage (MMC) problems introduced in Section 8.3, a generalization of weighted
maximum coverage problems. In a MMC problem we are given a ground set of elements
R and n collections of subsets of the ground sets: Ai for i ∈ N . The goal is to select n
subsets, one from each collection, so as to maximize the total value of covered elements.
The corresponding welfare is
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vr ,
2This value of the curvature constitutes the worst case value amongst all possible GMMC problems
introduced in Section 8.2. The reason to consider the worst case curvature over all problem instances
(i.e., over all possible choices of A¯ and {vr}r∈R) is that we wish to compare the approximation ratio
(11.7) with the game theoretic approximation, and the latter gives a certificate over all possible instances.
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which is obtained with the choice of w(j) = 1 for all j in (8.1) and (10.1). MMC
problems are a subclass of GMMC submodular problems (they satisfy Assumption 10),
and are used to model engineering problems such as vehicle-target assignment [AMS07]
and sensor allocation problems [MW08]. Due to their importance in the applications,
we treat their study separately.
Relative to MMC problems, we provide a general expression for the price of anarchy
as a function of f (Theorem 12) and show how this reduces to the results obtained in
[Gai09; RPM17], under the additional assumptions therein required.
Theorem 12 (PoA for multiagent maximum coverage). Consider MMC problems, i.e.,
fix w(j) = 1 ∀j ∈ [n]. The price of anarchy is PoA(f) = 1/W ? where
W ? = 1 + max
j∈[n−1]
{(j + 1)f(j + 1)− 1, jf(j)− f(j + 1), jf(j + 1)}, (11.12)
or equivalently
W ? = min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ (j + 1)f(j + 1)
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1)
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j + 1) ∀j ∈ [n− 1].
(11.13)
The previous theorem gives a simple and explicit way to compute the price of anarchy
(10.3) as the maximum between 3(n − 1) numbers. Observe that no assumptions are
required other than the Standing Assumptions. Theorem 12 thus extends the previous
bounds derived in [Gai09; RPM17]. In the latter works, the authors required the distri-
bution rules to be non increasing and sub budget-balanced, i.e., jf(j) ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [n].
The next corollary shows how the result in the previous theorem matches the results
in [Gai09; RPM17], simply requiring f to be non increasing (this is a less restrictive
assumption than what asked for in [Gai09; RPM17]).
Corollary 5. Consider f a non increasing distribution rule. The value of (11.12) is
given by
W ? = 1 + max
j∈[n−1]
{jf(j)− f(j + 1), (n− 1)f(n)} . (11.14)
In [Gai09, Thm. 2] the author provides a bound matching the expression in (11.14).
Tightness of the previous bound is shown in [RPM17, Thm. 1]. Additionally, [Gai09,
Eq. 5] also determines the distribution rule maximizing the price of anarchy (11.14).
The optimal distribution, denoted with fG, has already been introduced in (10.5) and is
reported in the following for completeness
fG(j) = (j − 1)!
1
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n−1
i=j
1
i!
1
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n−1
i=1
1
i!
, j ∈ [n] .
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In all the above mentioned results the feasible set of distribution rules is limited to
jf(j) ≤ 1 and f non increasing. Using the result provided here in Theorem 12 it is pos-
sible to determine the optimal distribution without imposing these additional constraints
on f by solving the following LP derived from (11.13)
arg min
f∈F , µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ (j + 1)f(j + 1)
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1)
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j + 1) ∀j ∈ [n− 1].
(11.15)
Numerical simulations have shown that the optimal distribution rule obtained optimizing
(11.12) precisely matches the one derived in [Gai09], so that removing the additional
assumption required therein does not improve the best achievable price of anarchy.3
Remark 15 (Matching the 1 − 1/e of [NWF78]). Relative to MMC problems, [Gai09]
explicitly determines the value of the price of anarchy for the optimal distribution fG.
It’s value amounts to (see Theorem 7)
PoA(fG) = 1− 11
(n−1)(n−1)! +
∑n
i=0
1
i!
n→∞−−−→ 1− 1
e
.
This shows that for MMC problems (a generalization of weighted maximum coverage
problems) one can obtain the same approximation guarantee achievable for weighted max-
imum coverage problems and first shown in [NWF78].
11.3 The case of supermodular welfare function
In this section we consider welfare basis functions that are non-decreasing and convex,
resulting in a monotone and supermodular total welfare W (a). Applications featuring
this property include clustering and image segmentation [SK10], power allocation in
multiuser networks [Yas+17]. In the following we explicitly characterize the price of
anarchy for the class of supermodular resource allocation problems as a function of f
(Theorem 13), extending [JM18; PM17b]. Additionally, we show that the Shapley value
distribution rule maximizes this measure of efficiency (recovering the result in [JM18;
PM17b]), but is not the only one.
Assumption 11. Throughout this section we assume that f(1) = w(1) = 1 and that w
is a non-decreasing and convex function, i.e.,
w(j + 1) ≥ w(j) ,
w(j + 1)− w(j) ≥ w(j)− w(j − 1) ∀j ∈ [n− 1] .
3This statement con be proved, by showing that the distribution fG solves the KKT system of (11.15).
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Theorem 13 (PoA for supermodular welfare). Consider a distribution rule f such that
f(j)w(j) ≥ 1 ∀j ∈ [n]. It holds
PoA(f) =
n
w(n)
1
maxj∈[n] jf(j)
.
Additionally, fSV is optimal amongst f ∈ F and achieves
PoA(fSV) =
n
w(n)
.
Observe that the Shapley value and all the distribution rules for which jf(j) ≥ 1
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 13. Indeed f(j)w(j) ≥ jf(j) ≥ 1 by convexity and
Standing Assumptions. Further note that the Shapley value distribution rule is not the
unique maximizer of PoA(f). Indeed, all the distribution rules with 1/w(j) ≤ f(j) ≤ 1/j
are optimal, as the previous theorem applies and they achieve a price of anarchy of
n/w(n) since it is maxj∈[n] jf(j) = 1 (due to f(1) = 1 and f(j) ≤ 1/j). Figure 11.2
compares the price of anarchy of the Shapley value, marginal contribution and optimal
distribution rule, in the case when w(j) = jd with d ∈ [1, 2], |N | ≤ 20. First, we observe
that any optimal distribution rule and fSV give the same performance, as predicted from
the previous theorem. Additionally, we observe that the quality of the approximation
quickly degrades as the welfare basis w gets steeper (d gets larger). This is due to the
fact that if w(n) grows much faster than n, the quantity n/w(n) quickly decreases.
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Figure 11.2: Price of anarchy comparison between the optimal distribution rule f ? de-
termined as the solution of the LP in Theorem 10, Shapley value fSV and marginal
contribution fMC distribution rules. The problems considered features |N | ≤ 20 agents
and a welfare basis of the form w(j) = jd with d ∈ [1, 2] represented over the x-axis.
140
11.4 Appendix
11.4.1 Proofs of the results presented in Section 11.1
Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. Observe that the value of W ? in (11.1) can be equivalently reformulated as in
the following program, upon observing that for j + l ≤ n it holds min(j, n− l) = j and
min(l, n−j) = l, while for j+l > n it holds min(j, n−l) = n−l and min(l, n−j) = n−j,
W ? = min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ w(l) + jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1)
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + (n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and j + l > n .
In the following we prove that the latter program follows from Corollary 3 by showing
that only the constraints with l ≤ j are required, and that the decision variable λ
in (10.11) takes the value λ? = 1. First, notice that f(j)w(j) is assumed to be non
increasing, and so W ? can be correctly computed using Corollary 3. For j = 0, the
constraints in (10.11) read as
λ ≥ w(l)
l
∀ l ∈ [n] ,
and the most binding amounts to λ ≥ 1, due the to concavity of w. For j 6= 0, we intend
to show that the constraints with l > j appearing in (10.11) are not required since those
with j = l are more binding. The following figure explains this more clearly.
j
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1
Figure 11.3: The proof amounts to showing that for any constraint identified with the
indices (j, l) and l > j (circles), the constraint (j, j) is more binding (crosses).
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To do so, we divide the discussion in two cases: l + j ≤ n and l + j > n.
Case 1. When 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n we want to show that for any l > j and λ ≥ 1
1 + λ
j
w(j)
[f(j)w(j)− f(j + 1)w(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
j
w(j)
f(j)w(j)− l
w(j)
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
]
,
where the left hand side is obtained setting l = j. This is equivalent to showing
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1)w(j + 1) ≤ 0 . (11.16)
By concavity of w and l > j, one observes that
w(l) ≤ w(j + 1) + (w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j − 1) = w(j) + (w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j)
and since l − j > 0, w(j + 1)− w(j) ≥ 0, λ ≥ 1, it holds
w(l) ≤ w(j) + λ(w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j). (11.17)
Using inequality (11.17), one can show that (11.16) has to hold
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
≤ w(j) + λ(w(j + 1)− w(j))(l − j)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
= λ(l − j)(w(j + 1)− w(j)− f(j + 1)w(j + 1)) ≤ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds because f(j+1)w(j+1) ≥ w(j+1)−w(j) (by assumption)
and l > j. Observe that the previous inequality is never evaluated for j = n, as there is
no l ∈ [n] with l > j = n.
Case 2. We now consider the case j+ l > n. Here we intend to prove that for any l > j
and λ ≥ 1
1 + λ
n− j
w(j)
[f(j)w(j)− f(j + 1)w(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
n− l
w(j)
f(j)w(j)− n− j
w(j)
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
]
,
where the left hand side is obtained setting l = j. The latter is equivalent to
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j)w(j) ≤ 0.
Similarly to (11.17), one can show that
w(l) ≤ w(j) + λ(w(j)− w(j − 1))(l − j),
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and get the desired result as follows
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j)w(j)
≤ w(j) + λ(w(j)− w(j − 1))(l − j)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j)w(j)
= λ(l − j)(w(j)− w(j − 1)− f(j)w(j)) ≤ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds because f(j)w(j) ≥ w(j)−w(j−1) (by assumption) and l > j.
The two cases just discussed showed that W ? in (10.11) can be computed as
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1)]
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1)]
∀j, l ∈ [n]0 s.t. j ≥ l and j + l ≥ n,
Every constraint appearing in the previous program is indexed by (j, l) and can be
compactly written as µw(j) ≥ bjl + ajlλ, upon defining bjl := w(l) and consequently
ajl :=
{
jf(j)w(j)− lf(j + 1)w(j + 1) 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
(n− l)f(j)w(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)w(j + 1) j + l ≥ n.
Consequently W ? can be computed as
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ bjl + ajlλ ∀j, l ∈ [n]0, s.t. j ≥ l, j + l ≥ 1 .
As previously seen, for j = 0 the most binding constraint is λ ≥ 1. Observe that,
when j ≥ 1 and j ≥ l, it holds ajl ≥ 0. Indeed, since f(j)w(j) is non increasing, for
1 ≤ j+l ≤ n one has ajl = jf(j)w(j)−lf(j+1)w(j+1) ≥ (j−l)f(j)w(j) ≥ 0. Similarly
for j + l ≥ n. Thus, the optimal choice is to pick λ as small as possible, i.e., λ? = 1.
Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. The proof is an application of Theorem 11.
(a) Observe that fSV satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 11 in that f(j)w(j) =
w(j)/j is non increasing (due to concavity of w) and fSV(j) = 1/j ≥ 1−w(j)/w(j − 1)
⇐⇒ w(j − 1) + j(w(j)− w(j − 1)) ≥ 0 (due to positivity and non-decreasingness
of w). Hence the result of Theorem 11 applies and substituting f(j) = 1/j gives
W ?SV as in the claim.
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(b) Observe that fMC satisfies the assumption of Theorem 11 in that f(j)w(j) =
w(j)−w(j − 1) is non increasing (due to concavity of w) and f(j) = 1− w(j−1)
w(j)
so
the second condition is satisfied too.
We conclude by proving that the constraints indexed with l < j ∈ [n] are not
needed and it is enough to consider j = l ∈ [n], so that W ?MC is as given (11.4). To
do so, we show that for any constraint with l < j the constraint with l = j is more
binding.
For l < j and j + l ≤ n we want to prove that
1 + λ
j
w(j)
[f(j)w(j)− f(j + 1)w(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
j
w(j)
f(j)w(j)− l
w(j)
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
]
,
where the left hand side is obtained setting l = j. The previous is equivalent to
w(l)− w(j) + λ(j − l)f(j + 1)w(j + 1) ≤ 0 ,
and since f(j + 1)w(j + 1) = w(j + 1)− w(j), it reduces to
w(l)− w(j) + (j − l)(w(j + 1)− w(j)) ≤ 0 . (11.18)
By concavity of w and l < j, it holds that w(j) ≥ w(l) + (j − l)(w(j + 1)− w(j))
and thus (11.18) follows.
In the case of l < j and j + l > n we intend to show
1 + λ
n− j
w(j)
[f(j)w(j)− f(j + 1)w(j + 1)] ≥
w(l)
w(j)
+ λ
[
n− l
w(j)
f(j)w(j)− n− j
w(j)
f(j + 1)w(j + 1)
]
,
which reduces to
w(l)− w(j) + (j − l)(w(j)− w(j − 1)) .
The latter follows by concavity of w. Hence, the price of anarchy of fMC is governed
by W ? as in Theorem 11, where we set f = fMC and fix j = l. This gives the
following expression
W ?MC = 1 + max
j∈[n]
{
min(j, n− j)
[
fMC(j)− fMC(j + 1)w(j + 1)
w(j)
]}
,
which reduced to the expression for W ?MC in the claim, upon substituting fMC with
its definition.
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11.4.2 Proofs of the results presented in Section 11.2
Proof of Theorem 12
Proof. The proof is a specialization of the general result obtained in Theorem 9 to the
case of set covering problems. We divide the study in three distinct cases, as in the
following
C1 :
{
a+ x = 0
b+ x 6= 0 C2 :
{
a+ x 6= 0
b+ x = 0
C3 :
{
a+ x 6= 0
b+ x 6= 0
In case C1 it must be a = x = 0, b 6= 0 and the constraints read as
λ ≥ 1
b
.
The most binding one is obtained for b = 1, i.e., it suffices to have λ ≥ 1 in order to
guarantee λ ≥ 1/b. In case C2 it must be b = x = 0, a 6= 0. The constraints read as
µ ≥ λaf(a) ∀ a ∈ [n].
In case C3, since a+ x 6= 0 and b+ x 6= 0, the constraints become
µ ≥ 1 + λ[af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)] .
If x = 0, then a, b > 0 and the previous inequality reads
µ ≥ 1 + λ[af(a)− bf(a+ 1)] a+ b ∈ [n], .
The most constraining inequality is obtained for b taking the smallest possible value,
that is b = 1. Thus 0 < a ≤ n− 1. Consequently when x = 0, it suffices to have
µ ≥ 1 + λ[af(a)− f(a+ 1)] ∀a ∈ [n− 1] .
If x 6= 0, the most binding constraint is obtained for b = 0. In such case, 0 < a+ x ≤ n
and the constraints read as
µ ≥ 1 + λaf(a+ x) ∀a ∈ [n] .
For ease of readability, we introduce the variable j := a + x and use j and x instead of
a and x. With this new system of indices the feasible region becomes 0 < j ≤ n and
j − x ≥ 0, x > 0. The latter set of constraints read as
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − x)f(j)
and the most binding is trivially obtained for x = 1, reducing the previous to
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − 1)f(j) ∀ j ∈ [n] .
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This guarantees that the program in (10.10) is equivalent to
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. λ ≥ 1
µ ≥ λjf(j) j ∈ [n]
µ ≥ 1 + λ(jf(j)− f(j + 1)) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − 1)f(j) j ∈ [n] .
Amongst the last three sets of constraints, the tightest constraint always features a
positive coefficient multiplying λ. Indeed the only term multiplying λ that could take
negative values is jf(j) − f(j + 1), but every time this is negative, the constraints
µ ≥ 1 + λ(j − 1)f(j) are tighter. It follows that the solution consists in picking λ as
small as possible, that is in choosing λ? = 1. The program becomes
W ? = min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ jf(j) j ∈ [n]
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + (j − 1)f(j) j ∈ [n] .
We conclude with a little of cosmetics: the first and third set of inequalities run over
j ∈ [n], while the second one has j ∈ [n − 1]. Observe that the first and the third
condition evaluated at j = 1 read both as µ ≥ 1. This condition is implied by the last
set of condition with j = 2, indeed it reads as µ ≥ 1 + f(2) ≥ 1 since we assumed f non
negative. Thus the first and third conditions can be reduced to j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Shifting
the indices down by one, we get
W ? = min
µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ (j + 1)f(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1]
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j + 1) j ∈ [n− 1] ,
from which we get the analytic expression in (11.12), i.e.,
W ? = 1 + max
j∈[n−1]
{(j + 1)f(j + 1)− 1, jf(j)− f(j + 1), jf(j + 1)} .
Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 12, the value W ? and consequently the price of anarchy can
be computed as
W ? = max
j∈[n−1]
{(j + 1)f(j + 1), 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1), 1 + jf(j + 1)} .
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We will show that when f is non-increasing, fewer constraints are required, producing
exactly (11.14).
First observe that f being non-increasing implies (j+1)f(j+1) = f(j+1)+jf(j+1) ≤
f(1) + jf(j + 1) = 1 + jf(j + 1), so that the first set of conditions is implied by the
third. Hence
W ? = 1 + max
j∈[n−1]
{jf(j)− f(j + 1), jf(j + 1)} .
We now verify that the first set of remaining conditions implies all the conditions in the
second set, but not the last one:
µ ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1) ≥ 1 + jf(j)− f(j) = 1 + (j − 1)f(j) ,
∀j ∈ [n − 1] that is, all conditions µ ≥ jf(j + 1) are satisfied for j ∈ [n − 2]. Thus, it
suffices to require µ− 1 ≥ jf(j)− f(j + 1) and µ− 1 ≥ (n− 1)f(n) for all j ∈ [n] and
the result in (11.14) follows.
11.4.3 Proofs of the results presented in Section 11.3
Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. The proof is a specialization of the general result obtain in Theorem 9. We divide
the study in the same three cases used for the proof of Theorem 12.
In case C1, the constraints read as
w(b)− λb ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ λ ≥ w(b)
b
,
the most constraining of which is given for b = n as w(b) is convex. Thus it must be
λ ≥ w(n)
n
.
In case C2, the constraints read as
λaf(a)w(a) ≤ µw(a) ⇐⇒ µ ≥ λaf(a).
In case C3, the constraints read as
µ ≥ w(b+ x)
w(a+ x)
+ λ
[
af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)
w(a+ x)
]
.
In order to conclude, we will show that the constraints obtained from C1 and C2 imply
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all the conditions stemming from C3. To do so observe that
w(b+ x)
w(a+ x)
+ λ
[
af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+ x+ 1)
w(a+ x)
]
=
1
w(a+ x)
[
w(b+ x)− λbw(a+ x+ 1)f(a+ x+ 1)
]
+ λaf(a+ x)
≤ 1
w(a+ x)
[
λ(b+ x)− λb · f(1)w(1)
]
+ λaf(a+ x) =
1
w(a+ x)
xλ+ λaf(a+ x)
≤λxf(a+ x) + λaf(a+ x) = λ(a+ x)f(a+ x)
From first to second line is rearrangement. From second to third is due to f(a + x +
1)w(a+ x+ 1) ≥ w(1)f(1) = 1 and to w(b+ x) ≤ w(n)
n
(b+ x) ≤ λ(b+ x) where the first
inequality holds because of convexity of w and the second inequality follows from C1,
i.e., from λ ≥ w(n)
n
. From third to fourth is rearrangement. From fourth to fifth is due
to w(a+ x)f(a+ x) ≥ f(1)w(1) = 1 =⇒ f(a+ x) ≥ f(1)w(1)
w(a+x)
.
The previous series of inequalities have demonstrated that if µ ≥ λaf(a) as required
by condition C2, and if λ ≥ w(n)n as required by condition C1, then µ ≥ λ(a+x)f(a+x) ≥
w(b+x)
w(a+x)
+ λ
[
af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)w(a+x+1)
w(a+x)
]
, i.e., conditions C3 are all satisfied.
It follows that W ? and consequently the price of anarchy is easily obtained as
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µ ≥ λjf(j) ∀j ∈ [n]
λ ≥ w(n)
n
.
The solution is given by λ? = w(n)
n
, µ? = λ? maxj∈[n] jf(j), which gives a price of anarchy
of
PoA(f) =
n
w(n)
1
maxj∈[n] j · f(j) .
Amongst all the distribution rules satisfying f(j)w(j) ≥ 1, the distribution fSV is op-
timal. This follows from the fact that maxj∈[n] j · fSV(j) = 1 is the smallest achievable
value since f(1) = 1. To conclude that fSV is optimal not only over all distributions
with f(j)w(j) ≥ 1 but also over all distributions f ∈ F it suffices to observe that [JM18,
Lem. 7.2] constructs an instance showing that n/w(n) is the best attainable price of
anarchy independently of what f is used.
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CHAPTER 12
Applications
As set forward in the introduction of Chapter 8, our objective was to obtain efficient and
distributed algorithms for the solution of GMMC problems. We decided to follow a game
theoretic approach and studied the utility design problem in Chapter 10 and Chapter 11.
More precisely we have developed a general theory to compute and optimize the price of
anarchy as a function of the chosen utility functions. In the following we do not tackle
the algorithm design component (the second component of the game design approach
of Figure 8.1), as there are readily available algorithms capable of determining a Nash
equilibrium in a distributed fashion (see Section 9.2 for the best-response algorithm,
and its complexity). In this chapter we demonstrate the applicability of our results to
the vehicle target allocation problem (Section 12.1), and to the problem of distributed
caching in mobile networks (Section 12.2). We provide thorough simulation results and
show the theoretical and numerical advantages of our approach. The results presented
in this chapter have been published in [PM18b].
12.1 The vehicle target allocation problem
In this section we consider the vehicle target assignment problem introduced in [Mur00]
and studied, e.g., in [AMS07; MR14]. We are given a finite set of targets R, and for each
target r ∈ R its relative importance vr ≥ 0. Additionally, we are given a finite set of
vehicles N = {1, . . . , n}, and for each vehicle a set of feasible target assignments Ai ∈ 2R.
The goal is to distributedly compute a feasible allocation a ∈ A so as to maximize the
joint probability of successfully destroying the selected targets, expressed as
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vr(1− (1− p)|a|r),
where (1− (1− p)|a|r) is the probability that |a|r vehicles eliminate the target vr and the
scalar quantity 0 < p ≤ 1 is a parameter representing the probability that a vehicle will
successfully destroy a target. In the forthcoming presentation, it is assumed that the
success probability p is the same for all vehicles, else one would have to define a different
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pi for every vehicle i ∈ N . Observe that the welfare considered here has the form (8.1)
with welfare basis (1 − (1 − p)|a|r). We normalize this quantity (without affecting the
problem’s solution) so that w(1) = 1 and thus define
w(j) =
1− (1− p)j
1− (1− p) . (12.1)
Observe that (12.1) satisfies the Standing Assumptions, and Assumption 11 in that
w(j) > 0 and w(j) is increasing and concave. Thus, it is possible to compute the perfor-
mance of any set of utility functions of the form (10.1) using Theorem 9, and to further de-
termine the optimal distribution rule f ? ∈ F by solving a corresponding linear program.
Figure 12.1 shows the achievable approximation ratios for the Shapley value, marginal
contribution, optimal distribution, as well as the approximation bound in (11.11). We
observe that the optimal distribution rule significantly outperforms all the others as well
as the bound (11.11) for non trivial values of p. For the extreme case of p = 1, f ?
matches (11.11), while for small p all the design methodologies offer a similarly high
performance guarantee. Figure 12.2 shows the distribution rules fSV, fMC and f
? for the
choice of p = 0.5.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p
PoA(fSV)
PoA(fMC)
PoA(f ?)
App
Figure 12.1: Price of anarchy and approximation ratio comparison between the optimal
distribution rule f ?, the Shapley value distribution rule fSV, the marginal contribution
distribution rule fMC, and (11.11). The problems considered feature |N | ≤ n = 10
vehicles and w(j) = 1−(1−p)
j
1−(1−p) with 0 < p ≤ 1 represented over the x-axis.
In both Figures 12.1 and 12.2 we have set the number of agents to be relatively
small1, i.e., |N | ≤ n = 10. This choice was purely made so as to perform an exhaustive
1Similar trends and conclusions can be obtained with larger values of n.
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j
f(j)
fSV
fMC
f ?
Figure 12.2: Distributions fSV, fMC and optimal distribution f
? obtained solving the LP
in Theorem 10 for the specific choice of w(j) in (12.1) with |N | ≤ n = 10 and p = 0.5.
search simulation in order to test the provided bounds displayed in Figure 12.1. More
specifically, we considered 105 random instances of the vehicle target assignment problem.
Each instance features n = 10 agents, n + 1 resources and fixed p = 0.8. Each agent is
equipped with an action set with only two allocations, whose elements are singletons, i.e.,
|ai| = 1. We believe this is not restrictive in assessing the performance, as the structure
of some worst case instances is of this form [RPM17].
Observe that any constraint set Ai where feasible allocations are singletons is the
bases of a uniform matroid of rank one, see Example 3. Further note that computing a
single best response is a polynomial operation in the number of resources. Thus, the best
response algorithm will converge polynomially to a Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 17)
and so the performance guarantees offered by PoA are easy to achieve.
The structure of the constraints sets Ai and the values of the resources are ran-
domly generated, the latter with uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1]. For this class
of problems considered, the theoretical worst case performance is PoA(fSV) ≈ 0.568,
PoA(fMC) ≈ 0.556, PoA(f ?) ≈ 0.688 (see Figure 12.1 with p = 0.8). For each instance
G generated, we performed an exhaustive search so as to compute the welfare at the worst
equilibrium mina∈ne(G) W (a) and the value W (aopt). The ratio between these quantities
(their empirical cumulative distribution) is plotted across the 105 samples in Figure 12.3,
for fSV, fMC, f
?. In the same figure the vertical dashed lines represent the theoretical
bound on the price of anarchy, while the markers represent the worst case performance
occurred during the simulations.
First, we observe that no instance has performed worse than the corresponding price
151
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
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Figure 12.3: Cumulative distribution of the ratio mina∈ne(G) W (a)/W (aopt) for fSV, fMC,
f ? across 105 samples. The dashed lines represent the theoretical value of PoA(fSV),
PoA(fMC), PoA(f
?) while the corresponding markers identify the worst case performance
encountered during the simulations.
of anarchy, as predicted by Theorem 9. Second, we note that the worst case performance
encountered in the simulation is circa 15% better than the true worst case instance.2 Fur-
ther, the optimal distribution f ? has outperformed the others also in the simulations. Its
worst case performance is indeed superior to the others (markers in Figure 12.3). Addi-
tionally, the cumulative distribution of f ? lies below the cumulative distributions of fSV
and fMC (for abscissas smaller than 0.95). This means that, for any given approximation
ratio r ∈ [0, 0.95], there is a smaller fraction of problems on which f ? performs worse or
equal to r, compared to fSV and fMC. Observe that this is not obvious a priori, as f
? is
designed to maximize the worst case performance and not the average performance.
12.2 Distributed caching
In this section we consider the problem of distributed data caching introduced in [Goe+06]
as a technique to reduce peak traffic in mobile data networks. In order to alleviate the
growing radio congestion caused by the recent surge of mobile data traffic, the latter
work suggested to store popular and spectrum intensive items (such as movies or songs)
in geographically distributed stations. The approach has the advantage of bringing the
2Recall that our results in Theorems 8 and 9 are provably tight: there exists at least one instance
achieving exactly an efficiency equal to the price of anarchy.
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content closer to the customer, and to avoid recurring transmission of large quantities
of data. Similar offloading techniques, aiming at minimizing the peak traffic demand
by storing popular items at local cells, have been recently proposed and studied in the
context of modern 5G mobile networks [And13; De +17]. The fundamental question
we seek to answer in this section is how to geographically distribute the popular items
across the nodes of a network so as to maximize the total number of queries fulfilled.
In the following we borrow the model introduced in [Goe+06] and show how the utility
design approach presented here yields improved theoretical and practical performances.
We consider a rectangular grid with nx × ny bins and a finite set R of data items.
For each item r ∈ R, we are given its query rate qr ≥ 0 as well as its position in the grid
Or and a radius ρr. A circle of radius ρr centered in Or represents the region where the
item r is requested. Additionally we consider a set of geographically distributed nodes
N (the local cells), where each node i ∈ N is assigned to a position in the grid Pi. A
node is assigned a set of feasible allocations Ai according to the following rules:
i) Ai ⊆ 2Ri , where Ri := {r ∈ R s.t. ||Or − Pi||2 ≤ ρr}. That is, r ∈ Ri if the
(euclidean) distance between the position of node i and item r is smaller equal to
ρr.
ii) |Ai| ≤ ki, for some integer ki ≥ 1.
In other words, node i can include the resource r in his allocation ai only if he is in the
region where the item r is requested (first rule), while we limit the number of stored
items to ki for reasons of physical storage (second rule).
3 The situation is exemplified in
Figure 12.4.
The objective is to select a feasible allocation for every node so as to jointly maximize
the total amount of queries fulfilled
max
a∈A
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
qr .
In order to obtain a distributed algorithm, [Goe+06] proposes a game theoretic approach
where each agent is given a Shapley value utility function, i.e., they assign to agents
utilities of the form (10.1), where f(j) = fSV(j) = 1/j.
In the following we compare the results of numerical simulations obtained using fSV
or the optimal distribution f ? = fG defined in (10.5). The following parameters are
employed. We choose nx = ny = 800, |N | = 100, |R| = 1000. The nodes and the
data items are uniformly randomly placed in the grid. The query rate of data items
is chosen according to a power law (Zipf distribution) qr = 1/r
α for r ∈ [1000].4 The
3Similarly to what discussed for the application in Section 12.1, it is possible to reduce the problem to
the case whereAi are the bases of a matroidMi, so that Proposition 17 applies here too. Once more com-
puting the best response is a polynomial task (it amounts to sorting qrw(|a|r)f(|a|r) and picking the ki
first items). Thus the best-response dynamics introduced in Algorithm 5 converges in polynomial time.
4Typical query rate curves has been shown to follow this distribution, with α ∈ [0.6, 0.9], see [Bre+99].
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12
Or
⇢r
nx
ny
Figure 12.4: The nodes 1 and 2 can include the item r in any allocation, i.e., r ∈ R1
and r ∈ R2 since the distance from nodes 1 and 2 to Or is less than ρr.
radii of interests are set to be identical for all items ρr = ρ = 200. We let α vary in
[0.7, 0.9]. We consider 105 instances of such problem, and for every instance compute a
Nash equilibrium by means of the best response algorithm. Given the size of the problem,
it is not possible to compute the optimal allocation and thus the price of anarchy. As a
surrogate for the latter we use the ratio W (ane)/Wtot, where a
ne is the Nash equilibrium
determined by the algorithm and
Wtot :=
∑
r∈R
qr
is the sum of all the query rates and thus is an upper bound for W (aopt). Observe that
Wtot is a constant for all the simulations with fixed α, indeed Wtot =
∑
r≤1000
1
rα
and
thus serves as a mere scaling factor. The theoretical price of anarchy is PoA(fSV) = 0.5
(tight also when the query rates are Zipf distributed [Goe+06]) and PoA(f ?) = 1 −
1/e ≈ 0.632, see Theorem 7. Figure 12.5 compares the quantity W (ane)/Wtot for the
choice of fSV and f
?, across different values of α. First we observe that the worst cases
encountered in the simulations are at least 10% better than the theoretical counterparts.
Further, for each fixed value of α, there is a good separation between the performance
of fSV and f
?, in favor of the latter. This holds true, not only in the worst case sense
(markers in Figure 12.5), but also on average. As α increases from 0.6 to 0.9, the
worst case performance seems to degrade for both fSV and f
?. Nevertheless, since we
are using W (ane)/Wtot as a surrogate for the true price of anarchy, it is unclear if the
previous conclusion also holds for W (ane)/W (aopt). Figure 12.6 presents a more detailed
comparison between fSV and f
? for a fixed value of α = 0.7 over all the 105 instances.
Relative to this case, Figure 12.7 describes the (distribution of) number of best response
rounds required for the algorithm to converge. Quick convergence is achieved, with a
number of best response rounds equal to 11 in the worst case. Observe that in every
best response round all players have a chance to update their decision variable, so that
a total number of nBR rounds amounts to n·nBR individual best responses.
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Figure 12.5: Box plot comparing the performance of the best response algorithm on 105
instances for the choice of distributions fSV and f
?, across different values of α. On each
plot, the median is represented with a red line, and the corresponding box contains the
25th and 75th percentiles. The (four) worst cases are represented with crosses.
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Figure 12.6: Distribution of W (ane)/Wtot on 10
5 instances for fixed α = 0.7.
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Figure 12.7: Distribution of the number of best response rounds required for convergence
on 105 instances, α = 0.7.
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CHAPTER 13
Conclusions and outlook
13.1 Part I: strategic agents
In the first part of the thesis we considered large scale systems composed of self-interested
agents and modeled their strategic interaction using the language of game theory. Mo-
tivated by the special structure arising in different real-world applications, we focused
on average aggregative games, i.e., games where the cost function of each agent depends
solely on his decision and on the average population strategy. The setup considered al-
lows for multidimensional decision variables, heterogenous private constraints, and global
constraints coupling the decision variables of the entire population.
Our research agenda was aimed at i) understanding the performance degradation
due to selfish decision making, and ii) designing scalable algorithms to guide agents
towards an equilibrium configuration. Towards these goals, we first exploited the theory
of variational inequalities to reduce both the Nash equilibrium problem and the Wardrop
equilibrium to common ground. This allowed to study the efficiency of a Nash equilibrium
allocation through the analysis of the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium counterpart.
In this respect, we provided conditions on the agents’ cost functions that either guarantee
the efficiency of the equilibria, or provide meaningful bounds on the efficiency loss. We
concluded Part I proposing two decentralized schemes to coordinate the agents towards
a Nash or Wardrop equilibrium and discussed under which conditions their convergence
is guaranteed. Our findings have been tested on a coordination problem arising in the
charging of electric vehicles and on a selfish routing model used in road traffic network.
13.1.1 Further research directions
Non average aggregative games
In Part I of this thesis we focused on average aggregative games. While this class of games
has recently attracted the attention of the researchers, we believe that many problems
within the general framework of (non average) aggregative games are still open. As an
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example, the problem of designing distributed algorithms for network aggregative games
has been considered only very recently.1 More broadly, it is unclear to what extent
the aggregative structure helps in providing results such as existence and uniqueness of
the equilibria under weaker assumptions than what usually imposed on non aggregative
games. There are few works addressing this question and their results are limited in
their scope, for example to scalar valued aggregator functions [Jen10].
Uncertain games and receding-horizon implementations
Within the framework studied in this thesis, we focused on the case of deterministic
games. Nevertheless, there has been recent interest both in the areas of optimization
and equilibrium theory to incorporate the effect of uncertainty. This desire stems from
the observation that a large portion of nowadays decision making happens in face of un-
certainty. As a concrete example, consider that of a car driver on a road network. While
his goal might entail reaching the desired destination as swiftly as possible, his decisions
are based on uncertain knowledge of the congestion he will encounter further ahead on
the network. In this respect one can envision at least two future research directions.
First, one could consider stochastic aggregative games where the aggregate function
is subject to common uncertainty. The fundamental question one needs to ask is what
it means to be an equilibrium configuration. In the simplest scenario, one can think of
an equilibrium as a stable configuration of the game constructed with the expected costs.
Most of the results presented in connection with the variational reformulation of Chap-
ter 4 hold with minor modifications, and one could use algorithms derived from the theory
of stochastic variational inequalities to compute one such equilibrium [YNS17; RW17].
As second research direction, one could consider receding-horizon implementations of
the schemes proposed here. While some of the applications presented in this thesis were
of dynamic nature (e.g., the charging coordination for a fleet of electric vehicles), we
have been able to model them as single-stage decision problems. This has been possible
due to the exact knowledge of the agents’ dynamics. As this is hardly the case in a real
world scenario, one might consider receding-horizon implementations of the single-stage
problems considered here. This research direction follows the same spirit with which
model predictive control is used in uncertain dynamic optimization problems [GPM89].
Non monotone games
Most of the results derived in the first part of the thesis were based on the assumptions
of Lipschitzianity and monotonicity of the variational inequality operator (or variations
thereof such as strong monotonicity, or co-coercivity see Section 3.1). In this regard, a
1In a network aggregative game each agent is represented with a node on a graph, while his cost func-
tion is influenced by his decision and by a linear combination of the decision variables of his neighbours.
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long term research goal is that of weakening the monotonicity assumption. While this
direction would have great impact (there are many situations in which the monotonicity
property is not satisfied), there seem to be a fundamental roadblock that needs to be
resolved or circumvented before embarking on this route. Indeed, as we have seen in
Chapter 3, game theory is a generalization of single agent decision making and hence
contains the field of optimization as a special case. Thus, the study of non monotone
variational inequalities requires a better understanding of non convex optimization first.
While there has been a recent surge of interest in other classes of continuous functions
that produce tractable optimization problems (e.g., continuous submodular functions),
we feel that this direction is currently underdeveloped.
13.2 Part II: programmable machines
In the second part of the thesis we studied a class of combinatorial resource allocation
problems arising in various applications connected to multiagent systems and machine
learning. More precisely, we considered a setup where a large number of cooperative
agents need to select a subset of resources from a common set, with the objective of
jointly maximizing a given welfare function. In the considered setup, the welfare function
was assumed to be additive over the resources and to be anonymous with respect to the
agent identities. An example of problem satisfying these requirements is the well-known
and studied weighted maximum coverage.
Since the class of problems investigated is computationally intractable (NP-hard),
our goal was to derive distributed algorithms that run in polynomial time and achieve
near-optimal performances. We approached the problem from a game-theoretic perspec-
tive and aimed at assigning a local utility function to each agent so that their selfish
maximization recovers a large portion of the desired system level objective. Towards this
goal, we presented a novel framework for the characterization of the equilibrium efficiency
(price of anarchy). More precisely, for a given set of utilities, we showed that the prob-
lem of computing the worst-case equilibrium efficiency can be posed as a tractable linear
problem. This result might be of independent interest to the community concerned with
the study of the price of anarchy. We then leveraged the linear programming reformula-
tion to resolve the question previously posed, i.e., to design local utilities that maximize
such performance metric. The importance of this results stems from the observation
that any algorithm capable of computing a Nash equilibrium would naturally inherit an
approximation ratio matching the corresponding equilibrium efficiency. Surprisingly, the
optimal price of anarchy (the price of anarchy achieved by optimally designed utility
functions) matches or outperforms the guarantees available for many commonly used
algorithms. We validate our results with two applications: the vehicle-target assignment
problem and a coverage problem arising in distributed caching for mobile networks.
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13.2.1 Further research directions
Different equilibrium notion
As discussed in the introduction of Chapter 8, the game design approach for the ap-
proximate solution of an optimization problem amounts to the design of three elements:
equilibrium concept, agents’ utilities and corresponding learning algorithm. While all
the efficiency results presented in this thesis are limited to the notion of pure Nash equi-
librium, one might be interested in using a different equilibrium concept. As a matter of
fact, the choice of pure Nash equilibria originated from the fact that their efficiency is
the highest possible. Unfortunately, pure Nash equilibria are intractable to compute in
general (see Figure 9.1 for the tradeoff between complexity and efficiency). The way we
resolved this issue was by assuming that {Ai}Ni=1 are the sets of bases for a matroid, so
that the best-response algorithm converges in a polynomial number of steps (Proposi-
tion 17). Instead, coarse correlated equilibria are tractable to compute in general. Thus,
an interesting research direction is to understand whether the efficiency bounds obtained
for pure Nash Equilibria extend to coarse correlated equilibria. Nevertheless, the perfor-
mance guarantees offered by coarse correlated equilibria are in expected value, and one
would have to understand how to derandomize the corresponding solution efficiently (if
at all possible).
Non-anonymous agents
The results derived in this thesis are relative to welfare functions of the form (8.1)
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪ai
vrw(|a|r) .
We observe that the key ingredient that allowed to reduce the computation of the price
of anarchy to a tractable linear program is the indistinguishability of the agents (also
called anonymity in the following), see the proof of Theorem 8. Formally, the agents are
anonymous if any allocation a = (a1, . . . , an) and any other allocation obtained as a per-
mutation of the former have the same welfare. While it is very much unclear if and how
to extend the current results to the case of non-anonymous agents, we remark that this
will greatly expand the number of applications that could benefit from this approach.
The tradeoff between anarchy and stability
Throughout Part II of this thesis, we assessed the quality of an algorithm with its worst
case performance over a set of instances. This is a common approach to study the
performance of an algorithm as it gives a bound that requires no information on the
distribution of inputs and holds instance by instance. Nevertheless, an interesting and
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underdeveloped question is whether optimizing the worst-case performance comes at the
cost of other performance metrics. In relation to the problem studied in this thesis, a
different and more optimistic metric to quantify the equilibrium efficiency is known as
price of stability. With the same notation previously used, the price of stability can be
defined as
PoS(f) := inf
G∈Gf
(
maxa∈ne(G) W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
)
.
Informally, the price of stability bounds the performance of the best equilibrium over all
the possible instances in the set Gf . While preliminary results have shown that there is
a fundamental tradeoff between the price of anarchy and the price of stability in specific
classes of problems [RPM17; FGL18], this research direction warrants further exploration
as it would provide an additional guiding principle in the design of efficient algorithms.
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